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**ESSAYS IN COMMON
SENSE PHILOSOPHY**

By the same Author

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF MODERN SCIENCE

Published by the Oxford University Press

MATTER, LIFE AND VALUE

INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION TO MODERN POLITICAL THEORY

Messrs Ernest Benn

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MIND AND MATTER

ETC.

ESSAYS IN
COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY.

by

C. E. M. JOAD

With a new Introduction

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PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

THE publication of a new edition of *Essays in Common Sense Philosophy* is not intended to imply, at any rate in the view of its author, an exaggerated opinion of the book's merits. It is neither a landmark in thought nor a monument to the creativity of the human spirit. On the contrary, it is, it is obvious, an immature book—in point of fact it was the first I wrote on philosophy or on any other subject—and it was impossible, given that one's mind was to develop at all, that it could rest indefinitely in the miscellany of somewhat unco-ordinated positions which it is the purpose of the following pages to maintain.

The miscellany and the lack of co-ordination were, of course, in part deliberate. I held fifteen years ago that the universe was to be regarded not, as most philosophers had supposed, as a coherent system expressive of an underlying unity, but rather as a collection of irreducibly different elements which happened to co-exist in various relations with each other. The collection could not, I thought, be credited with purpose, and the fact of co-existence was not symptomatic of an underlying ground plan. If this view was right, it was obviously not the business of philosophy to seek to present a unified picture of reality, since reality was in no sense a unity. All that the philosopher could do was to offer fruitful observations upon certain specific problems, and, in the light of the past history of philosophy, it was a matter neither for surprise nor regret, if these observations were mainly of a critical and negative order. I accordingly selected those problems upon

which I believed that I had something of interest to say and made no apology for leaving the others alone.

For thus allowing my selection of topics for discussion to be conditioned by no principle less arbitrary than my desire to discuss them, I found justification in the arguments of contemporary Realists. Fifteen years ago the realist reaction from the imposing idealist systems of the nineteenth century was at its height, and I had been taught by Bertrand Russell that philosophers were entitled to isolate their problems, to attack them piecemeal and to do their best to find out what could and could not be truly asserted in regard to the problems thus isolated without necessarily seeking to fit their observations into the framework of some general concept of the nature of reality. The axiom of external relations, I thought (see Chapter II)—and still think—was valid, and it was possible to throw light upon some of the dark places of traditional philosophical controversy, while remaining content to leave others comparatively obscure.

While I still hold many of these beliefs, I no longer feel disposed to maintain that the universe is a *mere* collection of events to be catalogued, or to urge as a corollary that any metaphysical system which seeks to bring the multiform variety of the world within the framework of a unifying principle is bound to be wrong. On the contrary I believe, and in subsequent books have tried to show,* that

* e.g. in *Matter, Life and Value* (Oxford University Press) and *Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd.)

the universe is one in which a principle of life, animating matter and knowing it, seeks so to develop and refine its powers of conscious awareness that it may come at last to apprehend a world of value. The evolution of life is, in fact, a purposive process, which, beginning with the awareness of matter on the part of living organisms—currents of life temporarily insulated from the main stream by their association with a material body—may end in continuous and untrammelled contemplation of value by a consciousness which, having discarded individuality as it has superseded the need for it, has become pure universal. A universe so conceived is still plural; it contains, that is to say, three distinct constituents, matter, life and value. But, though plural, it is purposive; there is purpose in the development of life towards its goal, and the three realms of being are brought into relationship by life's passage through matter to value.

To a universe so conceived the title of system may be not illegitimately applied; it may even be described as purposive. In this sense, then, and to this extent, I am no longer disposed to maintain the view that the cosmos is a mere collection or miscellany, and that the task of philosophy is, therefore, confined to discovering what may and may not be truly asserted in regard to isolated issues. I still believe that philosophy may achieve valuable results by tackling its problems piecemeal, and that true conclusions in regard to particular issues are true in and by themselves and not merely partially true aspects of truth as a whole; but I have in the main

come to share the traditional assumption of the great philosophers that it is at least *possible* for philosophy to divine the nature of the whole. I would go further and maintain that the endeavour to comprehend the universe at large and not a departmentalised aspect of it is *par excellence* the function of philosophy.

A claim put forward in the original Introduction is that the essays in this book present an essentially common sense view of things, that is to say, a view not in essentials radically different from that of unreflecting common sense. According to this view the universe consists pre-eminently of a number of material objects extended in space existing in independence not only of the mind that knows them but of any mind, and revealed in the process of perception more or less as they really are. The universe, common sense concedes, may include other things as well, mind and possibly spirit, beauty and moral obligation ; but these "contents" are by no means so clear and certain as the physical objects which so insistently impose themselves upon the senses. That this view of unreflecting common sense need not be entirely discredited by philosophy, that it may, indeed, with certain modifications derive support from philosophical reasoning, is the contention advanced in the first essay. This contention again I can no longer endorse. That the objects of perception are independent of the mind that knows them, that perception is in essence revelatory, a process in which the mind adds nothing to what it perceives,

these assertions I still believe to be true, but that the objects we perceive by means of our senses are those which common sense calls physical objects cannot, I now hold, be consistently maintained. The objects of the mind's direct apprehension in sensory experience are, I think, sense data—such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses and so on. The things which common sense calls objects do not, I believe, belong to the physical world but to a world of subsistence. They possess, that is to say, being of the kind ascribed in Chapter V to universals, and they are apprehended not by the senses but directly by the mind in just the same way as that in which, as the essay in question maintains, the mind directly apprehends universals, such as squareness, redness and justice. Whereas the awareness of the animal mind, and, I am inclined to think, of that of a newly-born baby, is confined to the apprehension of sense data, the distinguishing achievement of life at the level at which it has evolved in adult human beings is, I should say, just this capacity for being aware of a world other than the physical, and among the inhabitants of this world are, I hold, to be found those entities which are known to common sense as physical objects. This at first sight is a somewhat startling contention, and I can, therefore, no longer maintain the claim put forward in this book that the view of the universe which philosophy countenances accords in the main with the instinctive prepossessions of common sense.

It is obvious that the divergences of view just

indicated are too considerable to be reconciled by a process of wholesale addition to, deletion from and modification of the text. I have, therefore, decided to republish the book as it stands without any attempt at re-writing. I have endeavoured in subsequent books, *Matter, Life and Value* and *Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science*, to set out the grounds for my departures from the positions advocated in this one, and it seems better to let this collection of philosophical essays stand on their own somewhat unpretentious merits as a fairly representative expression of a school of Realism to which a number of philosophers were inclined to subscribe in the not very distant past.

From this point of view *Essays in Common Sense Philosophy* is not, I venture to think, wholly without interest. It is an unpretentious work, reacting no less in manner than in matter from the rather high-falutin way of writing philosophy adopted by the nineteenth-century Idealists to expound and sustain the magnificent structures of their *a priori* speculation. The reaction is, I think, indubitably a relief. Its merits are those of clarity and conciseness. The essays in this book are always clear, even when they are clearly wrong; and, if their conclusions are often unexciting enough, the refusal to soar is at least an effective safeguard against the erection of those top-heavy structures which a little logic from Cambridge has generally contrived to send toppling from their insecure foundations. Withal *Essays in Common Sense Philosophy* is reasonably pleasant and easy to read. It does not substitute obscurity of expression,

which is only a name for bad craftsmanship, for the expression of obscurity, which is another name for philosophy, and, if it is never inspired, it is, so far as I can see, never nonsense. To match these merits of manner, there are, I think, at least two of matter. There are, that is to say, two issues in regard to which the developments of Realism during the last fifteen years have endorsed rather than superseded the intimations of this book. The first is the issue between Realism and Idealism. The second chapter is in intention a criticism of the Hegelian type of objective Idealism, the influence of which was still dominant though diminishing at the time when it was written. The criticism concentrates upon the axiom of internal relations and endeavours to show that the arguments for supposing that the universe is a unity are far from conclusive. The universe, it is asserted, is not one thing but many things linked together by relations which are no less real than the terms they relate. This criticism is developed in Chapter III and applied to the problem of truth. The view that truth is coherence of ideas is shown to be open to serious objection, and arguments are adduced for the realist view that it resides in correspondence between belief and fact—between, that is to say, the judgments made by a mind and the non-mental facts which the judgments assert. The introduction of the word “facts” raises the second issue.

The world I have submitted contains many different things. These, I now add, belong to fundamentally different orders of being. That

there are mental things and physical things (or events, if the word be preferred) is a plain corollary of the refusal to accept either Materialism or Idealism, but in addition to these there are, it is now suggested, such things as facts. The number Two, it is obvious, is not a physical thing, any more than the fact that two and two make four is physical. Yet both the number and the fact are real constituents of the universe.

And the second question in regard to which *Essays in Common Sense Philosophy* still seems to me to be substantially right is that of the nature of these non-mental and non-physical facts Chapter V seeks to establish the independent being of universals as the basis of Realism. Such entities as justice, squareness, whiteness do, it asserts, really belong to the universe. Their mode of being is, admittedly, different from that of the physical world, and to indicate this difference they are said to subsist rather than to exist, but as subsistent objects they own a being no less authentic than that of just acts, square things and white things. Not only so but, as Plato maintained, they are independent of the actions and objects which they characterise. This belief in the reality and independence of the world of subsistence I have consistently maintained in subsequent books; indeed, I have added to its contents, including therein, as I hinted above, the entities which under the name of physical objects we normally regard as inhabiting the physical world.

Now these suggestions have been the source of one of the most fruitful developments of modern Realism. While its theory of perception has become entangled in a mass of difficulties, difficulties touching the status of the body, the relation of sense data to physical objects, and the relation of both to the world of vibrations and particles affirmed by the physicists, from which it seems at times impossible that it should extricate itself, and its epistemology has, under the influence of the Cambridge School of logicians, developed—or subsided—into an elaborate logical technique which requires its exponents to abandon the claim of philosophy to give us information about the universe in favour of undertaking “the logical clarification of thought”—philosophy cannot, we are warned, tell us what the universe is like, or means, it can only tell us more precisely what *we* mean, when we say that the universe is like this or like that—the development of Conceptual Realism has been encouraging and continuous.

In particular, Professor W. P. Montague in *The Ways of Knowing** has founded an impressive metaphysic upon the tentative and incomplete considerations which, following Meinong and Brentano, I had sketched in Chapter V as the basis of a Conceptual Realism. I do not mean to suggest that Professor Montague's important book owes anything to my immature work; it is, indeed, exceedingly unlikely that he has ever read it. But I cannot refrain from pointing out, or forgo my

satisfaction in being able to point out, that I have here independently emphasised certain considerations which were to play an important part in the later development of realist metaphysics. Yet, even so, the most I can claim is that I was one of a number who, as often happens in the development of thought, were struck about the same time by the force of certain considerations which had previously been ignored or under-rated. A number of us had begun, in fact, to look at the problem of universals in a new way, which was, nevertheless, substantially Plato's way.

The feeling of satisfaction deepens as I come to a re-reading of Chapter IV. For the development of Conceptual Realism, to which I have referred, has resulted in what is at once its *raison d'être* and its culmination, the rehabilitation of Value. If Value, as a recent writer has said, is the central problem of modern philosophy, it is largely the insistence of modern Realists upon the independent objectivity of such concepts as beauty and goodness that have made it so. Here I was in the thick of the movement. The inspiration for the chapter on Beauty was drawn in almost equal measure from G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*, with its claim for the unique and unanalysable character of goodness, and Plato's *Symposium*, which makes what is in essence a similar claim for beauty. It was only later that I found the line of thought which I had been following applied with immense effect to the problem of æsthetic criticism and valuation in Clive Bell's book *Art*.

It is in relation to beauty that the argument for the absoluteness and objectivity of Values is here worked out, but the same considerations might, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to truth or goodness. Since this chapter was written, a series of publications has placed the problem of Value in the forefront of philosophical attention, and of these the most important, Wilbur Urban's *The Intelligible World*,* Hartmann's *Ethics*,* and, dare I add, Whitehead's *Science in the Modern World*—for are not "the eternal objects" simply Plato's Forms in another guise?—have taken substantially the same line as that which I here ventured to follow. Concurrently there has been, in reaction to the relativism and subjectivism of the age, what amounts to a renaissance of Platonism. Values, it is coming increasingly to be agreed among philosophers, are not things latent in the mind of man, to be projected for his comfort and assurance upon the canvas of an essentially valueless universe, but real and independent factors in the world, which, dimly and uncertainly apprehended, are yet recognised as the goal of life's pilgrimage through matter in quest of them.

Here, then, are two important subjects, the criticism of Hegelian Idealism and the theory of subsistence, with its corollary, the objective and independent reality of Values, in regard to which *Essays in Common Sense Philosophy* still seems to me to be substantially right. And not only right, but in its immature way a harbinger of

developments to come. That it was a landmark, I repeat I cannot claim, but it was a stage which represented with some degree of faithfulness the contemporary thinking of a school, even if it were only a stage in an advance which was to supersede it.

And the applications of its doctrines are enlivening. Distinctly so. My heart goes out to the essay on "The Idealist Theory of the State," which, written under the shadow of the war, sought to bring home to the Hegelian Idealism against which it was in revolt the responsibility for generating an intellectual climate as congenial to war as a heat-wave to a thunderstorm. There is no word of that essay that I would wish to retract, I could wish only that the movement which at the time of writing has crystallised in Germany, a movement which is more antagonistic to the development of the individual and to the environment of social freedom in which alone the developed individual can realise his full nature than the pre-war Prussianism against which the essay was directed, may evoke from others a reaffirmation of its principles in the light of this new menace. The State was made for man, not man for the State. The fact is obvious, yet there is none more frequently overlooked, or overlooked at greater cost.

The last essay, on "Thought and Temperament," is in the nature of a *jeu d'esprit*. It goes, I can now see, too far in its representation of reason as the tool and the sport of the non-rational elements in human personality: the psycho-analysts were shortly

to go even further. But, apart from its inherent liveliness, it has interest as a straw which shows the direction of the wind. That wind was soon to become a hurricane battering down man's front of rationality, dethroning reason and will and conscience from their seats and sweeping them into the dustbin of the unconscious, mere débris on the flood of Freudian irrationalism.

C. E. M. JOAD.

Hampstead, 1933.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION	- - - v
INTRODUCTION TO FIRST EDITION	- - - 7
I. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SENSIBLE OBJECTS	- - - 13
II. MONISM IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENTS	- - - 47
III. THE MEANING OF TRUTH	- - - - - 79
IV. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE CONCEPT OF BEAUTY	- - - - - - - 106
V. UNIVERSALS AS THE BASIS OF REALISM	- - - - - 131
VI. COMMON SENSE AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE	- - - - - - - 159
VII. THOUGHT AND TEMPERAMENT	- - - - - 221

INTRODUCTION TO FIRST EDITION

THE essays in this book are an attempt to present the cardinal points of a common sense philosophy.

The quarrel between the "plain man" and the philosopher is of long standing. The "plain man" regards the philosopher as a spinner of academic sophistries which have no relation to the world, as he—the plain man—knows it, or as a student in blinkers who overlooks the truth under his nose, and goes into the byways and hedges to find unintelligible evidence for his complicated theories of Reality.

The philosopher regards the "plain man" as an unreflecting fool, shut up within the walls of his five senses, who refuses to admit the existence of anything of which his superficial understanding does not inform him, and who glibly uses words such as goodness, beauty, truth and reality, without the vaguest notion of the meanings he attaches to them. If the philosopher lights a torch to see the sunrise, the plain man sees the reflections of a half-penny dip and calls them the sun.

The following essays are, I suppose, sufficiently philosophic to seem singularly like nonsense to the plain man. At the same time they are sufficiently akin in spirit and conclusions to the plain man's view of the everyday world as we know it, to appear pedestrian and unsatisfying to most philosophers.

The history of philosophy has been, on the whole, the history of an attempt to synthesise and unify

the multitudinous conflicting appearances of the world of sense into a correlated self-explanatory whole, which can preferably be regarded as the embodiment of a deliberate design and purpose. Philosophy has found a world of scattered bricks and has heroically tried to supply the mortar to fit them into a house.

In the opinion of the writer this attempt has been on the whole a failure, and it has been a failure because Reality is not a synthesised organic whole, but simply a collection or aggregate of different things without apparent design or structure.

The world undoubtedly presents to the plain man such an appearance. It is possible, and to the writer it appears probable, that this appearance does not belie its real nature.

If this is the true state of the case a very great deal of the philosophy that has been written is beside the point. Philosophy becomes simpler if less sufficing, and the salient matters can be treated of more shortly and less ambitiously than most philosophers have treated them.

Much Philosophy has been little more than a clever essay in imperceptibly varying the meaning of well-known words. Once the meaning of important words such as sensible objects, truth, and beauty has been ascertained, or rather once we have determined in what respect it cannot be ascertained, our task is done.

For we have not to represent a system. There is no system in the commonly accepted sense of

the word to present. We have only to state what seems to us the truth about some of the most important matters that philosophers have discussed. And this is the explanation of a question which might easily present itself to the reader of these essays, namely why in the world just those particular subjects are discussed which are discussed, instead of and in preference to a number of others.

Why for instance is there an essay on the meaning of truth and no essay on the meaning of causality ?

The answer, as suggested above, lies in the presumption that if the world is not an interrelated teleological whole serving some definite end, if consciousness is not a uniquely significant phenomenon within it, the number of things to be ascertained and the number of remarks to be made both about the world and consciousness is considerably reduced. And as metaphysics consists in the endeavour to ascertain the truth about the world, and logic in the endeavour to ascertain the truths about consciousness or human knowledge of the world, the scope both of logic and metaphysics becomes very largely confined to pointing out why the claims of philosophers to have found out important truths tending as a rule to indicate system and purpose in the world and in our knowledge of it, are inadmissible claims.

On the positive side there remain certain important questions about which something fairly definite must and can be said, if only to justify the assertion

that, nothing *more* and nothing *more* definite can be said.

These important questions seem to the writer to be the following.

First, the nature of our knowledge of physical objects, whether there are indeed physical objects to be known, and whether we can ever know more than our own knowledge about them.

Secondly, the question of the relations that appear to exist between these objects, and whether those relations are real or imaginary; whether in fact the Universe is ultimately to be regarded as a perfect indivisible whole, or rather as a box containing many different and separate contents.

Thirdly, the meaning of truth, the test by which our knowledge is to be judged.

Fourthly, the nature of beauty and of æsthetic enjoyment.

Fifthly, the nature of those entities other than physical objects that have their place in the constitution of the Universe, entities variously called concepts, universals, and forms, and the nature of our knowledge of these entities.

I have also attempted to apply what I would call the common sense method in philosophy to current theories as to the nature of the State, with the object of discrediting that German theory of the State which idealises the entity called the State at the expense of other associations.

The final essay discusses the extent to which our thought and knowledge is free, how far our

reasons operate unchecked according to their own laws, and how far they are slaves to the rest of the man, being given us only to enable us to invent plausible theories, excuses and justifications for what we instinctively wish to do.

It is not pretended for one moment that even on the writer's premises the above comprise all the subjects about which something of importance can be said. They present however the salient features of a philosophy of which the main function seems to be to throw doubt on the conclusions of others.

The New Realism I am afraid seems a pedestrian and commonplace affair enough after the ambitious edifices reared by the Idealist systems against which it is very largely a reaction.

In attempting to square with the facts and to give countenance to the beliefs of common sense, it loses much of the dignity and comprehensiveness of other philosophies, and is termed unphilosophical. And there is no doubt that it has taken much of the stuffing out of philosophy ; it confines it in scope and function, it regards many of the problems it has attempted and even claimed to solve as insoluble, at any rate by philosophy ; it even restricts the number of questions about which philosophy may claim to have a say.

As a consequence it is regarded by adherents of the old systems as at best devoid of interest, and at worst as something of a traitor to the cause.

Philosophy has a hard time enough of it in these days, when men tumble over each other in their admiration for its old enemy science, and that philosophers themselves should belittle the importance and restrict the functions of philosophy, seems like treachery within the gates.

But philosophy is, after all, only one of the means by which we seek for truth, and truth is more important than the manner of our search of it.

If therefore we come to the conclusion that the road which has been followed by most philosophers is not the road which we should follow, our defection must be regarded not so much as an affront to philosophy, but rather as one more sacrifice on that altar of truth which philosophy herself professes to serve.

Chapter I. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SENSIBLE OBJECTS

BY sensible objects I mean the common objects of the every day world, tables, chairs, eggs, roses, etc., which the plain man believes to exist, and with which he believes himself to be acquainted by means of his five senses

Many philosophers, perhaps the majority, have doubted whether such objects can be said to exist at all except as affections of mind, or at least of some divine mind. Practically all philosophers have believed that even if such objects can be said to exist independently of any mind, and to be non-mental in structure, we can nevertheless have no knowledge of them as they really are: we know in fact only their appearances, and their appearances may be quite different from the real nature of the object. A few philosophers, including those who are called the "New Realists" believe that these objects exist independently of us and that we know their nature approximately as it really is.

I propose in this essay to state what appear to me to be the main alternatives in regard to the problem of our knowledge of external objects, and to indicate certain arguments in favour of the view that sensible objects exist independently and that the knowledge of them given by our senses is not illusory; that they exist in fact very much as we know them.

[The views which philosophers have taken of this problem appear to be reducible to three main attitudes, commonly known as Representationalism, Subjective Idealism, and Realism.]

Innumerable modifications of these views exist, but all these modifications appear to me on analysis to reduce themselves to one or other of these three main theories]

It will be convenient to examine each of these theories separately.

I.

[Representationalism is a view prominently advocated in the Philosophy of Descartes. Locke also was a representationalist ;] and I shall try to show later that the views of such different philosophers as Bradley, Lotze and Stout, all resolve themselves into forms of this supposedly outworn and discredited theory as regards their attitude to our knowledge of sensible objects.

[The theory of Representationalism is based upon a certain psychological theory of sensation]

From objects which are perceived there emanate modes of energy, called in the language of modern scientists, transverse vibratory motions propagated longitudinally, or electro-magnetic waves ; these impinge upon the optical nerve and through it imprint upon the brain a picture or image of the object causing the waves.

[The mind, which is passive throughout the whole process, perceives these pictures or images

thrown as it were upon a bright screen in a dark room, and it is these images which form the subject matter of all sensory knowledge.

Each of these images, which are commonly called ideas, is distinct and isolated.

"All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, among which the mind never perceives any real connection," said Hume, who also believed in this psychological account of the machinery of sensation.

(Now it is to be noted that this theory of perception involves three distinct entities :

The knowing mind (A), the idea or image known (B), and the physical object which is regarded as being the cause of the idea or image (C).

(A) knows (B), but does not, and never can know (C). Now although (A) cannot know (C), most representationalists agree in regarding (C) as like (B). Descartes believed in what he calls "the agreement of our ideas with reality" apparently on the ground that the trustworthiness of God warrants our believing in the existence of what we clearly conceive, and we conceive an apple to be like our idea of an apple.

Locke regarded our ideas as more or less exact copies of the things to which they refer, the world of ideas constituting a body of representations of real things.

The defect of this view is obvious.

All Representationalist theories have this in common, that they conceive of a third entity, a

textum quid as it is called, intervening between the knowing mind and the physical object.

What is known is never the physical object but always the idea or image.

But if we do not know the physical object we do not know anything about it. We do not know its attributes, its qualities or its powers. We do not know that it has the quality of being like the image, or even the power of causing the image, and we can only assume that it exists : we cannot know this.

Berkeley saw this clearly. "How can we possibly know," he asked, "whether our ideas agree with what *ex hypothesi* cannot be known at all?"

Locke himself, although maintaining at times that physical objects were like ideas, felt there was a flaw somewhere, and evolved his idea of "substance," which by bowdlerising the world of objects of all knowable qualities, made his view that the mind can never know them less improbable.

According to this view, all secondary qualities, such as colour and heat, are stripped from the physical world, and all that we are left with is some support or substratum to the qualities in the object which produce ideas in us.

We can never know what this support is, and it must of necessity be featureless, being "the same everywhere," but Locke conceives that we are driven logically to the assumption that it must exist. As a matter of fact we are driven logically

cease to exist when we cease to perceive them. They continue to exist because they are still known by mind, though not by our minds. They are known by the mind of God, who puts them into our minds.

How does Berkeley arrive at God? We have no experience of God, and no idea of Him. Therefore we can only know God *a priori*. But this conclusion is logically inadmissible on Berkeley's premiss which is that we can only know what we experience. Similarly, with the self, Berkeley assumes that it is the same "I" which at different times knows different ideas. But we do not experience any idea of the continuity of self. Therefore the self also is known *a priori*. Berkeley says that we have a "notion" of the self. The "notion" is not an idea but an inference from ideas. But Berkeley started with the assumption that we know only our own ideas.

One more step, therefore, was required to carry the position to its logical conclusion. This was taken by Hume. Berkeley knocked out Locke's substance or matter. Hume knocked out Berkeley's two illogical postulates, namely, God and The Self.

We are then left with known ideas only, continually flowing modifications of a discontinuous consciousness, and we come to Solipsism or the belief that an individual's given psychical state is the only thing that exists in the Universe.

Like all extreme theories this has a gratifying

simplicity and on the psychological premises from which it starts is logically irrefutable. There is, however, not the slightest reason to suppose it to be true.

(Against it may be urged the fundamental axiom of the realist position that the "act of knowing necessarily involves an object to be known, which is other than the knowing of it.")

I will, however, return to this point when I come to consider what I have called the Realist alternative to the above position.

III.

It has been said above that practically all the theories which have been advanced as to the nature of our knowledge of sensible objects reduce themselves to one of the three main types of Representationalism, Subjective Idealism, or Realism.

This may appear to be a somewhat extreme statement. I believe, however, that a very large proportion of modern Idealist theories exhibit on analysis the fundamental Representationalist or *tertium quid* attitude, that Representationalism dogs the footsteps of psychologists like Mr. Stout, and that the Pragmatical Bergsonian view of perception founded upon the new psychological view of sensation as a continuum which in William James' writings supersedes the psychological atomism of Hume and Berkeley is also tainted with Representationalism.

(The typical attitude of the modern Idealist with regard to perception is admirably expressed by Lotze.)

"The entire flow of sense presentations," says Lotze, "is an inner occurrence in our mind, and all sound and brightness are forms of the appearance under which we are conscious of the effects of stimuli quite otherwise constituted."

Now by sense presentations Lotze meant what is before the mind in the act of knowing or perceiving. The machinery of perception involves for him in the first place an excitation of the nervous system by presumably external stimuli, followed by an impression produced by this excitation upon the soul. This impression upon the soul becomes or is identical with, I am never quite sure which, a mental state, which is, or becomes in the long run, the mental activity which we call perceiving. The mind, however, never knows or perceives the presumably external stimuli. The "appearances" which form the subject matter of knowledge are the excitations of the nervous system. This is Representationalism unblushing. Once again we have the three entities, knowing mind (A), excitation of nervous system which is known, (B); and stimuli which cause excitation, but which are not known, (C). But, as before, if we cannot know (C), how can we know that (C) causes (B), or indeed that (C) exists at all

Consider the views of a later representative of this school.

(It is an admitted fact that we think we perceive books, and the more we consider a book the fuller does our knowledge of the book perceived appear to us to become.

For Mr. Joachim, however, "The more adequate knowledge of a book is not an accumulation of judgments of perception, but a revolution in which the book is swept away, and determinate connections between determinate universal concepts are substituted.")

This may be so. I do not wish to deny the truth of this statement, but (if it is so, then it does not appear that the reality which is assumed to underlie the book is ever perceived by the senses)

Once more we have three entities. Knowing mind (A), certain sensations which appear to us to be those caused by a book, and are known (B), and determinate connections between determinate universal which underlie and are the cause of these sensations (C).

But if we perceive (B) by means of the senses, knowing (B) to be illusory and never perceive (C), but infer its existence by *a priori* reasoning, how are we to link on (C) to (B), and how in particular are we to know that the supposed reality (C) causes the appearance (B) ?

This difficulty appears to me to be involved in all Monistic theories of perception.

According to these theories, according to Mr. Bradley's view, for instance, the appearances of things that are known to us through the senses,

are as different as they can be from the Reality which underlies and causes them. This reality is in point of fact always one and the same, namely the Absolute, but we have no direct knowledge of the Absolute. We know it partially, inferring its existence and nature by means of logical reasoning. But if we do not know the Absolute, how do we know that the objects presented to sense are appearances of it? When we assume the existence of the Absolute, we assume among other things, that it has the power of causing the appearances with which we are acquainted by means of our senses. (But this must remain an assumption, just as Locke's "substance" remained an assumption, while the Absolute is unknown or only partially known, and the Absolute is, in point of fact, only dragged in, because the appearances presented to the senses, being regarded as illusory, cannot therefore exist in their own right, and require a substratum or support in some unknown Reality in order that the otherwise inexplicable fact of their being presented to us may be explained. We experience never the Absolute but always its appearances. Until, however, we know the nature of the latter we cannot know that it has the quality of causing the appearances which we experience.

Let us now turn to an entirely different account of perception, that given by Mr. Stout.

Mr. Stout's account of perception as given in the Third Edition of the Manual, is briefly as follows :

The physical objects of sense as we know them

appear to be distinguished by qualitative differences. That is to say coal and cream appear to us to be distinguished among other things by the fact that the coal is black and the cream white. Mr. Stout believes that the objects in question are in fact distinguished by these qualitative differences of colour, *i.e.*, that the coal is black and the cream white, but that the blackness and whiteness of these objects is not identical with the blackness and whiteness perceived by us. The blackness inherent in coal in fact, Mr. Stout calls a "sensible quality." The quality of blackness we perceive when we look at the coal, is called a "sensation." This distinction is introduced by Mr. Stout because "If a buttercup is seen by the margin instead of the centre of the retina, or if it is seen by a colour-blind instead of by a normal person, or if it is seen by twilight instead of by daylight, or if contrast comes into play, the quality presented in viewing it is changed, but none the less the buttercup remains a yellow buttercup." "Sensible qualities" therefore remain constant; "sensations" change, and change rapidly, being in fact dependent upon changes in the perceiver.]

[Presented "sensations" are, according to Mr. Stout, immediately experienced or lived through. He speaks of them at times as "being in the mind." By this he appears to mean that the act of experiencing these "sensations" is a piece of personal mental history, and is not other than the sensations experienced. At any rate, [the "sen-

sations" are that which is immediately known, and they are mental.

Here again we appear to detect the three entities in perception which are revealed in the Philosophy of Locke and Descartes.

There is the knowing mind (A), the sensation apprehended (B), and the sensible quality inherent in the object which is supposed to cause the sensation (C).)

Mr. Stout, it is true, tries to evade this analysis, by running (A) and (B) into one another and speaking as if the sensation is one with the act of apprehending. But if this is so, it is a little difficult to see what is in fact apprehended, as the object of apprehension is certainly not (C).

(In no case therefore do we know directly the qualities of the physical world or indeed the physical world at all, for, as Aristotle showed, all objects can be analysed into the list of qualities they exhibit.

If, therefore, we never know (C), how can we know that it causes (B), and so on as before?)

In fact, Mr. Stout seems to be in the following dilemma.

If (B) is the same as (A), then we have mind knowing itself and nothing but itself in every act of apprehension. This is Solipsism.

If, however, (B) is not the same as (A), then (B) is a *tertium quid* intervening between knowing mind and physical object, and preventing us from ever coming directly at the latter.

The William James, Bergsonian view of per-

ception regards Reality as a kind of vast flux or blur, upon which the mind operates, carving out physical objects by means of concepts intellectually formed, according to its own special interests. Thus we carve out chairs and tables, because it is useful to us in life to do so, but that does not mean that reality is in itself like an agglomeration of static chairs and tables.

But if Reality is quite formless to begin with, it is difficult to see why we should carve out one object more than another, why a chair in fact and not a hyæna. There must, in fact, be some distinguishing mark in Reality ; Reality must be individuated in some rudimentary form to begin with, and it is the business of mind to make the rudimentary articulations of Reality distinct, and to carve out definite objects in place of the blurred distinctions which it finds.

Most psychologists would, I think, agree to this view, maintaining that Reality carries with it its own distinctions, from which mind creates the world as we know it.

But if this is so, it is important to reflect that we know in perception not the distinctions of the real, but the elaborated physical object which must necessarily have passed through the framework of our concepts.

We have once again, knowing mind, (A), objects known as constructed by means of mental concepts, (B) ; and rudimentary distinction in Reality (C.)

But as (C) is never known, how can we know that it is responsible for the mental construction (B), which is supposed to represent it, and so on as before ?

(Any theory in fact, which admits the possibility of there being three separate entities in perception, appears to cut the mind off finally and utterly from all direct knowledge of Reality.)

It must remain an assumption that what is known by the mind has any connection with or likeness to Reality, and the logical outcome of any theory involving a *tertium quid*, be it Monist, Pragmatist, or Atomist, appears to be subjective Idealism.)

Is it possible to construct a reasonable theory with two entities only ?

IV.

(In considering what alternatives to Representationalism are offered by the New Realism, it will be convenient to begin by stating briefly the view of perception which appears to me to present the fewest difficulties, before passing on to the other alternative views which have been advanced by Realists.

The view which I advocate is one which resembles very closely the theory of perception put forward by Professor Dawes Hicks, which is in turn founded in the main upon the writings of Meinong.

"(That there cannot be an act of knowing without something to know; or more generally, that

there cannot be an act of judging even an act of apprehending at all, without something to judge, something to apprehend is," says Meinong, "one of the most self-evident propositions yielded by a quite elementary consideration of these processes." It seems to me self-evident. Whether it is so or not, it is the fundamental axiom which lies at the basis of the Realist position, and will be assumed to be true until it can be proved to be false.

Now the one point of agreement among all the theories of perception we have considered lay in the view that all sensations were primarily caused by the excitation of the nervous system by certain stimuli.

This is an unimpeachable statement and, in the light of psychological research, can be agreed to. The point, however, to be emphasised, is that this excitation is a matter of machinery only. It constitutes the method by which we become aware of stimuli. It is not the stimuli of which we become aware, nor has it anything to do with them.

It seems an incredible confusion, and yet it is true that a vast number of philosophers have persistently confused the method of knowing a thing, with the thing which is known.

If you put a penny in an automatic chocolate machine, the penny acts as a stimulus which excites certain machinery inside the machine, the result being a chocolate. But nobody would dream of confusing the penny with the excitation of machinery, and the question of the excitation of

the machinery is irrelevant when we come to consider what is the primary cause of the production of the chocolate.

Similarly when we are enquiring about the primary cause and content of the act of perception, and we wish to ascertain what is, in fact, known, all questions of "wave motions, retinal changes, nerve currents, cerebral disturbances," and we may add, mental affections, become totally irrelevant.

The problem of sense perception is in fact a problem of the nature of the original stimulus, it is not a problem of the nature of the method by which that stimulus is conveyed to the brain. The latter is a matter for physiologists.

The words, "primary cause and content of the act of perception" used above may appear misleading.

What, it may be asked, is the entity which is at once the cause and the content of awareness. The words are used deliberately because the physical object possesses a twofold relation to the act of perceiving. It stimulates the act, and forms its content. What, in fact, happens in perception, on Meinong's view, is briefly as follows :

(A) A physical object, when placed in a certain juxtaposition to any one of the sensory organs produces a stimulation of those organs or excitation of the nervous system.

(B) This excitation is conveyed by purely neural processes to the mind, and passes into consciousness.

(C) This consciousness, as Meinong puts it, is "directed upon something," the something being the physical object from which the stimulation proceeded. The physical object is therefore at once the cause of the awareness as in (A) and its object as in (C).

Now this act of awareness (C) is lived through, in the sense that it is a fact in the mental history of the percipient. (Acts of awareness, however, exhibit qualitative differences; that is to say the act of awareness of red is different from the act of awareness of green.)

This does not mean, as Professor Dawes Hicks points out, that the awareness of red is a complex made up of awareness + red, but nevertheless as a mental act it is qualitatively different from any other mental act, such as the awareness of green.

This mental content "awareness of red" is an indivisible whole, and is such that in Professor Dawes Hicks' words, "it can never be the object of the act of which it is the content," the object of the act being a red physical entity.

Now it is important to notice that in this process of becoming aware of physical objects, mind exhibits two characteristics.

1. It discriminates and selects from the presented environment.
2. It goes out beyond it and adds to it.

As regards (1) the process of discrimination accounts for the different way in which the same object appears to different perceivers.

To take an instance given by Professor Dawes Hicks, it is obvious that a red rose which we will call R, will appear in different ways to an artist, a botanist, and a colour-blind person.

Those different appearances we will call r_1 , r_2 , and r_3 . Now these different appearances are brought into being by the fact that we discriminate from the presented whole, and emphasise certain features at the expense of others.)

Thus r_1 will contain only a certain percentage of all the attributes of the presented rose R, and r_2 will present a different percentage.

r_1 and r_2 therefore become that part of the presented whole which is actually perceived ; the percentage of attributes perceived forms the content apprehended, and this forms a contrast with the complete content of the physical object from which we have selected. This does not mean that r_1 , r_2 , and r_3 exist independently of being perceived. R exists independently of the act of perception, but r_1 , r_2 , and r_3 are selections from R, which are only called into being by that act.

(Thus we never sense reality completely, but are always directly in touch with a selected part of it.)

The way in which we make this discrimination or selection, which constitutes a large part of the active function of the mind in perception, depends upon our general mental make up. (As a rule, we select, as the psychologist would say, according to systems which interest the perceiver. Differences of mind, of bodily equipment, and above

all, of interest, will condition the kind of r which we shall carve out from the whole R .

This difference of "direction of attention" accounts for what are sometimes called the different appearances which the same object exhibits to different persons.

As regards (2) it would seem that the peculiar function which mind possesses of going out beyond the actual data of the given is called into play in practically all acts of perception.

(That portion of Reality of which our senses make us directly aware in perception is small. "Psychologists have made us aware," says Mr. Russell, "that much of what at first sight seems to be given is really inferred."

Thus when we think we see a table, we may in reality see directly only two legs and the surface of one horizontal plank of wood without actually perceiving the place where they join. We do not see the other two legs, and we do not see the underside of the table, but from the incomplete portion which we do see we construct the whole table.)

It is the business of Mind, however, to go out beyond these fragmentary appearances known to the senses, in which alone we are directly in touch with Reality, and to piece them together so that a complete physical object emerges as the result. We get a discontinuous and fragmentary view of Reality in all perception, but by selecting from the given whole those aspects that interest us, and at the same time synthesising and piecing to-

gether the aspects selected, we construct what is to form the content of our consciousness for ourselves, a content which is not other in substance than the content of Reality, but selected from it and, it may be, arranged differently.

In this sense it is true that all perception involves an element of judgment : there is in fact, no such thing as pure awareness of the given. In all perception we go beyond what we actually perceive, and it is in this activity of going out beyond it, that we provide an opportunity for the operation of what is called judgment.

When we are aware, for instance, of a patch of red colour, a noise of crackling and a sensation of warmth, we judge that these sensations together indicate a fire, and we say that we perceive a fire.

Now it is this element of judgment in perception, involving the synthesis of the fragmentary selected appearance of physical objects that accounts for the phenomenon of error.

(It has commonly been urged against Realist views of perception that their machinery does not admit of the possibility of Error.)

(The New Realism has perhaps in its anxiety to avoid attributing too much to mental construction, over-emphasised the passive attitude of the mind in perception.

Mind has rightly been regarded as directly in touch with the given Reality, but it has also been assumed that the only function of mind was to become aware of or to know the given. Mind

could not create for itself, and the best informed mind was that which knew most of the Reality spread before it.

How then does it come about that mind makes mistakes? Clearly mind cannot know what is not there, and if its only function is to know what is there, it cannot create error for itself. Whence then does error come?

(It is essential, if we are to account for the possibility of error to credit the mind in perception with some active function, which it may perform wrongly.) It may perform this function when, in going out beyond the actual given in perception as described above, it puts together various fragmentary data into a completed object which is not warranted by the data, or which is warranted nine times out of ten, and is lacking in the tenth.

The peculiar feature of error seems to be that sense data which are taken by mind to indicate a certain kind of physical object, act as cheats and in point of fact signify a different object.

This is seen most clearly in cases where sense data are deliberately made to act as cheats, as for instance for the purpose of deceiving the mind of an opponent in a game.

Thus at tennis the flight of the ball is commonly taken by the receiver to afford an indication of the way in which it will bounce. Mind, in fact, constructs in advance the bounce of the ball from the sense data afforded by its flight. There comes an occasion, however, in which the server, by

imparting a screw to the ball, causes the same flight to produce a different result, whereby the mind falls into error through just this activity of going out beyond the sense data afforded by the given and making a false construction from them.

V.

Turning to an examination of other Realist views of perception, we shall see that the difficulty of accounting for error has always dogged their footsteps. This difficulty has been brought as an objection against Mr. Russell's famous view of knowledge by acquaintance, to a consideration of which I will now proceed as a possible alternative to the view advocated above.

This theory owes its celebrity as the best-known of all the New Realist theories largely to the extreme simplicity and coherence of the account it gives of perception.

Mr. Russell is sceptical as to the existence of sensible objects as we know them. "I think it must be admitted," he says, "as probable that the immediate objects of sense depend for their existence upon physiological conditions in ourselves, and that, for example, the coloured surfaces which we see cease to exist when we shut our eyes."

All we may legitimately assume to exist are what Mr. Russell calls the hard sense data, which are the immediate objects of sensation. "When I speak of the sensible object," says Mr. Russell, "it

must be understood that I do not mean such a thing as a table, which is both visible and tangible, can be seen by many people at once, and is more or less permanent. What I mean is just that patch of colour which is momentarily seen when we look at the table, just that particular hardness which is felt when we press it, or just that particular sound which is heard when we rap it. Each of these I call a sensible object and our awareness of it a sensation.'

This being so, one wonders what right Mr. Russell has to speak of the table at all. The table appears not to be perceived, but to be inferred from the existence of the sense data on some *a priori* principle.] Mr. Russell states somewhere as an axiom that "our sense data have causes, other than themselves," but such a statement is scarcely sufficient on Mr. Russell's premises, by itself, to warrant our speaking of all the familiar objects of the world as if they existed, especially as Mr. Russell warns us against the acceptance of any but purely empirical knowledge when we endeavour to describe the machinery of sensation. (See "Our Knowledge of the External World," by the Hon. Bertrand Russell. Lecture III.)

(Is it true, moreover, either that we do perceive these isolated sense data such as rays, and patches of colour, or that they exist by themselves as objects of sense, independently of the mind that perceives them

Let us consider these questions separately.

Is it true then in the first place that in perception we perceive not tables, roses and electric bells, but patches of colour, particles of smell and sound vibrations ?

Take the case of the table. It is true that, as Mr. Russell says, in walking round a table we do see successive patches of colour which are continually changing, but we see other things as well. We see the shape of the table, we see two at least of its legs, we see the oblong top, and so on, we get in fact a partial and incomplete view of the whole, upon which the mind operates, inferring the unseen parts of the table from the seen and so constructing the whole in the manner described above.

This appears even more clearly in the case of sound. When a note is struck on the piano it is not a full account of one's sensations to say simply that we are aware of a sound vibration : we are aware of the whole note. We may hear it badly and inaccurately, or we may hear it out of tune, and different people may hear it in different ways, but these differences depend upon psychological conditions in ourselves. The important point is that it is always the note itself that is heard as a whole, not a few vibrations arbitrarily selected from the whole body of sound waves which constitute the note, and the note being recognised as a whole which is different from other wholes, is characterised by a certain name. If, as a matter of fact, the things we do perceive, however imperfectly, were not physical objects, but were, as

Mr. Russell would have us believe, raps of sound, patches of colour, and other isolated data, it is a little difficult to understand why we should think we see tables and hear notes.

Even if we agree with Mr. Russell that such data must have causes other than themselves, why if we never know these causes should we all mentally construct the same objects without apparent provocation and then call them causes? These sense data, according to Mr. Russell, exist objectively: they form a world which we know as it exists, and which, directly we become acquainted with it, we proceed, in Professor Dawes Hicks' words, "for some inexplicable reason to convert into another."

The theory appears in fact to be another form of Representationalism. We have the knowing mind (A), the sense data, patches of colour, raps of sound, etc., (B), which are known, and a third class of entities, (C), which are inferred to exist on the principle that our sense data must have causes other than themselves which are conceived of as the chairs, tables, notes and smells of the everyday world.

But as we know always, (B), and not (C), how can we know either that (C) exists, or that (C) is the cause of (B)?

Professor Dawes Hicks passes what appears to be a just criticism on this view, when he derives it from the "natural illusion to which analytic treatment of experience is always liable." Experience,

as we know it, tells us of the existence of chairs, tables and other physical objects. We can by analysis split up our experience into a number of different items, among which we can distinguish the patches of colour, raps of sound, etc., which form Mr. Russell's sense data. This does not necessarily mean that our experience was built up as an historical process, by putting together these items, or that the patches of colour, etc., which analysis reveals exist as separately existent, component parts of the total sum which is known. The fact that we can multiply together the factors 3 and 8 and arrive at a total of 24, which can also be split up into factors of 6 and 4, does not necessarily mean that we were ever separately aware of the factors 6 and 4, or that they figured in the process by which we arrived at the product 24. / #

In the words of a recent writer : (" It is almost a universal belief among psychologists that the child experiences colour, hears sounds, feels pressure long before he sees balls, hears voices or feels solid objects." Mr. Russell's view puts the cart before the horse. Our first perception of an object may be blurred, indistinct, and misleading, but we do perceive however incompletely, the whole object. It is only afterwards when we analyse it or try to describe it, that we can split the total " perception " into the various sense data which go to make it up.) We do not perceive the sense data seriatim, add them together, and then

hail the total, *i.e.*, the table, as a gratifying product of mental arithmetic.

(Secondly, have the sense data which Mr. Russell recognises as the immediate objects of perception an independent existence ? All objects known to sense have for Mr. Russell an equal degree of reality. "There are no such things," he says, "as 'illusions of sense.' Objects of sense even when they occur in dreams are the most undoubtedly real objects known to us | . . . ; in themselves they are every bit as real as the objects of waking life."

The hardihood necessary for the following of Mr. Russell into this extreme of Realism has proved beyond the present writer. (Here we have a statement which is tantamount to an assertion that all the appearances a thing can possibly have, possess an equal degree of reality ; that the shape of a penny, for instance, inasmuch as it more often appears to us to be elliptical than round, is really as much an ellipse as a circle, in fact more so.

Furthermore, if Mr. Russell means by an "object" what is usually meant by the word, namely, a concrete entity which continues to exist whether we are perceiving it or not, we are driven to the conclusion that the three-headed dragon of our dreams possesses an existence in his own right, and continues to exist interminably when once we have dreamt of him, and that the snow which we perceive to be blue when we put on blue spectacles is just as much blue as white.

There can be no such thing on this view, as what it called hallucination, and there is no place for error. It is at this point that the observations made above with regard to the difficulty experienced by many forms of the New Realism in accounting for error become most relevant.

If everything we perceive is equally real, it cannot be said that we perceive wrongly. To Mr. Russell a wrong perception, or what is commonly known as an "illusion," means simply that the objects so perceived though equally real with other objects, "have not the kind of connection with other objects of sense that experience has led us to regard as normal."

When therefore returning from some Company dinner (we perceive two lamp-posts on the pavement where we are normally accustomed to perceive one, there really are two lamp-posts just as this morning there was one lamp-post, and just as to-morrow morning there will be one lamp-post again, the only unusual element about the two lamp-posts being that they have not got the kind of connection with the pavement, the houses opposite, and the road which experience has taught us to expect.)

Whether this is so or not, I do not know. (Certainly at such times the relation of the double lamp-post to the pavement seems to me to be normal, and yet I am convinced in the morning of the unreality of the second lamp-post.)

— The doctrine of the equal reality and independent existence of all our sense data has been

put forward in a somewhat similar form by Dr. G. E. Moore, only Dr. Moore, for some reason which it is rather difficult to understand, calls Mr. Russell's sense data "sensations."

In a paper recently read before the Aristotelian Society, Dr. Moore took the line that what he calls "presented sensations" cannot be shown to be affections of the mind, unless it can also be shown that they only exist while they have the relation of being presented to the mind, unless it can be proved in fact that the assertion that they cease to have this relation is equivalent to the assertion that they have ceased to exist.)

Dr. Moore asserts that he has never been able to elicit such a proof from those who do regard "sensations" as affections of the mind, and proceeds to adduce one or two considerations tending to show that it is quite within the bounds of possibility, to put it at its mildest, that such sensations do continue to exist when they have ceased to be presented. He takes the following illustration.

'If I am watching a firework display I can actually see a given localised visual sensation—the sensation of a spark from a bomb, for instance,—come into existence and then cease to exist, and in such cases I know not only that the sensation in question has ceased to be presented, but also that it has ceased to exist."

In other cases, however, the cessation of the presentation may be due, not to the extinction of

the spark, but to my turning away my head. Dr. Moore argues that there is clearly a difference between these two classes of cases, and that in the latter we have no right to say that the sensation ceases to exist, because it has ceased to be presented. Therefore we do not know that it is an affection of the mind. Therefore it may exist independently, just as Mr. Russell's patches of colour and raps of sound may exist independently.)

It appears to me that it is impossible to say whether we agree with Dr. Moore or not, until we know what he means by "presented sensations." I, for one, cannot understand the meaning which he appears to ascribe to the term throughout his paper.

Thus in the instance quoted above, Dr. Moore speaks of seeing the sensation of a spark, and it is clear that he is using the word in a similar sense throughout. (But it is at once a misuse of language and a pitfall in philosophy to talk about seeing the sensation of a spark. We see a spark, and the act of seeing or sensing it constitutes the sensation.

I do not believe, however, that (Dr. Moore's "sensations") exist at all, in the commonly accepted sense of the word sensations.) If they do, they are simply in the way. (We have in fact come back to Representationalism again. There is the act of seeing (A), the sensation of a spark seen, (B), and the spark which presumably causes the sensation (C). But if we see always (B) and

never (C), how can we know that (C) exists at all, or even that it causes (B) ?

The "sensation" of the object which we are said to see only differs from the "ideas" and images (the *tertium quid* of Locke and Berkeley) in this, that Dr. Moore is inclined to endow it with objective existence apart from the mind to which it is presented.

If, however, mind in perception came into contact with a world of "sensations" which exist (Dr. Moore is not sure of this, but sees no reason to suppose that they do not exist) both before and after they have been presented, what conceivable reason can it have for transforming this world into another world, namely the world of physical objects ?

Dr. Moore believes, I imagine, that the spark exists as well as the sensation of it, but the spark might just as well be a mental invention for all the empirical evidence we have of its existence.

For my own part I find it very difficult to believe that our sensations do exist after we have ceased to experience them.

A sensation is physiologically speaking a disturbance of the nerves, and it seems absurd to suppose that our nerves are disturbed before we are brought into contact with the object that disturbs them, or that the disturbance continues to exist in its own right after the contact has ceased.

If, however, Dr. Moore is using sensation in the much less usual, and rather misleading sense of

that part or aspect of the object which is actually before the mind in perception, it becomes equivalent to Mr. Russell's "patch of colour" or "rap of sound," and we have to suppose that the patch of colour seen when I look at the table is a separate entity existing independently both of myself and the table, since it is very doubtful whether the table exists at all, and in any case "all objects known to sense have an equal degree of Reality."/ To avoid peopling the world with permanent hosts of existential entities, call them sensations, raps, patches, or what you will, every time one of my senses functions, of which the only object is to come between me and the physical world, I prefer to think with Professor Dawes Hicks that in perception only two factors are involved, these factors being the knowing mind, (A), and the presented object, (C).

I fail to see any warrant for assuming the existence of an intermediate existence (B), whether it be called "idea," as by Locke and Berkeley, "sensible quality," as by Stout, "sense datum," meaning patch of colour or rap of sound as by Mr. Russell, or "presented sensation" as by Dr. Moore. Such an intermediate entity can only serve the purpose of intervening between the mind and Reality, and preventing our having any direct knowledge of the latter, any knowledge of Reality at all, that is to say, except what is arrived at by inference. I prefer to think that we are in perception in contact with Reality itself, that

the divergent perceptions of the same object which are experienced by different people and by one person at different times, are due to the varying contents of the same whole to which we direct our attention. That these contents are part of the whole content presented, and are arrived at by the processes of selection and discrimination on the part of the percipient being called, as it were, into existence in their own right, simply by our act of perceiving them. That these contents have no independent existence apart from their being perceived, but that the whole object from which the selection is made has such an independent existence; that it is the peculiar function of mind to know in this way things other than itself, a function which is unanalysable and, if you like, inexplicable, and that error and illusion creep in through the tendency of mind continually to go out-beyond and to piece together the fragmentary views of Reality given by the senses.

Chapter II.

MONISM IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY

I.

MONISM seems to have gone out of fashion. Certainly, since Mr. Bradley published *Appearance and Reality*, the Absolute has not loomed so large as heretofore in philosophical discussion. Under the influence of M. Bergson and the New Realists, the centre of philosophical interest seems rather to have moved away from and beyond that question which fifteen years ago occupied the chief place on the stage, the question of the contending merits of Monism and Pluralism, a question which seems not so much to have received final adjudication in favour of one side or the other, as to have lost interest and faded into the background. When I say lost "interest," I am referring only to the peculiar form in which the controversy then presented itself. The fundamental points in dispute are still in dispute; and the New Realists wage war on Monism in all its forms. Only the clear-cutness of the old issue seems to have become blurred, and in particular Monism in the old sense of the word seems to have lost in repute. It is the object of this essay to sketch some of the chief lines of argument which in quite recent years have led to what I might call the deposition of Monism from its enthronement on the philosophical chair, and to consider the chief alternative suggested.

For if the reconciliation between Philosophy and common sense is not to be irretrievably endangered, Monism must be denounced.

The lines of attack which occur to one as having most endangered the Monistic stronghold in recent times, are those initiated by William James and the Pragmatists, and by Mr. Russell and the New Realists. The character of the former is familiar, and may be traced briefly and without detail. The latter is to my mind more significant, and has not yet received the full attention it deserves.

When I said that Monism had lost in repute, I did not, of course, mean to imply that its influence is not extensive. On the contrary, it is paramount in Oxford and may still be termed the orthodox philosophy in the Scottish Universities.

It does appear, however, that a real contrast is presented between the position of Monism to-day, and that indicated a dozen years ago, by the following quotation from Professor Henry Jones, cited by William James, as evidence of the existence of foemen worthy of his steel. "It is hardly to be denied that the power exercised by Bentham and the Utilitarian School has, for better or for worse, passed into the hands of the Idealists. 'The Rhine has flowed into the Thames' is a warning note rung out by Mr. Hobhouse. Carlyle introduced it, bringing it as far as Chelsea. Then Jowett, Thomas Hill Greene, and William Wallace, Lewis Nettleship, Arnold Toynbee, and David Ritchie, to mention only those teachers whose

voices now are silent, guided its waters into those upper reaches known locally as the Isis. John and Edward Caird brought them up the Clyde, Hutchinson Stirling up the Firth of Forth. They have passed up the Mersey, Severn, Dee, and Don. They pollute the Bay of St. Andrews and swell the waters of the Cram, and have somehow crept overland into Birmingham. The stream of German idealism has been diffused over the academical world of Great Britain. The disaster is universal."

Such was the weight of authority William James set himself to challenge. The Monistic doctrine as he conceived it was grounded on a combination of four main presuppositions. I call them presuppositions because, although they are cardinal points in the finished structure, they indicate at the same time the lines of reasoning which originally led men to a belief in the Absolute and the points of vantage from which its ascent appears least difficult. They are : (1) That things cannot interact if they are in any sense separate ; (2) That knowledge is impossible between two things which are in any sense separate : and that in consequence there is no independence of being apart from being known ; (3) A belief that truth is coherent ; and (4) the belief that mind can only cognise the mental and, therefore, that the Real is mental. The demonstrations of (1) and (2) are briefly as follows.

(1) is Lotze's famous proof of Monism. To act, says Lotze, is to exert an influence. If, therefore,

(A) and (B) are two objects, (A's) interaction with (B) becomes the influence exercised by (A) over (B). This involves the influence on (B) of the influence exercised by (A) over (B), which involves the further influence of the influence of the influence of (A) over (B), and so on *ad infinitum*. So that if (A) and (B) were really separate to begin with, an infinite regress of influences looms between them before any change in (B) can take place. Therefore, they were not separate to begin with. Further, the fact that the chain of influences exercised by (A) hits upon (B), and not upon (C), involves the supposition that (B) was somehow more fitted to receive them than (C). This fitness is interpreted as some kind of kinship with (A); and the fact that the influences produce a change in (B) implies a response on (B's) part which can be interpreted as sensitiveness to the influences of (A). Instead, therefore, of (B) isolated and different from (A), we now have (B) exhibiting kinship to (A) and sensitiveness to its influences in advance, before interaction can be supposed possible. Original connection is thus inferred.

(2) This is one of Professor Royce's proofs that the only alternative to the complete disunion of things between which knowledge is impossible, is their complete union in the one. (I am here giving only the general drift of the argument. The illustrations are not Professor Royce's). Knowledge, he argues, is impossible if things are separate. For consider the sentence, "The cat

smells fish." If the cat and the fish are originally independent, the smelling of the cat constitutes a connection between them. A third connection between this connection and the fish is thereby involved, and we have an infinite regress as before.

Further, if the fish and the cat existed entirely independently and without foreknowledge of each other, it would never be possible for the cat to transcend the space of pure otherness between them and come at the fish. If each being is isolated to begin with, each is shut up entirely in its own isolation and is unable to pass beyond it in the sense that having knowledge of something else requires. Some intimacy must already exist between them in virtue of which the cat can know the fish, and this intimacy is due to the fact that they both partake of and are known by a higher mind.

(3) The view that truth is coherent. This involves a rather different question, and will be considered in the next chapter. It is sufficient to say here that the view that the criterion of truth is constituted by its coherence with the general mass of our other knowledge, involves the conclusion that all knowledge constitutes one single truth, and that truth is not attainable short of that whole.

(4) The belief that Mind can only cognise the mental and, therefore, that the Real is mental, seems to me to rest upon three distinct lines of argument, though they are not always distinguished as such in Monistic writings.

First, there are two considerations affecting the nature of intelligibility.

(a) It is thought that a thing to be intelligible must be concrete.

This position is the exact antithesis of Plato's. For the question as to whether we speak of the *εἰδη* as concrete or abstract (and they are spoken of in both terms) is purely a matter of words. The *εἰδη* are not, at any rate, concrete in the sense in which monistic idealists interpret concrete. They are mathematical truths, scientific laws, moral axioms, and so forth, and these are regarded as abstractions by the idealist—universal abstractions, that is, formed from observation of their instances. As such they are said to point forward to these instances, and are felt to be not quite real or intelligible without them.

(b) To be intelligible a thing must be self-sufficient. In this connection it is to be noted that the ordinary objects of sense are not intelligible. For the reasons given by Plato, and again by Berkeley, they are to be judged misleading, if taken by themselves, giving rise to changing and contradictory sense-data, and pointing on to other things beyond themselves. Thus, no water is so hot that it does not suggest to the mind hotter water, and no sky so blue that it does not admit the possibility of greater blueness. Thus, things of sense, though concrete, are not self sufficient: they point forward. The kind of entity on the other hand which does begin to be

intelligible is a piece of music. A piece of music is both concrete like sensible objects, and it is a self sufficient whole like the $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$. It is a unity admitting diversity. Yet even this is not intelligible through and through. It appears to be divisible into distinct parts, and isolated notes with relations one to another. It is true that these notes are not in isolation what they were in the completed whole : they have lost significance : it is doubtful, indeed, whether thus isolated they can be considered the same notes at all, so that it is doubtful whether the analysing process could ever legitimately have been made. But it is undeniable that this process of separating up into notes can, in point of fact, be applied, and thus leads to confusion.

Similarly, consciousness is a self-sufficient concrete unity admitting of diversity, and though apparently possessing parts in the same irritating way as the piece of music, it must be adjudged, at any rate, to be more intelligible than anything which is entirely non-mental. A divine consciousness, however, would be without the defects that self-consciousness exhibits. From this it is but a step to the assertion that only the mental is really intelligible.

(c) Thirdly, a familiar theory of perception tells us that we know directly only our own sensations. Given the psychological atomism of Locke and Berkeley, for our basis, we soon dispose of Locke's illogical "substance," and are left with only the

mental as a possible object of knowledge. Not only is there no need then to drag in an alien matter, but it cannot, we are told, even be conceived how mind could come to know anything so alien in substance as matter is assumed to be, even if it did exist. Therefore, as the Real must be intelligible, an assumption which hardly seems to a Monist to call for question, the Real must be mental, while, for it to be thoroughly intelligible, it must admit of no inward diversity like the piece of music, but must be an unindividuated whole, "One through and through."

In the four doctrines outlined above, most of the paths leading to the familiar Absolute are, I think, indicated. I do not of course pretend that I have so far even touched upon many of the subjects involved in that conception, and I hope to go further into some of them in a moment, but I think that the above beliefs, the belief that there can be no interaction and no knowledge among separate things, the coherence theory of truth, and the belief that the Real is mental, may fairly be considered as the groundwork upon which the whole structure is based.

William James attacks the Monistic position root and branch. For the most part his attack is a criticism of intellectualism as such. He accuses the Absolutists of a double rationalisation and falsification of the continual flux of sensible experience.

There is, he says, "a loyal clinging to the

Rationalist belief that sense-data and their associations are incoherent, and that only in substituting a conceptual order for their order can truth be found. The substituted conceptions are treated intellectualistically, that is as mutually exclusive and discontinuous, so that the first innocent continuity of the flow of sense experience is shattered for us without any higher conceptual continuity taking its place. Finally, since this broken state of things is intolerable, the absolute *deus ex machina* is called on to mend it in his own way, since we cannot mend it in ours.*

Experience, he asserts, is really a continuous process. Its alleged atomic constituents are the result of a falsifying psychological analysis. Monists first break it up by means of concepts, and then introduce the Absolute, to put it together again. For the superior method we are referred to Bergson's subordination of concepts, limitation of their application, and recognition of the continuity of our experience. W. James pleads against the false abstractions of Monism, and the quality of extremeness that characterises the Monistic arguments.†

It is plain that much of his objection to this Philosophy is temperamental. He speaks of the "block" Universe, he dislikes its through and throughness, its severity on individuality, and its perfections. His disdain of intellectualist logic is, in fact, so great that he rarely condescends to

* *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 72.

† *Ibid.* pp. 60, 74.

meet the enemy with his own weapons, and to go into a detailed logical examination of the matters that lie at the root of the issue. He really gets down to the crux of the matter, however, when he realises the importance of the question of "Relations" in this controversy between Monism and Pluralism.

The result of supposing that there can be no such entities as Relations between things is, Mr. Russell tells us,* "Either that there can be only one thing in the Universe, or, if there are many things, that they cannot possibly interact in any way, since any interaction would be a relation, and relations are impossible."

Now William James is very anxious not only that the existence of relations should be realised, but that the validity of our experience of them should be established. The central doctrine of his *Essays in Radical Empiricism* is that, "The relations between things conjunctive as well as disjunctive are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so than the things themselves."† The generalised conclusion is that "the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure."

* *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 148.

† See also *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 280.

I pass more rapidly, however, over William James's criticism of Monism because, in my opinion, Mr. Russell has come much more closely to grips with the real difficulties on this very question of what he calls the externality of Relations. This question I now propose to consider.

II.

The most convenient starting point for discussion is afforded by a remark of Berkeley's to the effect that "Relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without perceiving the former." Putting aside for a moment the question of whether relations are distinct from the things related, it is at least clear that the second statement, namely, that things may be perceived independently of their relations, is untrue. Were it true, any connected scheme of knowledge would become impossible. Such a statement would imply that we could perceive a thing entirely by itself, that is without distinguishing it from its surroundings, for in so doing we should be perceiving the relations which separate it from them. But I cannot perceive the picture in my room, without also perceiving that it is on the wall, and, therefore, related to something which is not the picture. If I perceive two pictures together, I can only perceive them as being some distance apart, that is, as related in space. It is quite true that I

may not perceive the relation in the same way as I perceive the picture, and that the being of the relation may be a different kind of being from the being of the picture. It is a fact, however, that the relation is perceived. This conclusion does not alter the inference that we can perceive things without perceiving all, or even the majority, of their relations. Everything must, for instance, have a relation of likeness or unlikeness to everything else in the universe, yet it is not necessary to perceive all these relations to perceive the thing. If a knowledge of all a thing's relations were necessary before we could know the thing, we could never attain to a complete knowledge of anything this side of the Absolute.

Now this is precisely what the Monistic theory maintains. By denying the externality of relations and explaining them away as states of the terms related, Monists are logically driven to the position that there is only one thing in the universe, the Whole or Absolute, and that we can have no complete knowledge until we know the Absolute.

Now this view is closely bound up with the traditional subject predicate logic upon which it is based. If we accept, for instance, Mr. Bradley's definition of judgment, as "the act which refers an ideal content to a reality beyond the act," and hold that all propositions are of the type which ascribe a predicate to a subject, that subject being continuously the same, namely Reality, we shall tend to regard this combination of subject with

predicate as some sort of organic unity. By this will be meant among other things that the unity is a whole, the nature of which is such that it determines and conditions the nature of its parts, just because they are its parts. In fact, it may be urged, the relations of each part to the whole modify the part to such an extent that its nature is entirely determined by them, and to analyse the whole, in the sense of breaking it up into its component parts, isolating the parts from their relations and considering them separately, as we certainly can do for practical purposes, is to falsify the parts. We cannot, in fact, consider parts as such, *i.e.*, distinguished from the whole of which they are parts, without destroying the nature of the parts by the process. Thus everything is determined by its relations to everything else. Whereas the Pluralist would admit that each thing has a place in the whole, the Monist goes on to assert that it only is what it is because of that place. Thus this book upon the table is not the same book as it is upon the floor, for its relations are an integral part of it, and its relations are changed, and the clock upon the mantelpiece will be altered, however slightly, every time a tiger is shot in the jungle.

The main criticism which Mr. Russell makes upon this reasoning is his detection of an ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase "nature of." "The whole point of view turns," he says "upon the notion of 'the nature of the thing,' which seems (*i.e.*, according to the Monists) to mean 'all the

truths about the thing.' It is, of course, the case that a truth which connects one thing with another could not subsist if the other thing did not subsist. But a truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it must according to the above usage be part of the 'nature' of the thing."

Herein lies the crux of the matter. The Monists seem to me to confuse two distinct propositions. It may be agreed that a thing is what it is, because it has a place in the Universe, and because of its relations to other things in the Universe, but also because those relations are not the thing. To assert this latter statement involves a second and quite distinct proposition. Thus the table is what it is because it has a place in Reality; an incorrect way of putting this truth is to say that the rest of Reality must be assumed and co-implicated in the proposition in order that the table may be what it is. But Reality is not assumed, it is given. The table indeed presupposes Reality and its own connections with Reality, just as our apprehension of the truth about the table presupposes Reality. But when we assert that the table is what it is because of its connections with Reality, we do not mean that the table is its connections. They condition it, but it is separate from them. Similarly it is a truth about an egg that if it is kept too long it will smell. But this truth about the egg is only true because the egg is an egg independently of the truth. The

egg is in fact not an egg because it is true that it will at some future period smell. The egg conditions the truth, not the truth the egg.

The other main Monistic argument mentioned above was to the effect that the ultimate Real, being one and indivisible, all analysis by means of which we arrive at a world composed of things and relations was a false abstraction of thought, which led us away from Reality.

Admitting that this argument embodies a real truth, Mr. Russell insists that its application should not be unduly extended.

It is true that a whole, although created by and formed of its parts, is more than their arithmetical sum. By a whole as opposed to an aggregate, we mean a unity, a new entity which has come into being by their synthesis. Thus a proposition has obviously an import, meaning, value, call it what you will, quite independently of the grammatical words and phrases of which it is composed. Hence when we analyse a whole of this kind, falsification of some kind obviously takes place. But what is falsified? The Whole, the unity, the new entity which came into being as the result of the combination of parts. The parts themselves are not falsified. If a whole is really a whole and not a unit, it clearly has parts which it cannot be a fiction to distinguish from one another. The fact that analysis of a whole into its parts destroys the whole, does not mean that it also destroys the parts, or that the parts are

not really its parts, or that they cannot exist as distinguished from one another.

This conclusion appears very plainly if we consider a numerical whole such as ten. Ten is a whole composed of parts two, three and five. But the fact that these integers are parts of ten does not mean that they are any less real than the ten of which they form part, or that, when we abolish ten by dividing it up into component parts, the parts are in any way invalidated in the process.

Just as in the former instance, Monists, having discovered the truth that a thing is what it is, because of its relations with the rest of Reality, pushed its application too far, by going on to confuse the thing with its relations, so in the présent case the doctrine of the falsification of wholes by analysis is extended to comprise a denial of the validity of parts.

There does, therefore, seem to be some case for the existence of objects independently of other objects, and of parts independently of wholes. Such an independent existence presupposes the further existence of relations to connect any particular object with other objects, which, as the object may or may not have the connection in question, cannot be explained away as inherent states or modifications of the object.

It may appear that an undue amount of time has been expended over the arguments which have led us to this conclusion, nor have we

yet arrived at any indication as to the nature of the being of relations, and as to the sense, if any, in which they are independent of the things they relate. So far I have tried to establish only their externality. What, then, is the nature of their being?

Tradition is of great importance in Philosophy, and either directly through its influence or indirectly through reaction to its influence, plays a large part, not so much in discovering what are the really fundamental questions, as in determining those which, in point of fact, get discussed. In the present instance it was the extreme position taken up by Berkeley and his followers in asserting not only that relations existed independently, but that relata could be perceived independently of them, that led to the Monistic reaction which denies the independent existence of relations altogether.

Berkeley and Hume went so far as to maintain that any one term of a relation could be perceived by itself. "All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, among which the mind never perceives any real connection," says Hume, whose object in taking up this position was mainly to destroy the need for believing in external space. The relations by means of which, as we noticed above, we distinguish one thing from another are mainly spatial relations, and if it is maintained that a perception of such relations is not necessary to the perception of the thing, one of the reasons

for believing in the existence of external space disappears.

Furthermore, while holding relations to be independent of the things they relate, Berkeley naturally regarded them as mental creations. This view of their nature arose very readily from the atomistic psychology mentioned above. If we hold that sensible objects, whether they be conceived as material or mental, make distinct disconnected impressions upon the brain, and that the mind then apprehends these disconnected impressions and apprehends these only, it is a natural corollary to assume that the relations and connections, which we think of as existing between them, are the work of the mind, which arranges and groups them together according to certain laws (the nature of those laws being, by the way, unexplained, and a rather tough proposition for the English empiricists had they ever tried to explain it). The Realist answer to this position takes the form of a simple question. Unless objects are originally presented to the mind in some juxtaposition, why should the mind supply certain relations and not others? If (A) is not given to the left of (B) in reality, why should the mind supply the relation "to the left of," instead of the relation "to the right of," between them? This is a question I have never been able to answer, and if the slight digression may be pardoned, it may be observed that it appears to apply equally pertinently to the modern psychological, pragmatical, Bergsonian, theory of

sensations as a continuum which has so triumphantly shattered and displaced the discredited theory of atomism (see above page 26). William James may lay stress on the importance of realising that relations are given in experience. His theory of perception, however, tells us of a Reality that comes to us in experience as a continual flow, or change, without individuation or distinction of any kind. Upon this, as we have seen, the mind operates, carving out of it concepts and relations for the purposes of life or self-interest. But if Reality is really presented as this enormous blur, as void of distinction as a piece of white paper, why do we carve out of it such and such objects and not others? For instance, when I see a chair, it must clearly be in virtue of some distinctive mark in Reality that I carve out a chair and its Relations, and not an elephant and its Relations.

The truth would seem to be that our perceptions are not purely arbitrary, but depend upon and are conditioned by differences within our field of presentation, differences which account for relations as well as for relata. These differences may be given in a rudimentary and embryonic form, but they are given. It is the function of mind to make them clear and distinct. Thus, although mind may be said to construct relations in the sense that it groups and pieces together, elaborates and defines, the crude sense-data which form the material from which the relation is

evolved, it does not create them in the sense of arbitrarily imposing distinctions and connections upon a Reality which is itself devoid of them. If it were really true that relations were entirely a mental product, and that they were not in some form or other presented to the mind in Reality, either because Reality is composed of unrelated monads, or because it is a unified whole flowing from and into the Absolute without break of any kind, and if thinking consequently involves putting in relations and connections which are not really there, we cannot avoid the inference that the more we think the further we drift away from Reality. This is a disastrous conclusion for those who nourish a hope that thought is not totally devoid of value, and who, while admitting it to be possible that Philosophy has not, in fact, increased our knowledge of Reality, believe it to be possible for Philosophy to do so.

I do not intend to imply by this reflection that if a doctrine be true, the fact that it abolishes Philosophy as superfluous and misleading is any derogation to it. There are scientists perhaps who would not hesitate to subscribe to such a view, and the cry, "experiment on Reality instead of thinking about it," is not a new one. But Monists at least cannot be expected to agree with them. Monism, often entitled logical Monism, is presumably a product of thought. I do not see, therefore, how Monists, holding the views they do, can avoid the conclusion that the more care and thought they bestow

upon their doctrine, the more false it progressively becomes, as an account of the nature of Reality. Other systems indeed become false too, but in proportion as the Philosophy of the Absolute has laid claim to more complex and profound thought than any of its rivals, in just that proportion, if the considerations advanced above be right, it becomes more misleading than any of them.

I have tried to deal, up to the present, with two views as to the nature of relations which seem to me to be untrue, and to bring forward arguments which seem to operate in favour of their rejection.

These views are (*a*) that relations are not independent of the terms they relate, but are modifications of them. That things are not separate and brought into connection by entities which are also separate, but derive their interaction and knowledge of one another from mutual participation in the Absolute, in virtue of which they were interconnected from the beginning.

And (*b*) that Relations though independent of relata are mental, either because they are divine ideas, put into our mind by God, as Berkeley thought, or because they are created by our own mind to bring into connection our atomistically distinct sensations, as Hume and the later Empiricists thought.

If it be true then that relations cannot be explained away, either as states or parts of relata, or as creations of the knowing mind, it seems to follow that they must have some kind of being of

their own and form a valid existence as part of Reality. The question then arises as to the nature of their being.

III.

This important question has not, perhaps, received sufficient recognition among Philosophers. The existence of external relations has been so generally disbelieved, that few have paused to consider its possible nature. The following is Mr. Russell's theory, which is given as briefly as possible.

Mr. Russell divides, or used to divide, all Reality into two classes of terms, objects and concepts. The word term is used in the widest possible sense. Anything which can be an object of thought, or can occur in any proposition, is a term. As such it is immutable and self-identical. Of objects, we say that they "exist"; of concepts, that they "have being." For instance, existence is itself a concept, and, as such, has being. Existence does not exist in the same way that objects exist, but this cannot mean that it is nothing, for if it were nothing it could not significantly be ascribed to anything. To show the extent of the implications of this doctrine, we must mention the corollary (though this takes us on to dangerous ground, from which the existence of objective falsehood is not a far cry), that in order to make the denial of the existence of any term significant, the term must itself be; for as Mr. Waterlow remarks in a paper

on Mr. Russell's theory, "If Jupiter had not being, 'Jupiter does not exist,' would be an empty sound." The whole trend of thought is, in fact, an elaboration of a suggestion in the *Parmenides* (directed against the supposition that the *eiθn* are mental creations), to the effect that we cannot have a *v&onoma* of what does not exist. In order to be thought of at all, a term must have some sort of being.

Now Relations are terms of the kind which have being yet do not exist. Mr. Russell considers the instance, "Edinburgh is to the north of London."

It seems plain, he says, that "the relation 'to the north of,' subsists independently of our knowledge of it." The fact apprehended was there before we knew it. Something else is moreover asserted and known beyond Edinburgh and London. "To the north of" obviously stands for something and conveys some meaning additional to the meanings suggested by Edinburgh and London. This "something additional" is the relation "to the north of," and the "being" of this relation is independent both of Edinburgh and of London.

The above theory constitutes in many ways a fresh departure in Philosophy, maintaining as it does the independent being of prepositions, and of verbs. Much remains to be done before its validity has been sufficiently tested to establish its truth; in the meantime, however, it claims respect as the best explanation yet advanced of the

externality of Relations, a doctrine which, as I have tried to show, is the essential corner stone of any form of Pluralism, and the only alternative to Monism.

The following possible objections, however, present themselves :

(1) The first objection is one that, as we have seen, operates very strongly against all forms of Realism ; I mean, the difficulty of accounting for error.

According to the above view, the mind does not create ideas of facts for itself : its function is to apprehend facts existing independently of it. If, therefore, everything that the mind can perceive, objects as well as relations, already exists in Reality, if the mind does not even put in connections between disconnected sense data, for these connections are already given, the only duty left to mind is to become more and more aware of the Reality presented to it. Now the mind cannot become aware of what is not there, and, on the hypothesis that its only function is to become aware and not to create, it cannot create error for itself. We may evade this difficulty by resorting to the Spinozistic view that error is due to our partial apprehension of the given Reality, and would disappear as our apprehension became more complete. But the theory of external relations is essentially and fundamentally opposed to any aspect of Spinoza's philosophy, which it can scarcely invoke in its own support.

A better solution of the difficulty is suggested

by that activity of mind in going out beyond the given, and, by intelligent but sometimes unwarranted anticipation, putting in relations which are not there, already referred to (see page 34).

(2) The infinite regress of secondary relations involved every time two objects are brought into relation, and mentioned above as one of Lotze's proofs of Monism, must be admitted as a necessary implication, some would say a defect, of the theory. If the relation (R) holds between (A) and (B), this statement implies that (A) has a certain relation (C) to (R), and (R) a certain relation (D) to (B). The relations (C) and (D) involve other relations, and so on perpetually.

Thus we populate the world with hosts of existential entities every time a relational statement or proposition is made.

Mr. Russell boldly accepts this implication of his theory. The fact that the truth of one relational proposition involves the truth of an infinite number of others does not invalidate the truth in question, or infringe upon its isolation as a single definite entity. This implication, disturbing as it may at first sight seem, is really on a par with the existence of an infinite number of integers, or of the infinite regress involved in halving which can always occur, however minute the first number with which we begin the process. Nobody, however, interprets this infinite regress as a reason for supposing that we may not validly halve any number we please.

'(3) The most serious difficulty is occasioned, however, by the nature of the being of relations.

To begin with, the distinction between having being and existence may seem to some merely a distinction of words. The distinction is so peculiarly vulnerable to the type of argument employed by the early Greek Cynics and Megarians. They would point out to us the necessity of asking ourselves whether we are really asserting anything in any true proposition we may make. For instance, there is Mr. Russell's own statement, that the concept "existence" has being. Now if existence really has being, you are, they would say, simply asserting an identical relation. But if the two are not the same, how can it be said that the one is the other, that is, that existence has being?

Suppose, however, the distinction to be a real one: what is meant by "has being"? Is a relation, in fact, a true universal? If the cat is on the wall, and the egg on the table, what is the relation between the two "ons." Mr. Russell is, in many of his beliefs, a Platonist. One way out of the difficulty then would be to take the Platonic bull by the horns and postulate an *εἶδος* for every relation. This would solve the problem as to how all the different instances, say of "on," come into being, and assert the common relation between them all, in virtue of which we call them all "on." This solution rather savours of cutting the Gordian knot with a bludgeon, for all the familiar difficulties

of the Platonic $\epsilon\delta\delta\sigma$ rise to confront us. Is the $\epsilon\delta\delta\sigma$ of "on" transcendent? If so, what are the relations of its instances to it; are they relations of $\mu\mu\eta\tau\sigma$ or of participation? Is there any distinction between the being of "on-ness" and the being of a more orthodox $\epsilon\delta\delta\sigma$, such as that of goodness? And so on to all the other difficulties with which the writings of Professors Stewart and Jackson have made us familiar. With some of these difficulties I shall deal in a later chapter. Mr. Russell, however, rejects the Platonic $\epsilon\delta\delta\sigma$ view altogether. Transcendence in any form is repellent to him, and, like most mysticism, simply a device to avoid hard thinking, a *deus ex machina* invoked to get us out of the difficulties into which our deficiencies of thinking have landed us.

"Relations," he says somewhere, "are unlike most concepts in that they have no instances." A relation is one and the same in all the propositions in which it occurs. Just as the same "cat" may be employed in two different propositions—"the cat is on the table," and "the cat is drinking milk"—at the same time, so it is the same "on" which both relates the cat and the wall, and the egg and the table.

This is not sufficient, however, to quiet all our perplexities on the subject, a study of which reveals certain considerations which may help to clear the issue.

It is important, I think, to distinguish the study

of spatial relations from the observation of the instances of these relations. If we consider the relation "on" in abstraction, it is quite clear that the being of "on" is in no way affected by the nature of the things it relates. In this sense, it is independent of them. Thus it is possible to study quantitative relations, quite independently of the qualitative difference of the things they relate. The proposition two plus two equals four, to take an analogy, is quite unaffected by the particular objects you take as the units of two. Yet it does imply and is conditioned by the possibility of there being such objects. You cannot, in fact, think of any mathematical relations except as relations between terms. Similarly, although the meaning of "on" is not affected by the terms it relates, it has no meaning whatsoever, except with reference to the possibility of there being such terms.

The problem is, in fact, exactly analogous to the position taken up by Kant with regard to space and time. We cannot think of space as a separate thing existing by itself: it would be just nothing. Similarly a relation divorced from the possibility of relata, what Mr. Russell calls a "bare relation," would be meaningless. This does not, however, to continue the analogy, mean that space is *only* a relation between sensible objects, for it is implied in every perception of objects and not derived from the study of them. Similarly, the relation "on" is already given in Reality, and not in any

way arrived at by an analysis of the terms it relates. It is, in fact, the presupposition of there being such terms.

Here the problem must, at present, be left. It will be discussed more generally when we come to consider the nature of universals in a later chapter. But the unsatisfactoriness attending the nature of the being of relations should not induce us to doubt its reality. Relations are fleeting; they change much more rapidly than relata. They are mainly spatial, and, as perception, at least, is concerned mainly with spatial relations, we tend to fancy that we do not perceive them, for empty space cannot be perceived, and a line must be drawn between two spatially connected objects to enable us to judge accurately of their distance. These considerations should not, however, invalidate our conclusions that relations are real, are external, and are experienced.

One or two questions may summarise the arguments which have led to this conclusion: Can we have experience of what does not exist? I take it that the answer is in the negative. When we say "the cat is on the wall," do we not attach a definite meaning to the word "on," which is in no way affected by, or part of, our conceptions of cat and wall? To this, I think, we must assent. Have we any right to reject, as in any sense unreal, that which we experience? A negative answer only is possible. It follows, then, that the relations which connect experienced objects are experienced

relations, and as real as any other objects in our metaphysical system.

Yet when all is said that can be said in favour of Pluralism, and of the externality of relations as the basis of it, it must be admitted that the chief inducement which has led philosophers to embrace it, lies in a dissatisfaction with the Monistic alternative.

This dissatisfaction is with many temperamental; William James felt it strongly. He speaks of the "impeccable and complacent perfection of the Absolute," and complains of the "stiffness" of the whole doctrine, whimsically likened to the atmosphere of a seaside boarding house.

To something of the same feeling I must confess; yet I think that what I may venture to call the comparative obscurity into which Monism seems recently to have fallen is due to more serious and fundamental logical objections which have become increasingly subjects of comment. I have, for instance, never been able to understand how, if the Absolute is a purely perfect, complete, and indeterminate being, such that determination or characterisation of any kind would infringe its perfection, the possibility of evolution or development from it ever arises. How, in short, does the principle of difference emerge from perfect one-ness? If we grant this it will be said that the principle of difference is fallacious, that it is due to partial apprehension, and disappears with increasing

knowledge. If we grant this, it may still be asked, how came it that we ever thought that there was difference? How can perfect unity be the ground, I will not say of Pluralism, but of the appearance of Pluralism? And this difficulty receives expression, I think, in a certain duplication of conception among Monists. When they dwell upon the unity and perfection of the Absolute, it is thought of as the universal ground or condition of all the appearances that make up the world as we know it: when its fulness or completeness, its all-absorbing nature, is to the fore, it is thought of rather as the perfect sum or fulness of Reality, in which all contradictory appearances find perfect reconciliation.

Yet the universal ground of things is not the same as the sum of all the developments from that ground (why if it is, was the process of development ever initiated?), while neither conception seems to account for the origin of that element, whatever it is, negativeness, partiality, or what not, which produces apparent error, apparent multiplicity, and apparent dichotomy between knowing mind and known object.

We are told that all these are "ultimately" one. But the word "ultimately" gives the game away. The distinction between "ultimately one" and "one" is not, indeed, clear, but if the word "ultimately" means anything, "ultimately one" implies a contrast with something other than one-ness now. How that something other can ever have been generated

from the completeness of the Absolute, or become merged into it without carrying with it the principle of difference,—a principle of difference which can best be described as the fact that there does *appear* to be a difference between appearance and Reality,—is the insoluble difficulty which seems to me to be implicit in the whole elaborate structure of the Absolute. To put it briefly, granting that Pluralists are misguided, how can Monists account for the fact of there being Pluralists at all?

As an alternative to these difficulties, we would suggest the common sense doctrine of the reality of external relations adumbrated above. The fact that it has not yet, perhaps, attained its final and definite form should not deter us from affording it the consideration it deserves.

Chapter III. THE MEANING OF TRUTH

I.

IT seems to be necessary to say something about the meaning of Truth in any set of essays which purport to present an aspect of Realism, because one's view of truth, whatever it may be, follows inevitably from, and is conditioned by, one's theory as to the nature of Reality and of perception.

Of the two schools whose views on truth hold the field, it is difficult for a Realist to hold the coherence theory, and impossible for a modern Idealist to pin his faith on correspondence.

If, for instance there is no external reality other than thinking or your thinking, with which your ideas are to correspond, then "coherence," "merging," "interpenetration," "ultimate identity" and other kinds of Idealist processes must of necessity happen to your ideas, and you may say that any or all of these processes is the meaning of truth, but correspondence, which asserts that of two things, one corresponds with or is like another, can only occur if the two things are really distinct and different to begin with, and will not be reconciled or merged even in the end.

Before entering into the rival merits of coherence and correspondence, one or two preliminary observations may be made which are not so much in the nature of arguments, as a statement of positions which will be taken for granted, and

attempts clearly to define and to delimit what it is proposed to discuss.

First it is clear to me that Truth is a property of judgment. Facts are real, but judgments are true. Even if we hold on the correspondence theory that truth depends upon something non-mental, in the sense that any judgment depends for its truth or falsehood on whether a certain non-mental fact did or did not take place, the judgment has still to be passed before the question of Truth or Falsehood arises. If there were no minds there would be no such thing as Truth.

I do not wish to be taken as claiming a dogmatic validity for this distinction. Whether you call facts real or true is probably not a matter of great importance, but simply a question of the language you happen to use.

To me, however, it seems more convenient from the point of view of language, and less likely to lead to confusion from that of clear thinking, if we do adopt this distinction. In 1917 Professor Lloyd Morgan read a paper to the Aristotelian Society in the course of which he continually used the expression "true facts" when he appeared to be speaking what I should call real facts. This terminology had the unfortunate effect of leading to a confusion between truth and reality, in which the words true and real were used interchangeably and apparently synonymously to describe the same phenomena. It may of course be argued that if

there is no ultimate distinction between mind and matter, if knowing mind and known object are parts of one another and of a spiritual indivisible whole, it is a matter of indifference whether we call such a whole real or true, but if there is a distinction between mind and matter, or if such a distinction be assumed for the purposes of discussion, although we may be convinced that it is invalid in the long run, it will be found convenient to reserve the epithet "true" as an attribute of mental acts only, leaving real as an epithet of the thing known or object of those acts.

Also it may be held, and, I believe, justifiably held, that there is a Platonic $\epsilon\deltaοs$ of truth. If there is such an $\epsilon\deltaοs$ it is non-mental and its existence is a fact. The existence of such an $\epsilon\deltaοs$ might appear at first sight to invalidate the distinction which has just been drawn, but I do not see that there is any inconsistency in saying that the existence of truth is a non-mental fact, although the manifestation of the $\epsilon\deltaοs$ attaches itself only to mental functions. The $\epsilon\deltaοs$ of Truth would exist even if there were no minds to know it, but the manifestation of the $\epsilon\deltaοs$ in particulars is dependent upon there being minds to make true judgments. Thirdly it is important to emphasise the distinction between the meaning of truth and the criterion of truth. What truth means is clearly different from how you know a judgment to be true. The correspondence and coherence theories are concerned to find out

what is meant by truth : they are not concerned to discover a criterion by which you may tell what is true and what is not.

These preliminary distinctions having been made, I propose first to consider the correspondence theory of truth.

II.

The correspondence theory is chiefly concerned to establish a meaning for truth, in cases of true judgment and true perception. The meaning of truth is, according to this view, correspondence with fact, and when we call a judgment true what we mean is that there is an external fact with which that judgment corresponds.

In its usual form the theory asserts that a judgment such as "this book is red" is true if there is an external fact namely a red book with which the judgment corresponds, and is false if there is no such fact. Now it is obvious that this view of truth can only be held by an extreme realist. It assumes first that we see the book exactly as it is, secondly that our perceptions are infallible, and thirdly that the book is what it is apart from its relations with all the other objects in the Universe and with the Universe as a whole.

Now Idealist philosophers do not believe any of these things. They believe that we see this book partially and imperfectly and that our fuller knowledge of it is "a revolution in which the book is swept away and determinate connections between

determinate universal concepts are substituted": and they do not believe that the book can be isolated from its relations and considered as a separately existing entity. It is obvious therefore that the ordinary correspondence view of truth cannot be held by a Monist, or incidentally by a Bergsonian; it is also obvious that directly we modify our extreme Realist view of perception the correspondence theory gets into difficulties, for if the book depends for its being or even for its significance upon its relations with other objects not known, or if we do not see the book in its entirety exactly as it is, we cannot know what the fact is with which our true judgment is to correspond. With regard to the three assumptions mentioned above as being the assumptions upon which the ordinary correspondence view of truth rests. I believe the first to be false and the second and the third to be true.

As regards the third, I have tried to show in the previous essay that objects can be isolated from their relations without falsification of their nature, and that it is possible to know the nature of an object without knowing all its relations. As regards the second, I gave reasons in the first essay for supposing that although our perceptions are selective, partial and incomplete, they do faithfully convey to the mind that part of the selected whole which is in point of fact actually perceived. I also tried to show, however, in that essay that we do not perceive objects

exactly as they are, that is to say, we do not perceive them in their entirety, but that we perceive them only in part, and that we select those aspects of them which form the content of our perceptions according to systems that interest us. I do not therefore believe that the first of the conditions which must be assumed if we are to hold the ordinary correspondence view of truth, namely, that we perceive the red book exactly as it is, is tenable, and for this reason it seems to me desirable to modify the correspondence view as it is ordinarily held.

The modification which it appears to me desirable to make is as follows.

The correspondence which takes place when a true judgment is passed, is formed by a correspondence not between judgment and external fact, but between judgment and perception, or more fully between my perception and the judgment passed by my mind, of which the perception forms the basis or stimulus. The advantage of this modification lies in the fact that both the entities between which the correspondence is to be made out are known. They are both parts of my mind.

Now it has frequently been urged against the old "copying" theory of truth, first advanced by Aristotle, upon which the later correspondence view is based, that it postulates a correspondence between two things of which one is not known.

The difficulty involved is similar to that which

attaches to Representationalism. Either I know directly, the fact with which my true judgment is to correspond or I do not. If I know it directly, what need is there for me to pass a true judgment about it in order to correspond with it? If I do not know it directly, how am I to know that my judgment does correspond with it? Where, that is, we have two entities of which we know (A) but do not know (B), we can never know that (B) corresponds with (A). A true judgment therefore according to the old copying view is either superfluous or unauthenticated.

The view which regards the correspondence as a correspondence between judgment and perception is not open to this objection. I have endeavoured to show in the first chapter that in all perception the mind possesses the power of going out beyond what is actually given, and forming judgments upon our partial and incomplete perceptions. What is before the mind in thinking is not what is actually given in perception but something more than that. That "more" is mental construction. If it corresponds with the perception, we have a true judgment: if not, "error" has crept in.

The correspondence view in its ordinary form has considerable difficulty in accounting for error. If truth lies in correspondence between a judgment or perception and an external fact, what is the external fact in the case of error? It may be argued that it is just because there is no such fact, because correspondence cannot be made out,

that error arises. In this explanation, however, it is difficult to see how the judgment ever came to be passed. We cannot find a basis of perception on which to form a judgment in what does not exist.

We get into endless difficulties if we admit the existence of objective falsehood, and I do not feel that the solution of the difficulty by Mr. Russell's theory of "multiple relations," whereby the mind is related not to one objective fact, but separately and successively to each term in a complex relation is convincing.

For the reasons then that the ordinary form of the correspondence theory involves the assumption that we know objects exactly as they are, that in company with the old "copying" theory it falls into a difficulty of a kind similar to that which attaches to Representationalism, and that it gives no adequate account of error, I prefer the modified view of correspondence as correspondence between judgment and perception, and should be taken as referring to correspondence of this kind when mentioning the theory in future.

Whatever may be the difficulties and the incompletenesses of the correspondence theory, it cannot be denied that it is of the greatest value in practical matters. It is useful in particular in determining that one judgment is truer than another.

If, for instance, A says that B is six feet high, and C says that B is five feet eleven inches and

we take a ruler and measure B's height, and the result is six feet, it is quite obvious that A's judgment is more correct than C's. The criterion by which we assert correctness for A's judgment is that it corresponds with the perception of actual fact as given by the ruler, while C's does not.

Now it is quite true that this test is *purely empirical*, that we have adopted the standard of feet and inches as a convenient way of measuring, and therefore that the height of six feet as given by the ruler is a height that only exists in relation to ourselves. Yet granted all this, granted that the true judgment so arrived at may be devoid of significance—a point upon which I propose to touch later—there is still a very real sense in which the correspondence theory as applied to judgments of isolated fact is correct.

The correspondence theory also appears to be correct as affording a meaning for truth when applied to historical judgments.

If I judge that Nelson was shot in the chest, my judgment is true primarily because of its correspondence with my perception of the meaning of certain printed words written in the page of a history book. But this is not the end of the story. We may proceed to ask how those words came to be there.

Now the truth of such a judgment may be questioned on either of two grounds. It is not suggested that there are not other grounds on which it might be disbelieved, but that there are the

following two possible grounds of disbelief cannot be doubted.

The judgment that Nelson was shot in the chest may be doubted, either (1) on the ground that he was not shot, or (2) that he was not shot in the chest. Now it does not seem to me to be open to question that the only way in which we can possibly ascertain which of these three judgments, Nelson was not shot, Nelson was not shot in the chest, and Nelson was shot in the chest is true, is by an appeal to the testimony of eyewitnesses. If there was once a fact the perception of which by eyewitnesses corresponded with the judgment that Nelson was shot in the chest, then that judgment is true because of that historical fact and for no other reason.

In this connection it may be noted in advance, that the coherence theory of truth provides no ground for supposing it to be any more true that Nelson was shot in the chest, than that he was shot in the head. Both subsequent history and the general structure of my beliefs would be equally coherent if Nelson was shot in the head.

The coherence theory in fact provides no test whereby non-significant historical judgments of detail can be distinguished as possessing varying degrees of truth so that one may be regarded as truer than another. I cannot find it in my heart to believe that my knowledge of history would be any less coherent if I thought that the name of Henry VIII.'s third wife was Anne of Treves

instead of Anne of Cleves, and yet such a judgment would undoubtedly be regarded as historically false on the correspondence view.

The statement that the coherence theory provides no test whereby to judge unimportant historical facts true or false, has of course been denied by supporters of that theory. It is said that the judgment, Nelson was shot in the head, is *not* in point of fact coherent or consistent with the general body of beliefs held by the average educated individual. But as Mr. Russell has pointed out, if this is so, it is because something is known with which it is inconsistent, namely the fact of the manner of Nelson's death, and this fact has been established not by coherence but by correspondence. Thus even if the test of coherence be regarded as legitimately applying to the truth of historical judgments, it can only apply provided something is known to be true, of which the truth has been established independently of coherence.

It has, however, been argued, and justly, against true historical judgments established by correspondence and by correspondence only, that they are robbed of significance. It is certainly true that the value of the judgment, Nelson was shot in the chest, would be increased if we knew what manner of man Nelson was, what he was doing on ship-board, how it came about that he was shot in the chest, and so forth. But significance and truth are not the same thing and there is no need to confuse

them or their criteria. If Nelson was, in fact, shot in the chest, the judgment that he was so shot is true for all practical purposes, quite apart from its significance, and it would remain equally true, even if it were repeated by a person who had never heard of Nelson, and was totally ignorant of English history.

III.

The trouble about the correspondence theory of truth is not so much that it is untrue as that it is incomplete. As we have seen, there is no reason to doubt that we can by its means establish the meaning of truth in judgments of external fact and in isolated historical judgments. But knowledge of isolated historical facts does not constitute a complete knowledge of history. In considering any given period of history, we must admit that there exists something which may be called a comprehension of the whole, which enables the student to gauge the relative importance of various events, to estimate the influence of personalities, to allow for and to trace the interplay of causes and of motives, and to display that kind of knowledge which constitutes what in general we mean by an understanding of the period. This general comprehension is different in different historians, so that no two historians give the same impression of any given period. But though the impressions conveyed by historians may be different, they may be each true and equally

true. We cannot, I think, deny the application of the word truth to this general comprehension, and yet inasmuch as this general comprehension is something over and above the various judgments of isolated historical fact which go to make it up, its truth cannot be established by correspondence alone.

Similarly with regard to the truth about a circle. The third book of Euclid contains a number of perfectly true propositions about the circle as such, and it might be possible to increase these so that all the truths about a circle as such were known. But these truths do not constitute the whole truth about a circle. The circle is also a conic section and as such bears relations to hyperbolas, parabolas and to other conic sections. Hence further truths remain to be ascertained about the circle as part of a whole, which are over and above the truths about a circle as such, and these further truths about a circle as a whole cannot be established by the view which regards truth simply as correspondence between judgment and perception of isolated facts.

The Truth about a thing is not an aggregate of all the true judgments about it. The true judgments remain true, but they are incomplete, and it is in just that particular respect in which they are incomplete, in that respect in which they fall short of the whole truth about the thing, that the correspondence theory fails.

It is for this reason that the correspondence

theory is beset with difficulty when we come to consider judgments which involve concepts or universals.

A concept must be regarded as something more than the sum of all possible perceptions, and in so far as it is more, the truth of a judgment which involves concepts cannot be established by correspondence.

It may of course be argued, as it is argued by psychologists, that a concept has neither value nor existence apart from the perceptions which it represents. I do not think, however, that most philosophers would agree with this view, and if we do not agree with it we must admit that the truth of the "more" involved in a concept must be arrived at by some new test. Let me try to make clear in greater detail what is meant. If I make the judgment "This picture is beautiful," what is the external fact with perception of which my judgment is to correspond? It is not the picture itself, for a *beautiful* picture is something more than a picture. It is not the *ēdōs* of beauty, for assuming that a Platonic *ēdōs* of beauty exists, that *ēdōs* is not to be found in the picture, we do not perceive the *ēdōs* when we perceive the picture, and the *ēdōs* is never completely known. How then is it to be decided whether my judgment is right or wrong? Even if it is judged wrong by the standard of the majority why should I slavishly accept their decision?

It is in cases of this kind that the coherence theory

becomes useful. The coherence theory holds that the meaning of truth is coherence with the general mass of beliefs about the Universe as a whole. Now if Reality can be regarded as a systematic, organic whole, the parts of which are related teleologically to it, if no one fact can be understood by itself, but only in relation to the whole of which it forms a part, it is quite obvious that judgments about any part of reality cannot be known to be true, unless we know what the whole means. As this is humanly impossible, it would seem that judgments involving such concepts as truth, justice and beauty cannot ever be known to be completely true. The conclusion is the same if we believe in the existence of the Platonic Forms of truth, justice and beauty. The Forms themselves can never be completely known, so that judgments about particulars which partake of these Forms and which thus comprise an ultimately unknowable element, cannot be known to be quite true.

This conclusion squares with practical experience. I do not for instance believe that it is possible to pass a true judgment about the meaning of truth, and it is in part the object of this chapter to show that no satisfactory account of this meaning whatever it may be, has yet been arrived at.

Similarly in matters of artistic judgment the differences of opinion that exist are chaotic. Questions of taste are notoriously unsuitable for dogmatic

decision, and it seems impossible to predicate absolute truth or falsehood for any artistic judgment.

It is however argued, and I think justly, that the test of coherence is useful in artistic judgments, not for the purpose of predicating for them absolute truth or falsehood, but as a means by which to discriminate those judgments which are more true from those which are less true. Although it may be urged that there is no external standard, by an appeal to which the judgment of the Chinaman who regarded the preliminary tuning-up as more beautiful than the concert, can be pronounced false, his judgment may be regarded as less likely to be true than that which prefers the concert on the ground that it is admittedly inconsistent with the general consensus of existing opinion on the matter.

But even if the superior truth of the consensus as established by the test of coherence be admitted, it constitutes at best a very weak argument in favour of coherence. A consensus of aesthetic opinion is an elusive thing, and not capable of arithmetical summation. Moreover the consensus of any one age has frequently been shown to be wrong by the consensus of the next, which seems to indicate that a judgment which was once true would become false by sheer lapse of time. Even therefore if we allow the test of coherence in aesthetic judgments, we must safeguard ourselves by the proviso that the test is

an equivocal one, and the judgments which it seeks to establish are for ever wavering between the true and the false.

The truth of judgments involving *a priori* concepts such as goodness and beauty, which are known, in so far as they are known at all, independently of experience, cannot in fact be established by any test. The correspondence theory breaks down, as we have seen, when applied to them: the coherence theory, even if the validity of its application be admitted, is an uncertain guide, and admits a latitude of scepticism as to its conclusions, which does not attach to judgments of which the truth is established by correspondence.

In Plato's language the *εἰδη* all spring from the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* from which they derive their meaning and their existence, and as we can never completely know the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, the *εἰδος* of *ἀληθεία* must itself be involved in some of that obscurity which shrouds its source.

It has been urged that on the coherence theory, and on that theory alone, are we able significantly to deny existence to creatures of the imagination such as centaurs, purple quadratic equations, and triangles whose interior angles are greater or less than two right angles. We refuse to believe in these things, it is said, because a moment's reflection shows that their existence is incompatible with the rest of Reality as we know it.

But the words "as we know it" give the game away. It is an important and frequently emphasised

contention of those philosophers who urge the coherence theory of truth, that we do *not* know the whole of Reality. We know it partially only and imperfectly.

If therefore we knew Reality completely, it might be found as Mr. Russell has pointed out, that centaurs, purple quadratic equations and the rest were not really incompatible with it. The coherence theory of truth which asserts the unreality of centaurs asserts also the unreality of that Reality with which they are supposed to be incompatible. When we know Reality as it is, when, that is, we know the real Reality, we may discover that the real Reality includes real centaurs.

The argument that until we know reality as a whole we can never know absolutely the truth of any particular judgment, applies equally to the coherence theory of truth. On its own premises we can never know that the coherence theory of truth is really true, and for that reason its application should be used with the greatest caution, and only as a test of practical judgments where absolute truth is not required, or at least not required by the coherence theory of truth.

And yet it is as applied to practical judgments that, as we have noticed, the coherence theory is most palpably a failure, for we have seen that it despises the truth of isolated judgments of fact, and deems truth in such matters to be of less importance than "significance." Now it is a little difficult to understand what the meaning of the

word "significance" in this connection is taken to be. As I understand it, however, it is something like this. Where each of several hypotheses can be regarded as an equally probable explanation of certain facts, or where several possible accounts can be given of certain phenomena, each of which fits in sufficiently well with the general structure of our beliefs and our judgments of what is probable, each of those hypotheses or accounts may be regarded as "significant."

Now several different systems have been advanced from time to time with regard to the nature of the Universe, each of which, being perfectly consistent with itself, may be regarded as equally significant. Clearly these systems cannot all be true. One may be true and, in that event, the others must be false, and yet they may all be significant. It is obvious that a certain characteristic must apply to the true one, which is absent from the others, namely the characteristic of squaring with the facts. It is equally obvious that the coherence theory provides no means of recognising this special characteristic, nor of discriminating the true significant theory from the various false significant theories. Provided they are all equally significant, they are all for the coherence theory equally true.

Sometimes the word coherence seems to be used by supporters of this theory very much as if it were synonymous with consistency. Theories are regarded as true not so much because they are

coherent with our general knowledge of the Universe as because all their parts are consistent with one another.

But the test of consistency fares no better than that of coherence. A fatal objection to it is constituted by the fact that there have been several perfectly consistent philosophical systems, which although contradictory to one another, ought each of them on the "consistence" theory to be regarded as equally true, whereas in fact no one of them was true.

Thus Descartes, in common with other rationalist philosophers of the seventeenth century, believed that all the facts about the Universe could be found out by the sheer process of reasoning about it. If the philosopher were to shut himself up in his study, he could, it was thought, provided he reasoned well enough, pronounce infallibly what the nature of the universe must of necessity be, just as, again provided he were clever enough, he could discover the whole body of mathematical truth simply by the process of reasoning upon Euclid's postulates and the properties of numbers. All truth was in fact regarded as being of the nature of mathematical truth, and discoverable by the same means. In so far as philosophers had not been able to do this, their failure was thought to be due, not to the consideration that the facts about the universe might not, all of them, be discoverable by the pure light of *a priori* reasoning, but to a deficiency in the reasoning process itself. On this assumption

philosophers proceeded to turn out systems of wonderful thoroughness, mathematical precision, and perfect consistency, which had no relation at all to the facts of the universe as we know them, except that of being unlike them. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, arguing with praiseworthy logic from certain premises, produced a political philosophy of unrivalled simplicity and clearness, involving, however, conditions which are utterly repellent to the average liberty-loving individual, and which are vitiated by Hobbes' complete oversight of the fact that there are always certain things which people will die rather than endure.

If Hobbes, reasoning in his study, produced a system which was perfectly coherent, but which took no account of the psychology of individuals, are we to call that theory true simply because it is coherent or consistent? On the other hand the whole attitude of the English empirical philosophers, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, is a protest against the identification of coherence with truth. These philosophers based their indictment of the mathematical systems of Descartes and Leibnitz on this one ground pre-eminently, that however consistent these systems might be, they were at variance with the facts as we know them, and so whatever else they were, were not true. The English philosophers corrected the conclusions of the *a priori* rationalist school by asserting that if you want to find out what the universe is really like, you must go and look.

This insistence on the fact that the claims of metaphysical theories must be submitted to the test of the facts as they are known, is a vindication of the correspondence theory of truth, and a repudiation of the claims of coherence.

The argument of the empiricists put briefly was "However coherent a theory may be, it is not true unless it corresponds with the world as we find it."

It is of course argued by advocates of coherence that the philosophical systems referred to above which, though they appear to be coherent, are in fact untrue to Reality, are not really coherent, and only seem to be so because they are not made sufficiently complete.

The argument proceeds as follows : the further the bounds of our knowledge extend, the more will it be seen that only one system is really coherent, that is to say only one system is ultimately true. Other coherent systems which appeared to be coherent with the knowledge we formerly possessed, will be shown to be unable to assimilate fresh facts about the Universe as they are ascertained, or will only be able to assimilate them by eliminating features of difference and reducing themselves to the common pattern of the one true coherent system.

Thus our one coherent system will also correspond with all the known facts, or rather the distinction between ultimate truth and ultimate fact or reality will vanish, correspondence will become identification, and we arrive at the Absolute. This I

take to be the meaning of the rather mystical language in which Monistic philosophers indulge at this stage of the argument, when they speak of ultimate truth and ultimate reality being reconciled and identified in the Absolute.

I do not wish here to re-open the question as to the ultimate validity of distinctions and relations which was dealt with in the last essay. If, however, we assume the arguments there brought forward as to the existence of external relations to be in the main true, the following appears to be a fairly just estimate of the claims advanced by the coherence theory to offer a meaning for the truth.

(1) In so far as it claims to offer a meaning for truth in isolated judgments of historical fact, the coherence theory is valueless and irrelevant.

An interesting example of its irrelevance in issues of this kind is afforded by the reports of a case that recently appeared in the law courts. A man was prosecuted for manslaughter on the ground that he had caused the death of his father by driving him about from place to place in an open dog-cart and inclement weather. Now of the various reports of the case, one contained a misprint, one report stating that the man caused the death of his "sick" father, and the other report averring that it was the death of his "rich" father. The coherence theory of truth affords no means of deciding which of these reports contained the true account. Either epithet is coherent, and I think, equally coherent with our general judgment of

probability in such matters, the word "sick" explaining how easy it was for the old man's death to come about, and the word "rich" suggesting a motive for a crime on the part of an impecunious son who had expectations.

The only method of deciding in such a case is by an appeal to correspondence. The coherence theory breaks down in a similar way whenever it attempts to give the meaning of truth in questions of isolated fact.

(2) If, on the other hand, the coherence theory aims at giving a meaning to absolute and ultimate truth, and takes refuge from the charge that it provides no meaning for the truth of judgments of fact on the ground that it does not do so simply because such judgments being partial are not true, we must judge it by its own high standard and point out that just in so far as it seeks to provide a meaning for ultimate truth it cannot itself be true. No one pretends that the coherence theory, even if it is true, constitutes in itself the whole of truth, and yet it is the coherence theory itself which tells us that nothing short of the whole of truth is true.

So long, in fact, as we assert that the coherence theory, being incomplete, is not wholly and absolutely true, there always remains the possibility that its incompleteness may be found in just that part of it which asserts that there is only one truth, and that that truth is only to be found in the Absolute. There is always the suspicion that if

we knew the coherence theory completely, if, that is, we could cease to regard it as a theory and could contemplate it in its real nature as part of that indivisible system with which it asserts it is related by relations which are themselves parts of it and of the system, we might find it asserting that there are several truths all of them true, and that complete truth *may* be found short of the Absolute.

IV.

If there is any force in the above arguments, it would appear that neither of the orthodox theories of truth is satisfactory in its entirety. Correspondence suits the ordinary facts of experience, while coherence fits into the conception of reality as a systematic teleological whole. As it is urged that it is only on this latter view of reality that concepts or universals can have a definite meaning, coherence provides a standard whereby, although we cannot predicate absolute truth for a judgment involving concepts, we can at least claim greater truth for one judgment than for another. By combining the two theories we may cover the deficiencies ~~of which~~. Such a combination may work well enough in practice but philosophically it is unsatisfactory.

There cannot be two equally true meanings of truth, just as there cannot be two equally true criteria of it, and until we know wherein truth lies, we cannot tell which of its possible meanings is the true one. This leads us to the suggestion that the coherence and correspondence theories both

prove 'inadequate, because proceeding on the assumption that truth is one and the same, they endeavour to discover a meaning for it which will fit all the senses in which it is used. But truth is an ambiguous word, and it is not difficult to see that the theories with which we have been dealing are concerned with different aspects of it.

Coherence is clearly concerned with The Truth, whatever that may be, and despises as untrue whatever falls short of it. When considering a judgment such as "This book is red," it asserts truly enough that this statement does not contain all the truths that there are about the book. It then proceeds to the further assertion, that, because there are other truths about the book, besides the truth that the book is red, therefore the truth that the book is red is not true.

This reasoning presents in another form the doctrine considered in the previous essay, that because a whole is something more than the sum of its parts, the parts are therefore not really its parts, and have no real existence apart from the whole. We saw that there were good reasons for doubting this conclusion, and the same reasons would now lead us to agree with the correspondence theory that the truth, that the book is red, may be itself true, although it is only a part of all the truths about the book.

Whatever be our opinion about this point, there is no room for doubt that the truth that the book is red is different from The Truth about the

Chapter V. UNIVERSALS AS THE BASIS OF REALISM

I.

THE previous essays provide, I hope, in rough outline a sketch of the kind of Realism I am trying to advocate.

I purposely refrain from speaking of this sketch as a system, because, as I pointed out in the introduction, it is of the very essence of this view of the Universe that there is no system, in the ordinary Philosophical sense. The realism advocated in these pages is, in fact, not so much a view of the world as a method of looking at it. It is not even a method in the technical sense of that word so much as an attitude of mind, and I shall try to show in the next two essays that as an attitude of mind it can be applied to two such widely different subjects as the relation of thought to temperament, and the philosophical theory of the state, as well as to the more orthodox objects of metaphysical enquiry.

It will, however, serve the purpose both of filling in the outline given in the preceding chapters, and of bringing what I have said into relation with other Realist systems, if some general remarks are made on the subject of that vexed philosophical entity the "universal."

It will be sufficiently clear from the preceding chapter on the concept of beauty, that I follow very closely the Platonic view of universals, or in Plato's

language "Forms." Certain additions must, however, be made to his account, and certain distinctions pointed out, in order that the theory of universals, which I should regard as the basis of common sense Realism, may be brought into line with modern philosophy.

With the gist of the Platonic argument as it appears, for instance, in the "Republic," I should agree. All just acts must partake of a common nature, in value of which they are all just. This common nature is other than any or all of the individual acts which may be called just. It is, in fact, an object of thought, that which is before the mind when we think of justice. In saying that it is an object of thought I do not mean that it is a mental construction. It is known by mind as a fact subsisting independently in the universe, and this fact is not modified by the circumstance that mind knows it.

Let us assume, for instance, that "X" is a just action which took place in the year 1918; let us also assume that "X" is known by "Y," an individual who contemplates the act. In 1919 "Y" dies, so that "X" ceases to be known by "Y." Is "X," or the qualitative nature of "X," an act committed in the past, modified or altered by "Y's" ceasing to know it? It would seem not, for the fact cannot be altered by an event happening a year later.

Let us further assume that in 1920 the earth collides with a comet, and is reduced again to

chaos, all mind upon the earth being destroyed in the process. The action "X" now ceases to be known by any mind. Does this involve any modification in the qualities of "X" beyond the subtraction of the one quality of being known by mind? I conclude not, and conclude therefore that the justice of "X" is not a mental quality dependent for its existence on mind, but an inherent attribute of "X" arising from its participation in the Form of justice itself.

A similar argument may be applied to prove the existence of the *Form* of justice, and we arrive at the Platonic conclusion that the forms are eternal, non-mental, immutable entities, known by mind, but not owing to mind the fact of their existence.

Difficulties in the theory occur when we begin to examine the nature of the forms or universals themselves. Three types may be distinguished.

First, the universal which exists for each class of sensible particular, e.g., the universals horse, table, man.

Secondly the universal which exists for each class of mathematical entity, e.g., square, triangle, two.

Thirdly the most complete form of universal, such as the universals goodness, truth and beauty.

Universals of the first class are often called pseudo-universals, because they are regarded as a mere abstract of the class they denote. It is therefore denied by many that the universal

man exists. Berkeley and Hume for example said that when we think of "man" we form the image of some particular man.

This contention I believe to be psychologically untrue. I believe that what is denoted to mind by the expression "man" is the universal man. This seems to me to be so because the word "man" would still retain some meaning if no individual men existed to be thought of. Nor is that meaning a mental construction or mental image created by my mind only, for it is clear that the word man would continue to have a meaning even if I ceased to be alive to think of that meaning. Similarly the meaning which it has, whatever that may be, would still continue to be its meaning even if no mind were left to think of it. Therefore the meaning of the word man is neither any particular man, nor one of my thoughts, nor one of anybody's thoughts, it is the universal man which is an object of thought.

This point may be seen more clearly by considering the universals which exist for classes of particulars which are themselves not real, e.g., the universals griffin, unicorn or chimæra.

The question may be asked how can the universal griffin appear to the mind or be thought of unless it is there to appear to the mind or be thought of, and in these cases we cannot answer by saying with Hume that we are thinking of an individual griffin, because no one has seen an individual griffin.

As Dr. Moore has pointed out, when I am thinking of a unicorn, what I am thinking of is certainly not nothing: "if it were nothing then when I think of a griffin I should also be thinking of nothing, and there would be no difference between thinking of a griffin and thinking of a unicorn. But certainly there is a difference; and what can the difference be except that in the one case what I am thinking of is a unicorn, and in the other a griffin." Therefore a unicorn must be there to be thought of, and it must further be thought of as being something different from a griffin. Therefore, the universal "unicorn" exists, even if its only ascertainable attribute is its property of being thought of by me.

This distinguishes the universal unicorn from the universals of real entities, such as the universal man, which possesses other attributes besides the property of being thought of by me.

The next class of universal is the class of mathematical universals. These possess this peculiarity among universals, that they have perfect particulars or instances, and these universals must be carefully distinguished from the perfect specimens of their instances.

The existence of a perfect instance of a mathematical universal may be shown in this way.

When we demonstrate with the help of a figure a geometrical proposition we are not really thinking about the figure we have drawn. As Plato pointed out, the figure we have drawn is in-

accurate in many particulars. Its lines are not straight lines, they have breadth as well as length, and its points of intersection occupy palpable spaces. Therefore many of our conclusions are not true of the figure as drawn.

On the other hand we are not making our conclusions about the universal or Form itself. The Form of a square or a circle is squareness or circularity, and it is not for instance possible for circularity to intersect with circularity, whereas the circles before us do intersect. What is in fact before our mind is the perfect square and the perfect circle, of which there exists one for every imperfect square and circle we draw.

Perfect squares are many, and therefore distinct from the universal squareness, which is one. They are, however, perfect, and therefore distinct from the ordinary particular, which is imperfect. This circumstance of their perfection makes it possible for us to have "*a priori*" knowledge about them, and thereby differentiates them from particulars of universals of the first class, about which our knowledge is empirical only. Plato's view, expressed in modern language, and it is a view which I should accept, is that all *a priori* knowledge deals with universals and the relations of universals. But from the very fact of their resemblance to universals in this matter of perfection, particulars of mathematical universals are also included in the scope of *a priori* knowledge.

An instance will make the point plainer. It

will be observed that there is a difference in kind between the judgment "All red-haired men are quick tempered," and the judgment "All straight lines constitute the shortest distances between any points." The first judgment deals with a particular of a universal of the first class. It is an empirical judgment, and is made without certainty, the proviso being implied that there may always be red-haired men who fall outside it. The mind therefore makes a definite jump beyond the evidence of known instances of red-haired men to the unsupported general proposition.

In the second case the judgment is known to be true *a priori*. Although all the instances of straight lines can never be examined, it is nevertheless known that they will conform to the general proposition. Our conviction in the second case is not strengthened by the evidence of additional instances, and although instances may in the early stages be necessary for the realisation of the truth of the proposition, the truth is known to be independent of the existence of instances. This is because instances of mathematical universals being perfect are the subject of certain *a priori* knowledge; hence the certainty of mathematical propositions. Relations such as "between" or "on" share the peculiarity of mathematical universals in having perfect instances.

This point brings us to a further distinction between universals of the second class on the one hand, and of the first and third classes on the

other, a distinction which illustrates the nature of the being of universals.

Many commentators on Plato have distinguished what they call a later theory of ideas from Plato's earlier view. The chief point of difference between the two theories lies in the different ways in which the relation between the Form and the particular are conceived. As a rule, in the "Republic" for instance, Plato regards the particular as participating in the Form, and owing such being as it possesses to the presence of the Form in it. The verbs *μετέχω* and *κοινωνῶ* are used to denote the relationship.

There are certain classes of Forms and particulars, however, in connection with which this conception of relationship is clearly inappropriate. In particular, numbers and other mathematical entities seem to evade this terminology. Plato held that there was a Form of number, and his followers, according to Aristotle, regarded those numbers which are also Forms, e.g., two-ness as opposed to two, as being the only real kind of number, although for some inexplicable reason they held that there were only ten of such numbers. Aristotle, in criticising this theory, points out that the Forms of numbers are not on all fours with the Forms of other entities. In the first place, they are not real numbers because they will not add; two may be added to three, but two-ness cannot be added to three-ness. In the second place, they cannot be regarded as the source of the existence

of their particulars ; nor indeed does Plato so regard them, for in speaking of the relation between the Forms of numbers and their particulars he drops the language of participation and speaks of the relation as one of imitation. The Form is a *παράδειγμα*, a model, and the relation between it and the particular is a relation of *μίμησις*.

Hence Aristotle argues that the Forms of number and of other mathematical entities are not true Forms.

Numbers are essentially only relations between entities. They imply a standard, and they imply nothing more. They do not, for instance, imply their own real existence, and Plato, it is urged, on the assumption that they were analogous to other kinds of Forms, has gone astray by proceeding to endow them with substantive existence.

Thus, and here Aristotle is in line with most modern criticism, two-ness is simply the relation between a member of a class of entities and the class to which it belongs. It has no independent existence.

By putting together the various statements that occur in Plato's own writing, and considering them in the light of Aristotle's criticisms in the "Metaphysics" it becomes fairly clear that two distinct classes of Forms or universals are here being dealt with by Plato.

On the one hand there are forms such as those of horse and man ; on the other the forms of mathematical relations, such as number, equality,

rest and motion. Forms of the second type belong to the later theory of Ideas, and by his attempt to endow the Form of number with individual substance, thereby treating it as if it belonged to the first type, it is urged that Plato is confusing the two types.

I should prefer to call both types of universal legitimate universals, recognising, however, a difference in their nature, this difference not being always clearly defined in Plato.

Universals of the first type, and their particulars, possess an individuality that cannot be expressed in terms of anything else. We come to know the nature or form of the horse from examples of individual seen horses, and our knowledge is individual in the sense that it cannot be analysed into any other form of knowledge or method of expression. Universals of mathematical relations, universals such as likeness, measure, size and motion, are essentially different. Every statement which gives a scientific account of them gives an account, the essence of which is, that it expresses one thing in terms of another.

This distinction between the two types of universal is, for modern thought, expressive of two distinct ways by which we arrive at knowledge.

The first expresses itself in special sciences such as history and biology, which rest upon the fundamental assumption of the qualitative differences and individuality of their subject matter. The second, assuming only quantitative differences

in the subject matter with which it deals, issues in the mathematical sciences of which the assumption is that everything can be expressed in terms of something else.

Plato makes statements which apply to universals of one class only, and not to universals of the other, in different parts of his writings without specifying which class he is considering. In the famous seventh letter, for instance, he states that definition can only tell us what kind a thing is, can in fact only tell us what it is in relation to something else. The Forms therefore cannot be described in language at all, their individual and peculiar essence being lost in any attempt to state them in terms of other entities. This statement applies clearly to universals of the first class. Equally clearly it is inapplicable to mathematical universals, which *are* definable in the sense in which Plato is using the word definition. Where, however, Plato insists on the community and the connection between the "*ἀρχαὶ*" or foundations of the sciences, he clearly has universals of the second type in mind.

It would seem, therefore, that the very fact that universals of the second type have particulars whose differences are quantitative only, and not qualitative, makes it possible to regard them as, in a sense, abstractions from their instances, devoid of full individuality, and therefore not so full or complete as universals of the third type, such as truth, goodness and beauty.

These latter are concrete, though not in the sense in which the universal of the Idealist is concrete; they are concrete in the sense that they incorporate and contain within themselves all the individual qualitative differences which their particulars exhibit. Whereas it is possible, though erroneous, to regard the mathematical universal as a mere copy of its particulars, the universal of goodness is not a copy of any good act. It is, as Plato says, that which makes the act good, that which, by attaching itself to the action is the cause of its existence as a moral entity. Whereas the relation between squareness and the perfect square may be described as one of imitation, that of the good act to its universal is one of participation.

I have treated somewhat at length the distinction between the different types or kinds of universal, because the fact of the difference has been chiefly provocative of the criticism which has been urged against the theory.

It must be admitted that Plato himself rather invites criticism on this head. He implies that the Forms are homogeneous in character, or at any rate fails to describe their differences, and then proceeds to make observations about them, which are clearly applicable to some types of universals and not to others.

If, however, the difficulty is fairly faced, and the fact of the difference admitted, I do not see that it constitutes any reason for supposing

because there are several kinds of universals, that therefore universals do not exist, or are not very much as Plato described them.

To me the existence of universals, eternal, immutable and separate, seems to be the only basis on which the pluralism I have advocated in the previous chapters is possible.

And the theory is not without striking confirmation from modern scientific developments. One or two instances may serve to show how modern scientific conclusions fit into and imply a theory of fundamental and static universals.

Let us assume that the modern scientific position which describes the ultimate constitution of matter as a number of atoms, electrons, molecules, or what not in a continual state of flux, is correct. How are we to conceive of their nature?

The scientific electron is divested of all sensible qualities. It is not cold or sweet or green. The qualities of coldness, sweetness and greenness are said to arise from the movements of the electrons in certain ways and at certain speeds. They are not qualities of the electrons.

The motions of the electrons being of such importance, we may proceed to ask why the electrons move as they do. Now, if they are themselves featureless and unchangeable, the fact of their motion is unintelligible. The motion of the electrons, which is the result of the attractions and repulsions of the electrons, is unintelligible on the assumption that the electrons

are without individuation. If they were featureless they could not attract or repel one another. Attractions, repulsions, stresses and so on would seem, therefore, to be not so much movements of the electrons as states of the electrons, and the electrons must accordingly be thought of as capable of changing their state.

If, therefore, neither the state nor the position of the electron is unchangeable, where are we to look for an ultimate and abiding reality?

The answer would seem to be in the figure or scheme according to which the electrons move. They move according to fixed and universal laws, and these, being the cause of the movements of the electrons, are in turn responsible for all the change and variety of the world as we know it. These laws, which may be regarded as ultimate and universal, are not different in conception from Plato's mathematical universals, and the considerations which have led us to ascribe being to the mathematical universal will apply equally to the system whereby the movements of the electrons are arranged.

Modern biology suggests a further argument for the existence of Forms as the underlying reality of the changeful world of particulars.

No scientific doctrine commands more universal acceptance than the theory of the evolution of species. Yet many scientists, Sir Ray Lankester for instance, in developing this theory seem to affirm the reality of something which is not a particular thing.

The question may be asked, what is the subject to which the changes and developments in any particular species are ascribed? This subject is not any one of the individuals of the species which successively appear, and the gradual divergence of which from the supposed type is regarded as evidence of the theory; nor on the other hand is it the aggregate of all the individuals of the species. Perhaps the best way of describing the divergence would be not so much as alteration of the type, as the gradual revelation of a type until then imperfectly known.

The Form of the species, by their approximation to which individuals belong to the species at all, imperfectly revealed in the earlier generations, becomes more clearly manifest in the later. Evolution only reveals the universal of the type; it does not alter the type.

The later theory of "sports" held by De Vries and the Mutationists can be interpreted on the same lines. Admitting that the conditions which govern the production of a "sport" in any particular generation are unknown, the conclusion that they are purely "fluke" manifestations of which no account can be given is not the only one to be drawn. Sports may be manifestations of the Form of the species whose nature, not being fully known, has remained unsuspected, at any rate in that aspect of itself which has manifested itself in the "sport."

And in general it must be admitted that the

Platonic theory of universals provides as good an account of the problem of change, or becoming, as any explanation that has been advanced.

An instance will perhaps illustrate that problem in the briefest way. When a child takes a ball of putty and moulds it into a square, what exactly has changed, and how has it changed? As a preliminary distinction we may divide the ball of putty into form and matter,—circularity and putty. It is clear that the child does not alter the matter in the process, the mass of putty remaining constant. Nor does he alter the shape. One shape cannot become another shape, a circle cannot cease to be a circle and become a square. What he does alter is the whole thing, the material in which the distinction between matter and form is made. As the whole thing alters, it is seen that one form replaces another in it. The only account that can be given of this process is that a form which is present at one time, at another time is not present, the change taking place without process of generation or destruction.

The material body, therefore, which changes, points on to something unchanging which is behind the material body, but is not the material body. This unchanging something is the form which remains constant, and is at one time exhibited in the body and at another is absent. Similarly, all change may be accounted for by the presence or absence of a form, which is at one

time manifested in the changing object and at another absent from it.

From the above account it will be seen how fundamental is the position, and how important the function of universals in the kind of doctrine I have been advocating. They are a part of reality, as real as minds, as real as objects, known ultimately by the mind, and not by the senses; the objects of all "*a priori*" knowledge. Our senses, though needful as an introduction to the knowledge of universals, are a hindrance to full comprehension of them, a comprehension which can be realised by mind alone.

II.

The divergence of this view from many current forms of Realism becomes manifest if the position and kind of being I have assigned to universals is compared with the place they occupy in other systems.

I should like to take this opportunity of contrasting this view with a system of Realism so widely known, as for instance, Professor Alexander's.

With the greater part of Professor Alexander's philosophy I should find myself in complete agreement. It is a philosophy which embodies in a high degree those qualities of sanity and common sense which critics have professed to find so conspicuously lacking in many philosophers. It is, in the main, non-technical in character, and

does not in its conclusions involve any great strain on the credulity of common sense.

Professor Alexander denies to mind the peculiar and unique position in the universe which Idealists have attributed to it. Mind is for him simply an object in a world full of objects, with a power of knowing which is dependent on the existence of the relation of physical co-presence between itself and the object known.

The actual process of knowing is one in which "the mind enjoys itself in contemplation of the object," and Professor Alexander thus carefully avoids the introduction of any third entity between the mind and the known object.

Objects are known by mind as they exist, that is to say the fact that they are selected from their environment by mind does not mean that they are vitiated in the process, or that they owe any of their characteristics to mental construction or selection. "Objects are not dependent for their characters on the mind which apprehends them, and have those characters where there are none to apprehend."

Thus the validity of parts is affirmed, as distinct from the whole of which they are the parts. Instead of merging the parts in the whole, and denying their existence short of it, the question is asked whether even the whole can be self-existent independently of its parts. Space and Time are not appearances, as they are for Idealism: they are as real as the objects which they contain.

More than that—and here we approach a more controversial issue—they are for Professor Alexander at the foundation of reality, “holding the world together, so that whatsoever exists, exists in them.” Space and Time are not separate and distinct. There is one reality—Space-Time—“a stuff which is the simplest form of reality out of which all existents are made, as it were, crystals within the matrix.”

Objects, including mind, “are special modifications of Space-Time, eddies in the system of motions, and are, in their ultimate expressions, groups of motions.” Things are divided into categories because of their fundamental spatio-temporal character; identity is occupation of the same Space-Time, diversity occupation of other Space-Time, and so on.

Universals are no exception to the rule that all entities are configurations of Space-Time. “Universality as a category is the constancy of a spatio-temporal configuration.” A universal is more particularly a plan of configuration in the sense that individuals, e.g., individual dogs, follow the plan of construction, which is the universal “dog,” varying from it only within limits. This does not mean that a universal is only a plan or arrangement of particulars having no existence apart from them. It is also a distinct entity, an individual which repeats itself being made of the all pervading Space-Time stuff.

It is not proposed here to discuss Professor

Alexander's conception of Space-Time as the one, ultimate, real reality. We are only concerned with the bearing of his conception on the problem of universals.

The first thing to notice is that there is no difference in kind of being between Professor Alexander's universal and his particular.

"It will be clear," he writes, "that the controversy as to whether universals are separate from particulars, or in them disappears for us, because universals and particulars are made of the same stuff, namely Space-Time, the particular being the specialised configuration, the universal the plan of it."

Space-Time being the continuum in which both universals and particulars are eddies, it is clear that the substance of both is the same. It further appears on reflection that universals and particulars are not distinct or separate, nor is universal separate from universal, or particular from particular. They are united by the fact that they not only draw their being from the same source but partake of the same essence. For Professor Alexander's relations are not external in the sense of being separate from their terms. Relations also are configurations of Space-Time.

If Professor Alexander had said there is Space, and there is Time, and universals and particulars exist in them, it would be possible for them to be distinct from another, and to be related by relations distinct from their terms. But by

saying there is one Space-Time, and universals and particulars and the relations between them are not so much in it, as made of it, Professor Alexander approaches a conception which is not far removed from that of the monistic Absolute.

He does not, it is true, deny reality to the configurations because they fall short of the whole, nor does he insist that his Absolute must be in essence mental, but in its all-absorbingness, its power of endowing with common being and unity of origin all the features of the world of sense, including mind and object and relations, his Space-Time simply duplicates the functions of the Absolute.

If this analysis of the implications of Professor Alexander's Space-Time theory be correct, his claim to present a thorough-going Pluralism, or Singularism, as he calls it, cannot be substantiated.

It is essential for Pluralism that the universal should be distinct from its particular; that it should, moreover, be immutable and static (Professor Alexander's universal, be it noted being made of Space-Time, is a plan of movement, therefore eminently alive, and therefore presumably capable of change); that it should be able at one time to clothe an individual by its presence, and at another to be absent from it; and that it should not be ultimately identifiable with its particulars and with other universals in a common

entity to which both owe their being, and of which both are made.

As regards the relation of the universal to Space and Time, it would seem that, so far from all universals being made of Space-Time, some universals are Timeless, and others non-spatial.

Plato, regarding Time as unreal, sought always for an abiding reality which would be outside time.

His indictment of the validity of physical objects known by the senses, was largely influenced by his conviction of the unreality of things which change. He therefore sought ultimate reality in things which are ultimately timeless such as mathematical relations. The universal of a circle is, for instance, quite independent of the coming into being of its instances, and when Plato was thinking and writing of the second class of universals described above, he regarded all reality as approximating to the type of being they displayed.

Universals of this type, therefore, are timeless. This does not mean, however, that all universals are timeless, although Plato, who frequently, as we have seen, attributed to all universals qualities which attached to some only, often writes as if they are.

Plato's indictment of the changing nature of sensible things will not hold as an indictment of Time itself. Admitting the truth of Plato's indictment of the unreality of changing things

on the ground that at any given moment they are not wholly real, but always in process of becoming something else, there remains open another road to an ultimate reality besides the road that leads to timeless mathematical relations taken by Plato.

While we may agree that our apprehension of the world of becoming is not a complete apprehension, the reason for its incompleteness may be sought not in the fact that the world of becoming is in Time, Time therefore, being the culprit that taints with unreality, but in the fact that we have not time enough in which to complete the apprehension. The mind gets fleeting visions of the world of becoming, not because that world is unreal being in time, but because mind has not enough time to get a complete view. The present is never properly given at any specified moment. The "coming" element cannot be eliminated from it ; and it cannot consequently ever be understood by mind (in the sense in which a universal can be understood by mind) because it has never properly come. History, in fact, can never become science.

— The fact, therefore, that it is all through Time, and only through the whole of Time, that things display their whole reality, does not necessarily lead to the notion of all reality as an unchanging thing, but to reality as a thing enduring through change. Hence we arrive at universals of the first and third types, which are not timeless, as universals of the second type are timeless, but

are in Time, and only display their full nature through their manifestations in particulars occurring throughout the whole of Time.

And it is in connection with universals of the third type, which I have called complete universals, that the difference between Professor Alexander's view and the view that I have advocated here is most marked.

The theory of beauty as a Form or universal which manifests itself in or attaches itself to physical objects without the intervention of mind has been explained in the preceding essay.

For Professor Alexander, however, beauty is a synthesis between two reals, physical and mental ; " in which mind and body join much in the same way as they are synthesised in the human person, and in which the mental element informs the physical thing." The æsthetic object as physical is not, therefore, for him æsthetic. The object in fact only becomes beautiful when endowed with certain qualities imputed to it by mind. " It needs qualities which are imputed to it by the mind, and are not in itself."

To this we should like to make the objection, which Professor Alexander himself brings forward against the theory, that the nature of an object is modified by the fact of its being known, or is in any way dependent upon being known for being what it is, the objection namely that " all mental action is a reaction on the object, and in respect of its cognitive character leaves

the object unaffected in its nature." To take one of Professor Alexander's own examples, "the shilling which is in my possession depends on me for being possessed, but not for being a piece of silver, a white metal with a certain atomic equivalent." Many people, savages for instance, would regard a shilling as beautiful, and its beauty would seem to them to be due to its whiteness and roundness. If, therefore, the line of argument which claims that the whiteness and roundness of the shilling are not mental qualities, are not the outcome of its being known by mind, is a valid argument, why may we not extend it to apply to the beauty of the shilling, which is as much an attribute of the shilling as its whiteness or roundness?

Similarly with regard to the form of Goodness.

Goodness for Professor Alexander is determined by a coherence among wills. "The objects of will are propositions or connections of fact, e.g., so much wine is drunk, this life is destroyed. But what makes such facts good or bad is their accordance or discordance with the wills of persons. Accordingly we call external facts good in so far as they constitute the satisfaction of persons."

Goodness is therefore, for Professor Alexander, relative. It is relative to human will, and actions are good, not in themselves, but in so far as they accord with human wills.

This theory is open to the criticism made

by Dr. Moore in his book on Ethics, that, in so far as it is possible for an action to be in accord with one will or body of wills, and in disaccord with another, it permits of an action being both good and bad at the same time. For any form of Realism which regards actions as well as objects as being what they are, and having the character which they have independently of any person's thought about them, or any body of persons' thoughts about them, this view is untenable.

It is not my intention to side-track this examination of the nature of universals into a discussion on Ethics. I wish, however, further to illustrate what has been said with regard to the nature of universals by showing the bearing upon Ethics of a theory which postulates a Form of goodness.

The nature and operations of the form of goodness may be regarded in the same way as the nature and operations of the Form of beauty. Goodness, like beauty, is a Form or universal. The Form of goodness manifests itself in actions, as the Form of beauty does in objects, and the Form of truth in judgments. The Form of goodness is not present in all actions; some, in fact most actions have no moral significance; nor when it is present is it always recognised. When the Form of goodness is recognised as being present in any action, we call the action moral. Different people, and also different societies of people, have varying capacities for recognising the Form of goodness when it appears. A society which

has a high capacity for recognising the manifestations of the Form of goodness in actions is a society with a developed moral and social consciousness.

Every individual has a tendency to call certain things moral. What things, however, he will call moral, depends in the main upon the community to which he belongs, and also in part upon his own capacity for recognising independently of, or in opposition to, the general moral valuations of his community those actions in which the Form of goodness has manifested itself. If a man possesses this capacity to a marked extent, he is called a seer, preacher, revivalist, or reformer.

How does this account of the manifestations of the Form of goodness square with the utilitarian standard, which regards a good action as that which produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number?

It will be admitted that, as a rule, and over by far the greatest field of human action, the intuitionist and utilitarian criteria of actions deliver identical judgments. That is to say, actions which a civilised society regards as moral do, as a matter of fact, in most cases tend to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Equally clearly this is not always the case. It happens from time to time that so-called moral actions are productive of more unhappiness than the opposite actions. In primitive societies in which the burning of one's enemies was regarded

as a moral, and even religious act, this was frequently the case. As, however, the moral consciousness develops, the number of cases in which the intuitionist criterion of a moral action is at variance with the utilitarian criterion which judges by results, tends to diminish. In the perfect society one may suppose that these criteria would coincide or become identical, and all actions which secured the approval of the moral sense would in fact be productive of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Translated into the language of universals which we have been using, this means that actions in which the Form of goodness is manifest do in fact always produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Actions in which the Form of goodness is recognised as manifest do, as a rule, produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The fact that so-called moral actions do sometimes fail to produce happiness is due to failure to recognise the presence of the Form, or the attribution of it to actions in which it is not present.

A perfectly moral society, like a society whose members possessed perfect taste, would become one which was unerring in its recognition of the presence of the Forms of goodness and beauty.

Chapter VI. COMMON SENSE AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE

IT will be generally admitted that the practice of the States comprising Western civilisation has brought the world to chaos and to anarchy. The question therefore arises for the philosopher, is that practice justified by the theory of the State which Philosophy has evolved? If our answer to this question is that the orthodox political philosophy justifies the present practice of States, and regards such a practice as arising inherently and inevitably from the nature of the State, the further question will arise, is there any reason for believing the orthodox political theory to be wrong?

Common sense cannot but take the view that the discovery of reasons for distrusting the orthodox political theory is a consummation eminently to be desired, since, when the practice of States is almost universally revolting, one cannot help regarding the theory which gives it countenance as vicious. Common sense will start therefore with an ineradicable bias against the prevailing Hegelian theory of the State.

And here let it be said at once that the existence of such a bias is both dangerous and embarrassing to a disinterested contemplation of the nature of the State. A man's reason habitually follows his liking, much as the feet of a hungry dog follow his nose, and the discovery

of intellectual arguments derogatory to a doctrine which one happens particularly to dislike is often a suspiciously easy task. The recognition that bias exists tends, however, to render it more innocuous than it would be if unsuspected, and in general it must be said that the leaders of the modern reaction against the orthodox theory of the State make no secret of the hostility to the State that characterises and perhaps guides their conclusions. Many of these theorists deny the necessity of a State altogether ; others, like Norman Angell, reduce the State to a mere piece of administrative machinery. Generally the State is either discredited on moral grounds or subordinated to other forms of association on economic grounds.

One is tempted therefore to enquire, is there a permanent place for the nation State over and against all the other associations, moral, spiritual, commercial and economic, which cover, or covered before the war, by far the largest part of the normal individual's field of activity ?

The following discussion falls naturally therefore into three parts :-

i. How far can the orthodox political theory of the State, the theory of Hegel, T. H. Green, Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet be regarded as providing a justification for the existing practice of States ?

ii. What are the nature of the arguments which may be urged against that theory ?

iii. If we find these arguments to be on the whole convincing, and the orthodox theory of the State incorrect, is there any logical justification for the existence of the State, i.e., a specifically political body based on territorial divisions as a distinct and permanent form of association in the future of human Society ?

I.

The theory of the Absolutism of the State elaborated in Germany and popularised in England by T. H. Green may be traced in its origin and development to two rather different though allied strands of thought.

In the first place there has been the tendency which is observable throughout the whole history of political philosophy to regard the State as a self-sufficing entity, identical with the whole of human society. Aristotle, for instance, begins his enquiry by abruptly announcing that it is "the nature of the State to be self-sufficing." In Plato's "Republic," although we find a description of the training of a class of warriors to defend the State, and the corresponding implication that there are persons outside the State against whom it is to be defended, no account is given of the extent to which the external relations which the State has with other States, may affect its structure.

This tradition, the tradition that the State may be discussed and considered as an isolated self-sufficing entity, clogs the steps of all political philosophy.

It follows as a corollary that where the existence of other States is recognised at all, it is assumed that the only relation which they can have to the State is one of hostility. Thus, according to Professor Greenidge the juristic or natural relation of one Greek State to another was in theory one of latent hostility, and was recognised as such. This normal relation of States could only be modified by a definite alliance. Brigandage and frontier raids between two adjacent States were in fact permissible, unless a definite treaty of alliance had been concluded.

Grotius held the doctrine of "the freedom of States from all external restraints," and Hobbes was voicing the same attitude when he tells us that "*civitates natura hostes sunt.*"

The existence of other States, and the external relations of the State with them being ignored when the nature of the State is under consideration, the State tends to be regarded as identical with human society, and proceeds upon the basis of this implicit identification to make claims upon its members which could only be justified if it was in fact all embracing. As a result, two distinct questions tend to be confused, namely the relations of the individual as the citizen of a State to that State, and his relations as a member of the human species to mankind as a whole. If the State is identical with human society these relations are identical, hence they cannot conflict; hence the claim made by the nation State, on the authority of the theory

we are considering, upon the absolute allegiance and implicit obedience of its subjects, a claim which, in so far as other claims are recognised at all, is regarded as overriding them. Hence also the power, importance and absolutism of the State and the tendency to endow it with a personality, and in Hegel, with something of the divine.

The second strand in the thinking which has gone to produce the German theory of the State is also derived from the Greeks. It arises from the Greek notion of *φύσις*.

Many Social Contract writers regarded the essential nature of the individual as that which he may be considered to have possessed in some hypothetical state of nature before his primitive ego was unpaired and submerged by the influences of Society. The Greeks took the opposite view. For them, a man's essential *φύσις* or nature was not that which he possessed as a savage, but that to which he could only attain when living in Society. A man in fact was not a man, not wholly in possession of his full nature unless or until he lived in Society ; he was only an animal. It was the function therefore of Society to bring out the latent potentialities of his nature, and to constitute him a real individual. It was only by living in the State that a man could realise all that he had in him to be. It was only by intercourse with his fellows, by the realisation of social duties and the fulfilment of social obligations, that he could develop his full nature and attain to his real *φύσις*.

The individual therefore owes to the State a debt for the fact that he is the highly developed civilised being that he is. Besides the obvious benefits that a citizen of a civilised society receives from the State, free education for his children, and that security from violence which the law guarantees, he also owes the State gratitude for its bestowal upon him of his own individuality in all its richness and potentialities.

This conception of the State as the developer and guardian of the individuality of its members was taken over and developed by German philosophers. Kant, believing the State to be based on contract, describes what he conceives to be the implicit pact between the State and the individual in the following terms. "Men abandon their wild lawless freedom, in order to substitute a perfect freedom, a freedom undiminished because it is the creation of their own free legislative will, but a freedom which nevertheless assumes the form of lawful dependence because it takes place in a realm of right, or law." Hegel extended this peculiar notion of the nature of freedom. It is for him something active and objective, manifesting itself, first, in law, second, in the rule of inward morality, third, in the whole system of institutions and influences that make for freedom in the modern State. In the State man has fully raised his outward self to the level of his inward self of thought. The State represents the sum of the contractual wills of all the citizens in it who have consented to belong

to the State, and by so summing the wills of its individuals it causes to come into existence a new entity over and above that sum, namely the State's will and the State's personality, in which the individual will is made to transcend itself. The State is thus regarded as being an individual, and as an end in itself.

Now as the State is, and is more than the sum of the consenting wills of all the individuals who compose it, its actions must always be irreproachably right in the sense that they represent those wills.

The result is twofold, and somewhat paradoxical.

First the State cannot act unrepresentatively. Thus the policeman who arrests the burglar, and the magistrate who subsequently locks him up, are really expressing the burglar's own free will to be arrested and to be locked up, the policeman and the magistrate being simply the officials of a State which represents and expresses the burglar's will as being a constituent member of it.

Secondly, the individual cannot act purely as an individual, but only as a representative of the State, and he cannot will with a purely individual will, but only with a piece of the State's will. Thus, according to Mr. Bosanquet, even in rebelling against the State the individual does not really rebel with an individual will which has a different source from the communal will, but with a piece of will which he has obtained from the State, a

piece in fact of the State's will, the State being divided against itself.

From this it is but a step to the complete doctrine of the Absolute State. The State comes to be endowed with a number of functions which elevate it into the nature of the divine. Thus "it carries back," says Hegel, "the individual whose tendency it is to become a centre of his own into the life of the universal substance." Thus it enlarges the individual's personality, purging it of petty aims, and enabling it to transcend itself by devotion to something outside itself.

Godlike attributes of irresponsibility and amorality are further bestowed upon it.

For instance the State is the expression of the social morality of all its citizens ; it cannot therefore itself be bound by moral relations. For relations imply two parties, and there can be no other party besides the State which is the sum of all. This I take to be the meaning of Mr. Bosanquet's remarkable statement, "the State has no determinate function in a larger community, but is itself the supreme community ; the guardian of a whole world, but not a factor within an organised moral world."

The State being above morality it follows in Mr. Bosanquet's words that "it is hard to see how the State can commit theft or murder in the sense in which these are moral offences."

It is not surprising that on this view of the nature of the State the normal relation between one State

and another, when indeed the existence of other States is admitted, should be regarded as one of hostility. For the view of the State outlined above is by no means confined to German philosophers. Since T. H. Green popularised it at Oxford, and Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet elaborated its doctrines, it has become an integral part of that idealist philosophy which may be regarded as embodying the orthodox tradition in English philosophical thought to-day. It is popular at Oxford and at the Scotch Universities, and has only been seriously attacked in England during the present century.

Since the war dissatisfaction with the theory has grown. For it is in the omnipotence of the State in time of war that the theory finds its most striking logical development. "The State of war," writes Hegel, "shows the omnipotence of the State in its individuality; country and fatherland are then the power which convicts of nullity the independence of individuals." In the hands of writers like Nietzsche and Bernhardi, who have pushed the State's claims with ruthless logic, the theory develops aspects so revolting that political philosophy has for once been dragged down from the clouds, and the so-called German theory of the State become a byword for execration to the man in the street.

It is true that some, if not most, British thinkers have refused to accept, at any rate in theory, the implications of the Absolutist view of the State as

applied to the State in time of war. The State's paramountcy in time of war conflicted for Green with his "right to life" theory, and he concluded that war could at most be relatively right, never absolutely right. War is not for him an attribute of the perfect State, it is the attribute of a particular State in its imperfect actuality. Green never, however, seems fully to have thought out the particular question of the extent to which the State on his theory is justified in claiming the unwilling services of its members in a war it has chosen for itself, without provocation, how far the State's decision to declare war does in fact necessarily represent the "common will" of individuals, or how far an individual may be allowed to judge for himself to what extent any particular war is, in Green's words, "relatively right."

Notwithstanding this refusal on the part of Green to accept the full implications of the theory, the doctrine of the paramountcy of the State has found as much acceptance in England as in other countries, and has provided an intellectual background and implicit justification for the foreign politics of Statesmen.

The doctrine that the State is not bound in its external actions by the canons of the moral law has had considerable influence on the actual practice of statesmen and diplomats. Our reasons are mainly useful for the purpose of providing intellectual justification for our instinctive bent, and statesmen in all countries have liked the theory

well, because of the sanction it gave to the apparent unscrupulousness of their foreign policies. Hence the philosophy described above has too frequently found concrete expression in the utterances of statesmen, and in the actual dealings of States. Germany's action in 1914 in violating the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium was a perfect exposition of this philosophy in action. England's attack on Copenhagen in 1807 without a formal declaration of war, on the ground that the "interest of the State" and the "immediate security of the people" justified the absorption or destruction of the Danish Navy, was another. Hence it is obvious that if amoral expediency is the guiding principle of State action in foreign affairs, any scheme for a League of Nations based on mutual trust after the war is chimerical. The mutual trust and reliance demanded by such a scheme would be impossible if each nation were to believe that its neighbour was only awaiting the opportunity afforded by weakness or distraction on its own part to indulge in a policy of aggressive Imperialism.

We must therefore try to show that the conception of the State of Hegel, of Mr. Bradley, and of Mr. Bosanquet can be exposed to serious criticism, and that this criticism may be most powerfully directed upon that part of the doctrine which, in the realm of action, urges the exemption of the State from moral considerations, and in the sphere of obligation

justifies the absolute claims of the State upon the allegiance of its members.

II.

The traditional political philosophy described above is, in my opinion, fallacious. It is untrue in the principles which it assumes, and it is based on a fantastic disregard of the facts.

(A). The chief false principles upon which it rests are the assumption of the identification of the State, remarked on above, with the sum of human society and the assumption of its truly representative character.

As regards the first of these assumptions, if it were so identified, the question of how far it should be bound by moral considerations in dealing with bodies other than the State would not arise, for there would be no such bodies. Similarly, if it were truly representative of the wills of all its citizens, the question of the extent to which it was justified in imposing obligations upon them against their wills would not arise, for it would not be possible for the State to act otherwise than in accordance with their wills.

Neither of these conditions is, however, true of the State as we know it, and it is with the State as we know it that common sense is concerned. Let us first consider the question of the relations of the State to other States involved by the first of these principles.

Let us assume for the moment that the para-

mountcy of the will of the State over the wills of the individuals who compose it is a sound principle. Now it must be remembered that this paramountcy is based on the doctrine that the State's will is the sum and representative of the wills of its members. Individuals in the State coerced by the State may thus be regarded as coercing themselves. But once the existence of individuals and bodies outside the State is admitted, it is clear that the same justification cannot be found for the irresponsibility of the State in dealing with them. The State in no sense represents or expresses the will of bodies outside the State. It cannot therefore urge the quasi-moral justification for coercing them which it asserts in dealing with its own members. Forceable action by a State against the citizens of another State has, in fact, no moral basis.

Political theory has endeavoured to overlook this fact by talking always of The State as such, a conception which involves the presumption that no citizens exist other than its own, with regard to whom it is possible for the State to act amorally. Mr. Bosanquet, in a recent paper, read to the Aristotelian Society defends the practice of considering The State as such, as though it were an all comprehensive isolated entity, on the ground that the State is a class name intended to denote any member of the class of States. The State is considered as a representative of its class, and in Mr. Bosanquet's words, "is a brief expression for 'States *qua* States.' Would my critics," asks Mr. Bosanquet,

"find the same difficulty in the title of a book on 'the heart' or 'the steam engine'?"

But this analogy will not hold. The nature and functions of the heart are not modified by the existence of other hearts. The nature and structure of the State is, as we shall try to show, profoundly influenced by the existence of other States and by its relation to them; nor can we arrive at a complete conception of the nature of the State unless these relations and the modification they produce in the State's structure are taken into account.

Mr. Bosanquet goes on to point out that his remarks about the nature of the State are not strictly true of States as we know them existing in imperfect actuality. They are true only of the State in its perfected and complete nature.

Common sense is apt to be impatient of an argument of this kind. It is indeed clear that by "The State" as such, Idealist philosophers mean the perfect State, the State in its complete actuality, tending to stigmatise all existing States which in some point or other fall short of the attributes possessed by the perfect State, as to that extent and in that particular respect not States. The common sense philosopher on the other hand deals with States as they are. If certain arguments with regard to the nature of the State do not apply to States as they are, so much the worse for the arguments. If States as they are do not in any particular respect square with a certain conception of the perfect State, so much the worse for the perfect

State. After all the desirability of the further development of the State in the direction of perfected actuality is not an incontrovertible premiss ; and it is at least open to doubt whether, having regard to the defects displayed by States, as we know them, we should not be justified in asking for less of the State, and not more of it.

This is an important point, for it determines the nature of our approach to the problem, and the aspects of it which will seem to us to be important. Mr. Bosanquet evinces a disinclination to consider the nature of existing States. Being interested primarily in his conception of the perfect State, he tends to regard existing States as real and incidentally as interesting only in so far as they approximate to his conception. For this reason their State nature, such as it is, must be developed ; everything irrelevant to the true nature of the State must be suppressed. "More of the State and not less, is required within communities," says Mr. Bosanquet. If, however, our interest is centred on States as we know them, and the desirability of the further development of the State nature is questioned, we shall regard as misleading any argument which, by speaking of "The State" as an isolated all-inclusive entity, overlooks the existence of the relations which States as we know them undoubtedly possess to bodies which are outside the State.

Once the existence of such bodies and the relations which the State bears to them be admitted,

it is difficult to see why it is any harder for the State "to commit theft or murder in the sense in which these are moral offences" in dealing with them, than it is for a church, trading company, or college authority to do the same. If in fact the principle of morality is recognised as a possible guiding principle in the relations of one individual with another, there seems to be no reason why it should suddenly vanish as a guiding principle in the relations of a number or group of individuals with another group.

We may trace in history the various stages which have marked the growth of social organisation from individual plus individual equals family, from family plus family equals tribe, until we arrive at tribe plus tribe equals State. As each fresh social unit was registered in this advance, it came after a time, but only after a time, to be recognised that it should be bound by and subject to moral relations in its dealings with other units of the same kind. No-one now would dream of doubting that a family was under an obligation to observe the code of morality in its dealings with a neighbouring family, on the ground that the family could be regarded as a corporate entity, possessing a will of its own, representing the wills and claiming the allegiance of all its members. Why then cannot philosophers do the further addition sum of "State plus State equals human society," and why cannot they admit that the moral obligations which are considered binding upon other social units in

their dealings, are binding also upon States in their dealings?

It may, of course, be argued that the individual is not in point of fact guided by moral motives in his dealings with other individuals; why then should States be so guided?

But few, I think, seriously doubt that the individual does acknowledge a moral code, even if he fails to practise it.

It is not true that the individual is actuated by purely selfish motives as the artificers of that figment "the economic man" would have us believe, any more than it is true that he is guided by purely altruistic motives. The truth seems to be that the individual is far more attached to the interests of one person or group of persons than to those of others. He may, for instance, be the representative of a company or a college, or the trustee of certain property. People in such a position are frequently paid to look after other people's interests. Such men have no right to be generous for other people, and in this sense and in this capacity they are continually acting as the so-called "economic man" would act, since they are concerned more for the good of certain particular people, than for that of society as a whole.

But though most individuals as regards some part, at least, of their actions, act in a typically economic way, such a procedure does not mean that they are acting purely selfishly, or that their actions are exempt from moral considerations.

The question of selfishness or the reverse has nothing to do with the particular considerations which influence the actions of a man who is definitely acting on behalf of others.

The Foreign Minister of a State is in this position. He is bound to consider the interests of his own State as of primary importance. But he is not bound to allow those interests to blind him to all considerations of a moral right and wrong, on the ground that he is the representative of an all embracing body which by its very nature is precluded from the possibility of acting immorally in its relations with other bodies.

If, as we have seen above, the allegiance which individuals have owed to certain social units, such as family and tribe, has not exempted their actions from moral considerations when acting on behalf of their family or tribe, there is no reason to invest with such an exemption an individual acting on behalf of a State. The allegiance and loyalty which such a man owes and is expected to owe to the State for which he acts, involves the subordination of his own interests to those of his State. Such loyalty is called patriotism. "Patriotism" in this sense, says Mr. Russell, "contains an element at once noble and open to attack, an element of worship, of willing sacrifice, of joyful merging of the individual life in the life of the nation." But once we admit that it is a valuable thing for the individual to recognise a good other than his own good, namely the greater good of

the community to which he belongs, there is no logical reason for stopping short of the human race. Just as the individual's allegiance to tribe or family has become merged in and transcended by allegiance to the nation State, the community which has grown up out of the amalgamation of these smaller units, so allegiance to nation may "logically be expected to merge into allegiance to the community of nations which may one day transcend the nation."

I have endeavoured to show in this section that there is no peculiar characteristic attaching to the nation State as we know it to-day of such a kind as to render it alone of all the social units which have marked the stages of the organisation of society, entitled to dispense with the ordinary principles of morality in dealing with its neighbours.

The State on this conception is not the all-embracing unity subsisting in amoral isolation, and marking an ultimate stage in social development envisaged by the traditional political Philosophy; it is rather a unit, and not necessarily an ultimate unit marking a definite stage in social progress, existing in a world containing a number of other such units to which it is related by the ordinary principles of moral intercourse. It is, in short, a factor in a moral world outside itself, even if that moral world is not as yet a highly organised one. It is not simply the amoral guardian of the moral world constituted by itself.

(B). The traditional political philosophy is

based on a fantastic disregard of facts. It disregards first the existence of the large numbers of associations of individuals formed for non-political purposes both inside and outside the nation state, and it disregards in the second place the actually existing amicable relations between different States.

(1). A common sense view of modern society provides us with a very different picture from that painted by theorists of the omnipotent State. The Political State has not at any time been the only form of organisation known to man. At no time, however, were its boundaries cut across by so many other organisations as during the years before the war.

For this there were several reasons. The existence of the State as a unity depended upon what may be called the general principle of cohesion among its members. In order that it might be a nation and not an agglomeration of individuals, a certain power of getting on together was required of all its members. This power, from which it derived its unity, depended in its turn very largely upon the existence of common customs and common traditions. It could only be built up after a considerable lapse of time, and the growth of the political organisation called the nation State was consequently a slow and difficult affair. Also the stability of that organisation would depend in a large part upon the maintenance of that community of custom and tradition which characterised its members and guaranteed its cohesion.

During the last century, as the result largely of the invention of machinery, the spheres of custom and tradition in the individual's life have shrunk.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the way of life which was followed by the citizens of western states, had with unimportant modifications remained the same for centuries past. People performed the ordinary operations of life in a traditional manner, and the operations which they performed were themselves traditional. Consequently, a general basis of customary behaviour among citizens could be assumed to remain constant, and it was on this basis that the State rested. The coming of the Industrial Revolution, and increased facilities for communication brought about a rapid change in social life. Big towns grew up, factory life came into existence, money was made rapidly, and fresh social strata appeared bringing with them fresh manners and customs. Local customs ceased as a result to be distinguishable as such in definite districts ; people's lives in general rested less on habit and custom and more on idiosyncracy and income, and no general way of life could, as was formerly the case, be taken for granted by the State. As a result, that part of the individual's behaviour which was bound up with the political organisation to which he belonged, being the part which was identical with the sphere of habit and custom shared by other inhabitants of the same State, but not by

the inhabitants of other States, decreased both in importance and extent.

On the positive side, other and new ways of behaviour came to take its place. As a result of the individualist thinking of the nineteenth century, aided by the rapid change of circumstances indicated above, the old Greek notion that one good life could be definitely and universally predicated for all individuals in the State, it being the business of the statesmen to define and promote this good life among the citizens by means of the laws, came to be abandoned.

For the Greeks there had been a definite contrast between the statesman and the ordinary citizen, the former setting the moral standard, the latter following it unquestioningly. We hold on the contrary that inspiration and insight into moral goodness may come from any member of society, that there is no one good life applicable to all individuals, and that it is vital to leave to the individual the power of judging for himself within limits the kind of good life he should lead. Thus it is not now possible to formulate for the individuals of a modern State any one theory which will define and govern their relations to the State comparable with the theory of Natural Rights, or the Law of Nature of the Middle Ages; theories which remained constant, independently of considerations of change. Freedom of contract is now postulated universally for the individual, and this freedom finds concrete expression in the

formation of numerous associations of individuals for non-political purposes which have no necessary relationship with the State.

These associations are mainly of two kinds ; associations of individuals for economic purposes, and associations of individuals for ethical purposes. They may be of world-wide extent, embracing citizens of many States, such as the Roman Catholic Church, or they may lie wholly within the boundaries of one particular State. In no case however do they contain all the inhabitants of one local territorial division. Having for their object either the production of wealth or the encouragement of ethics and religion, they include all that is of most importance in the relations of the individual with society, and they were before the war squeezing the State out of the life of the ordinary man to such an extent that almost the whole of his activities were carried on in associations non-co-terminous with the State. The State, in fact, only entered into the life of the ordinary man when he had to pay taxes, serve on a jury, or vote. These associations cutting, as they did, right across the bounds of the nation State, were coming profoundly to modify its structure, presenting in their possible ultimate development an alternative to the perfection of the nation State ideal indicated by Hegel and Mr. Bosanquet ; and yet they receive practically no attention from orthodox political philosophers who continue to describe the nature of the State as if the State remained unaffected

by these organisations, as if, in fact, such organisations did not exist.

Let us examine a little more closely the nature of these associations. The largest are economic associations for the production of wealth. Being economic in aim, their methods and objects are different from those of political associations. The distinction between so-called economic action and political action is not so much one of insight and method as of ends. Economic action is dictated by individual ends ; political action by the ends of a Society as a whole. The disregard displayed by economic action for the interests of all save the authors of that action produces the effect of blindness, characteristic of economic law.

It is not, however, true to say as many philosophers of the Norman Angell school have held, that the economic conception represents the behaviour of most men. If this were true, if, in fact, everybody was primarily selfish, appeals to the good of society at large would fall on deaf ears, whereas if no other instance were forthcoming, the existence of the self-sacrificing patriotism that marked the opening of the war proves that individuals are influenced by the welfare of society as a whole. A truer conception is that which regards all men as economic men as regards certain of their actions and certain of their aspects, those actions and those aspects being precisely those which arise from the fact that, as remarked above, individuals care more for the interests of some

people than they do for those of others. It is to this fact, and not to the fact that most men are always selfish, that we may attribute (in the modern State) the growth of associations of economically acting individuals for the production of wealth.

These associations have seemed to some to be so important that they were at one time regarded as making war between States improbable if not impossible. Cobden's famous ideal of Free Trade depended on and was conditioned by an amicable society of free nations affording a background of security for international trading companies and financial associations. To increase the maximum of available wealth was his chief object, and he thanked God "that Englishmen live in a time when it is impossible to make war profitable."

Norman Angell describes a society so enmeshed by the interweaving of financial organisations that the economic welfare of almost any part of it is dependent upon the economic welfare of the rest. "The telegraph," he says, "involves a single system of credit for the civilised world; that system of credit involves the financial interdependence of all States."

Although we may not agree with all of Mr. Angell's conclusions, we must recognise that the synchronised bank rate and international financial associations on which he lays stress constitute an element of great significance for, and some hostility to, the Absolute State ideal. He shows that "It pays men better to think and feel as members of the

universal society," i.e., as if territorial State boundaries did not exist, or would shortly be superseded. "In banking, and for that matter in other economic things also, the world is one Society. Politically it is several distinct societies tending to compete with one another. Of these two facts the former is more important, and determines action to a greater extent."

When it is remembered that these economic associations cut right across the bounds of the nation State, it will be seen that they afford the possibility of a division of society based on economic interests, alternative to the State division of society based on territorial proximities. In practice, what was happening before the war, was that the member of a company whose object was the production and importation of oranges from Brazil was much more concerned in the interests and welfare of the Brazilians who sent over the oranges, than in those of his next door neighbour in a London suburb whom he probably did not know. Here we have the gradual substitution of an economic international bond based on money-making, for the old local and national bond based on the chances of birth in the same square mile. A common sense fact of this kind making clearly against the influence of the nation State, and pointing on to an order which may possibly supersede it, is ignored by political philosophers, who continue ideal State building oblivious of the practices of individuals.

The case of associations for ethical purposes is somewhat similar. Since the time of the Greeks the moral and religious side of the individual's activities has become more and more dissociated from the State, and it is no longer the business of the law-giver to decide what the good life for the individual shall be. It is only during the last century, however, that great stress has come to be laid on the importance of individual choice in ethical matters. Mill first emphasised the fact that in matters of conduct and belief the spontaneity of the individual is of great value, and ought not to be cramped. "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion and only one person was of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." It is now recognised that it is only through individuals that the vague aspirations and religious insight of any particular age gain expression, and these individuals may be and usually are, dissociated from and hostile to those who hold political power. We are no longer prepared to accept authority in these matters unless it is self-chosen, and the reason why Utopias produce as a rule such a feeling of repulsion is because the average reader does not happen to want to live the kind of life which their authors advertise as the best. "Mankind," says Mill again, "are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves,

than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest."

Now as the State is not concerned with the good life, but only, as we shall try to show later, with the background necessary for the maintenance of the good life, it becomes clear that in matters of ethics the State's concern is rather with criminals than with honest citizens. The ordinary citizen accordingly ceases to find satisfaction for his ethical needs in the political organisation and State controlled Church to which he belongs, and seeks to form independent, and often international, associations for the purpose of satisfying his soul in his own way.

Under the continually increasing stress and strain of modern life, the individual finding himself endowed with an increasingly complex moral, or more cynically, nervous system, has tended to found increasingly esoteric and variegated associations for its satisfaction. People are heard to complain that politics is, on the whole, a dirty game into which they do not wish to enter, a game which observes in public life a lower standard of conduct than that which they maintain in private. Mere outward observance of the laws of the State does not demand a high degree of morality. A law-abiding citizen is not necessarily a moral man, and a law-making citizen is frequently an immoral man. No man would dream of voluntarily submitting his intimate personal relations to the handling of the law, and it is widely felt that the morals

of the individual are not only outside the State's business, but above its level. "Why should I," argues the individual, "who have a high ideal of life and personal relations conform to the law, which has a low one?" Hence have arisen all kinds of associations of individuals for ethical purposes which take no account of the State, and transcend its barriers. Theosophy, Christian Science, Spiritualism, and the High Church Party, are all representative movements which tend to substitute a loyalty to groups for a loyalty to individuals, and make claims upon their members other than, and sometimes antithetic to, the State's claims.

Associations of these two classes embrace all that is most intimate in the individual life. Every activity that fills his pocket or enriches his soul, goes on in associations non-coterminous with the State. Thus individuals engaged in the pursuit of material or spiritual satisfaction pay no heed to the boundaries of the nation State, and in fact ignore the divisions upon which it is based. It is inevitable, therefore, that when the claims imposed by human society upon¹ the individual are increasing both in complexity and intensity, there should come a clash. And the clash between the claims of the State and those of other associations is but symbolic of the clash between the philosophy which regards the perfection of the State ideal as the only legitimate development of social organisation, and that which regards the State as only one, and not necessarily the

most important one, of the forms which the more complete organisation of society may take.

The difference between the view I am trying to put forward and the traditional political philosophy is most sharply brought to light in just this matter of the conflict of claims.

On this point Mr. Bosanquet writes as follows :—
“ It is an error, I think, resting on a confusion regarding the sphere of the State, to suggest that obedience to it can conflict with the existence of loyalty to associations. . . . at home or abroad. The State’s peculiar function is in the world of external action, and it does not enquire into the sentiments of men and women further than to establish the bona fide intention which the law includes in the meaning of the act. But whatever loyalties may exist in the mind, the State will undoubtedly, when need arises, of which it through constitutional methods is the sole judge, prohibit and prevent the expression, in external acts, of any loyalty but that to the community which it represents. Absoluteness in this sense is inherent in the State.” It is here laid down that when the conflict of claims referred to above has to be decided in the field of external action, the State is in all cases at its discretion entitled to enforce obedience to its claims as opposed to the claims of other associations, and furthermore it is, and must necessarily be, the State’s nature so to do.

Now it is precisely this proposition which is

emphatically denied. It must be remembered that of all the associations to which the individual belongs, the State is the only one which he does not join by his own voluntary act. The individual joins ethical and economic associations by choice. He belongs to them because they satisfy a need of his nature, or a want of his pocket. To the State he belongs because he happened to be born in a certain bedroom, a phenomenon over which he had no control. The origin of the State's claim upon the individual is thus founded on a topographical accident.

As it frequently happens that a man's motive for joining some other association is due to his dissatisfaction with the State in which he finds himself, the State is not entitled to assume that in time of conflict the individual will yield unfaltering allegiance to the State which has failed to satisfy his needs, and flout the claims of the particular association which may be presumed not to have so failed. The phenomenon of the conscientious objector to military service in war-time affords a good instance of the case in point. The conscientious objector says in effect, "I recognise that I am a member of a political association called the State, and that this association from which I derive the benefits of security and a social consciousness has important claims upon me. At the same time I am a member of another and larger association, namely, the human race. In certain cases the claims of the State and the claims of

humanity may conflict ; such an occasion has now arisen, and I am bound to consider to which of the two I owe the greater allegiance. It is not a foregone conclusion that I should in all circumstances obey the claims of the State, and I must above all retain the right to decide according to the dictates of my conscience."

Now in coercing such a man the State is exercising a power to which it can lay no claim except on the Absolutist theory of State. And when we say that the Absolutist theory of the State is based on a fantastic disregard of facts we mean that it takes no regard of the phenomenon of conflicting obligations (a phenomenon exemplified by the conscientious objector), which arises from the fact that the individual is a member of more than one association, except in so far as it represses all such obligations on the ground that it is absolute. In doing so it overlooks the fact which precluded Hobbes' perfectly logical theory of the State from being anything more than a mathematical pattern State drawn on paper—namely that there are always certain things which people will die rather than stand. Their revolt may be either against the exercise of the State's claims or against the State's denial of their right to choose between conflicting claims.

It is this factor of revolt that renders it impossible for the State to be absolute in anything but name. So long as people have the will and the power to deny its jurisdiction in any par-

ticular respect, it is not absolute; and the fact that people have such will and power, disastrous as it may be for the Absolutist Theory, is for themselves the indispensable safeguard against oppression.

Were it not so, were the Absolutist theory founded on fact, it would be possible for the State to inflict any arbitrary humiliation upon its members to be accepted without demur. Were the State for instance to decree that every fifth citizen should be branded with the letter "T" on his left cheek, on the ground that it was for the State's good, or, in Mr. Bosanquet's words, "when need arises of which it through constitutional methods is the 'sole judge,'" there would be no logical ground for resistance to such a decree. The enormity of such a position produces an inevitable reaction from the theory which contemplates it as possible, and recent experience of State power in war-time suggests that a possible line of development as over against this "more of the State," which Mr. Bosanquet postulates as a panacea for existing defects, may be the further development of voluntary associations for purposes other than political, between the rival claims of which and of the State the individual shall when they conflict be the sole arbiter.

(2). The traditional political philosophy disregards both the existence of other States and the increasing complexity of the relations of the State with them. In so doing it overlooks the fact that

the normal relation of one State with another is a relation, not of hostility, but of friendly intercourse, a friendliness which on the Absolutist theory is inexplicable.

Different methods of intercommunication and inter-State arrangements, mainly of an economic nature, were growing up before the war to which the traditional political structure of the State involved has failed up to the present to adapt itself. The evolution of international postal and telegraph systems, quarantine regulations, standardisation of weights and measures, informal arrangement for the repatriation of aliens, all point to the beginnings of international "rapprochements" which have as yet found no political expression. As a rule such movements and tendencies only find expression in actual modification of State structure at a considerable period after they have attained concrete form. Although, however, the outward form of the State may remain apparently unaffected by this *de facto* transgression of its territorial boundaries, it would be futile to contend that the nature of the modern State has not been profoundly modified by the growing intercourse between its own citizens and those of other States, and any political theory which seeks to give an account of the nature of the State must find a place for these modifications, and so define the State as to embrace them in the definition. This the Absolutist theory, in regarding the State as an isolated entity, fails to do.

Most significant is the fact that some of the arrangements referred to are based on moral considerations. The fact that no State acting alone can control disease has long been recognised, and the obligations of the State towards the citizens of other States in this matter are admitted.

The adjudicative provisions of the Nobel prize, and the international impartiality which has characterised the administration of them, deserve special attention as showing that States have actually been brought to the official recognition of literary and scientific achievements of value among non-citizens. *De facto* developments of this kind find no place in the ordinary theory of the State. According to that theory the State has no moral obligations towards the citizens of other States, and except for purposes of aggression or defence, no official cognisance of their existence. Once again the theory fails to take account of admitted facts.

To sum up the points discussed in this section, I have tried to show :-

A. That the traditional political philosophy is wrong in principle, failing as it does to see that if moral considerations are applicable to the relations of individual to individual, of guild to guild, of Trade Union to Trade Union, and of family to family, they are also applicable to the relations of State to State. There is nothing in fact unique about that particular division of human beings

called a State, so that when grouped in a State and acting as a State they may justifiably disregard that moral code by which they are bound in their other relations.

B. That the traditional political philosophy disregards the facts of modern society. It disregards (1) the existence of the numerous associations of individuals for non-political purposes, the significance and possible hostility of these associations to the State, the alternative line of development for human society which they suggest, alternative, that is, to the conception of an even more powerful and more perfect State, and the conflict of claims upon the allegiance of the individual arising therefrom. It disregards (2) the existing amicable relations between States, and the extent to which the rigid demarcation between the boundaries and authorities of different States involved by the isolating tendencies of the theory, is being in practice cut across and broken down.

The considerations indicated above and more particularly the chaos to which the competing power of absolute States has reduced the western world, have produced of late years a powerful reaction against the Absolute State theory. Writers have gone so far as to deny the necessity of the nation State, and to predict its extinction. We have now to examine this reaction, and to see how far we may legitimately follow it in its disregard of, and contempt for the State.

III.

Even before the war, a general movement of opposition to the State was apparent. The Collectivist reaction to the Individualist thinking of the nineteenth century had in its turn produced its reaction.

There is no doubt that in the field of intellectual controversy the Fabian School of thought had won a fairly complete victory over its individualist opponents by the opening of the twentieth century. But there was always an uncomfortable feeling that the victory of thought had produced a deadening of spirit. Revolutionary ardour had become diverted into plans for sanitation, and Socialism which had been an affair of red ties and long hair had become a business of red tape and safety razors.

A section of the Socialist movement had indeed always been opposed to the State. They based their faith rather on direct economic action, than on political power, and capturing the State machine. They distrusted Fabianism as tending to separate the body politic into two distinct sections, (1) the "workers," carefully and benevolently regimented by, and moderately contented under (2) a hierarchy of intelligent and public spirited officials, who drew their salaries from the fruits of the "workers'" labour, and governed them efficiently in the "workers'" own interests. Now an elaborately organised State involves an elaborately organised and specially trained governing class, and this is regarded as the negation of democracy. Hence an insistence

on the economic power of the workers, and the importance of a revolution in industry from below which will place the control of industry in the power of the workers themselves either with a collateral political power, concerned with education and foreign relations (Guild Socialism), or without any specific body corresponding to our notions of a political authority (Syndicalism).

This general reaction to the State differs in this from the older Individualism, that it tends to substitute for the state as the repository of power and the keystone of society, not the individual, but the group or guild. "In the sphere of economics," says Mr. Barker, "this doctrine assumes the form of Guild Socialism. In the sphere of legal theory it assumes the form of insistence on the real personality, the spontaneous origin, and (with some of its exponents) the inherent rights of permanent associations." In this latter form, the doctrine has been urged on the one hand, by the advocates of the rights of Trade Unions, and on the other hand, by the champions of the rights of churches and ecclesiastical bodies. In both forms it has tended to produce a federalistic theory of the State, whether the State is regarded as a union of guilds or a "community of communities which embraces groups not only economic, but also ecclesiastical and national."

The importance of the voluntary associations for non-political purposes described in the previous section thus finds explicit expression in political

theory. With this strand of thought is combined a general tendency to anti-intellectualism, an impatience with authority, a leaning to the swift decisions of the referendum as opposed to gradual filtration of the people's will through a representative system, a reliance on instinct or intuition as a short cut to the laborious conclusions of thought, which rightly or wrongly traces its origin to the philosophy of Bergson. The result is a general reaction to the State which expresses itself in many different forms, and numbers among its exponents men with such different political views, as Mr. Belloc, Mr. Orage, Mr. Bertrand Russell, Mr. Angell, M. Sorel, Mr. Pearson, and many others. Since the war this feeling has been enormously strengthened. On the one hand the growth of State power in internal affairs, with the consequent curtailment of the liberty of the individual, the increase in the number of officials and in the scope of their authority, an authority which extends into the most intimate domain of the individual's private life, has given people a disagreeable foretaste of the kind of Government an efficient bureaucracy under a highly organised State would involve. On the other hand many people have come to attribute the fact of the war itself to the predatory power exercised by the modern State, combined with its irresponsibility in the sphere of external relations, an irresponsibility untrammelled by moral considerations.

The view which attributes the origins of the war to the power of the State is, I think, for the reasons discussed above, in essence a correct view, and the charge which it implies is answered in an unconvincing fashion by the upholders of the Absolute State theory. The gist of Mr. Bosanquet's answer to it seems to be that the chances of conflict between the State and other States are minimised and ultimately avoided by perfecting the organisation of the State.

"States," he says, "are, or should be, co-operating units, and the more perfectly each of them attains its proper object of giving free scope to the capacities of all persons living on a certain range of territory, the easier it is for others to do so." And again, "In order to reinforce the organisations of rights by other States the main thing it (the State) has to do is to complete its own." Admitting that all organisation brings a risk of conflict between the organised bodies, Mr. Bosanquet finds a remedy in the more complete organisation of those bodies, and so we come back to the usual conclusion that "Therefore in this sense, to begin with, we want more of the State, and not less."

It is a little difficult to see why the more complete organisation of England before the war as a self-expressing democracy, in which the State performed more fully its function of sustaining the individual's rights, would have rendered England less open to the chances of conflict and attack from a

military autocracy such as Germany. "The more complete discharge of their functions by existing States" can only result in the State being made more efficient as a State, more Absolute, and therefore more devoid of morality in its external relations, and more menacing to the freedom of its component members. It would not remove the incentive to conflict between States, except in so far as the State, more efficiently organised, might deter its neighbours from attack through fear, but it would render the State more likely to prevail should conflict arise. And this indeed appears to be the most probable fate for the world if States develop in practice along the lines laid down for them by theorists, a congeries of self-contained and isolated States, suspicious of their highly organised neighbours, and restrained through motives of fear alone from attacking them—a world in fact, armed for peace.

It is a little difficult to see how Mr. Bosanquet's definition of the State's function holds on this development of his theory. It is the function of the State according to Mr. Bosanquet "to give free scope to the capacities of all persons living on a certain range of territory," but the exercise of this function appears to be always subject to the right by which "In times of stress. . . . it will suspend or subject to conditions any form of intercourse between its members and persons or associations within or without its territory, and will require any service that it thinks fit from its

members." It is clear that the simultaneous exercise of this function and this right on the part of the State is incompatible, and as you do not remove the chances of external conflict by the perfection of internal machinery, perfection of internal machinery tending rather in Mr. Bosanquet's sense of the word machinery to increase the individual's faith in the State, and make him more subservient to its purposes, it rather looks as if the theory itself foreshadows what in practice would be its inevitable outcome, namely, not the increased development of the individual and the maintenance of his right of self-development, but the restriction of his liberty, the diversion of his capacities, and the exploitation of his services in the interests of the State.

In any event the answer of the apologists for the State has, on the whole, failed to satisfy those critics who see in its unrestricted power the inflammable material from which wars are generated, and the distrust of the State has proceeded so far that many wish to abolish it entirely, or reduce it to a mere piece of administrative machinery.

The lines of thought which are most hostile to the State are essentially economic in character. Mr. Angell's is typical of many. As we have seen above he regards the stratification of society on an economic basis as more important than, and destined ultimately to supersede, the present political stratification on a territorial basis. The

doctrine, like many economic theories, is at bottom fatalistic in character.

It is assumed that each man is both more attached to his own interests than anyone else, and also more capable of looking after his own interests than anyone else. It is further regarded as a self-evident truth that individuals do not act in ways which do not pay them, and as an economic fact that wars do not pay ; they do not pay even the victor. Now wars are a direct outcome of the division of society into political States. Therefore political States will tend to disappear, and the only kind of war likely to survive is the economic class war, which is calculated to pay the poor and the many at the expense of the rich and the few. Hence Mr. Angell seeks to eliminate the fact of national politics at the expense of international economics. The State is regarded as an obsolete institution, which will only survive, if at all, for the purposes of administrative convenience ; beyond this the State is regarded as having no essential function in society.

It would be easy to criticise this argument. It is for example like many materialistic theories based on so called self-evident truths, open to the objection that if the consummation indicated is inevitable there is no need to urge it. If in fact Mr. Angell's view that people do not go to war because it does not pay is true, there is no need to urge them not to go to war on the ground that it will not pay.

A self-evident truth which is frequently overlooked is that self-evident truths are not evident to all people. As a fact people act uneconomically from their neglect of the truth on which Mr. Angell bases his doctrine as frequently as they act economically. The nationalistic instinct called patriotism, the instinct for self-sacrifice, the desire for power as opposed to gain, all prompt people to act in ways which do not pay them, and the State which affords scope for the expression of all these human characteristics will stand so long as they persist.

I have, however, summarised Mr. Angell's argument because in its implied belief in the temporary and unessential nature of the State it is typical of the hostility to the State that underlies much modern thinking of an economic character.

It is in sympathy with that view of history which interprets all historical events as being the resultant pull of economic forces. This view in its extreme form suggests that all the facts about society are entirely and adequately explained by the working of economic law alone, political organisation being simply the result of the interplay of economic motives. If strictly held, this view renders political theory impossible.

The question that we have to ask is, whether given unlimited development of the economic activities of society, given unlimited growth in the scope and number of associations for economic and ethical purposes, there is still a place for the

State over and above these associations, which nothing short of the State can fill.

Now, as noticed above, it is the tendency of economic action to be blind. Two rather different things are signified by the epithet. First that economic action is concerned with individual ends, and not with the ends of society as a whole. Secondly that the results of economic action though they affect society as a whole, are not willed by society or by any individual. This apparent paradox arises as follows. Assuming the principle of free will for individuals we may say that deliberation and choice in economic matters fall within the sphere of the individual's initiative. The individual cannot, however, choose the results of the actions he has willed. These results affect society as a whole, so that although the general conditions of Society at any moment are the result of the ways in which numbers of individuals have willed and chosen, they are themselves not chosen by individuals or by society, for society as a whole cannot choose. An instance will make the point clearer.

As a result of the shortage of foodstuffs that occurred during the war, the prices of commodities rose. People deprecated this and complained that prices did not go down. They wanted, for instance, cheap sugar, and hearing a rumour that at a certain shop sugar was being sold at less than the prevailing rate, besieged the shop in a mob to obtain sugar cheaply. As a result of the demand,

the sugar either went up in price or was sold out ; the result which was the exact contrary of what each individual had willed, being at the same time the direct outcome of their combined willing.

Similarly, the economic conditions of society are the accumulated results of individual actions, but they are not willed by individuals. Thus the appearance of necessity in economic action arises from the fact that the final outcome of the action of individuals is outside the control of any individual. It is in fact characteristic of the action of the individual that the effects of his action go out beyond what the individual himself has willed. His will and knowledge are always more limited than his effective environment.

It is because of this fact, because the general social conditions any particular action will tend to create are hidden from its author, because in fact economic action is blind, that political action becomes necessary. It is the function of political action vested in the State to check the blind results of economic action.

This function will always remain. As human organisation becomes more economic in structure, as society becomes in consequence more closely interrelated and individuals more dependent one upon another, as people act more from economic motives than from motives of habit and custom, the function of the State in this connection becomes increasingly important. It is only in developed societies that economic law is impor-

tant, and for this reason the economic reading of history is valueless as applied to societies like that of the Greeks, which were based mainly on habit and custom. The circumstances which rendered necessary the passing of the Factory Acts form a good example of the way in which the State can and must step in to check the effects of purely economic actions on the part of individuals, and as individual action becomes more prevalent, political action becomes more important. The necessity for the Factory Acts invalidated once and for all that particular form of individualism which is most favourable to economic action. The political theory of the Manchester Radicals, inspired by Bentham and Mill, was in brief that each individual could be trusted to look after his own interests and welfare better than anyone else, and that in consequence it was not the business of the State to interfere as between individuals. This position rests upon two assumptions, if it is to claim for itself fairness for all, and not irresponsibility for the few; it assumes (1) that each individual has an equal opportunity and equal power of choice, and (2) that each individual is equally far-sighted and has equal power of giving effect to his choice. Taken together these assumptions involve that the proposition, "each individual is capable of looking after his own interests," means the same thing for each person.

As a fact neither assumption is correct. Owing to the difference between their economic circum-

stances people have different ranges of choice, and so different powers of choice. As a general rule we choose our great men from about one fifth of the population from the mere circumstance that the other four-fifths have not the opportunity of showing whether they have it in them to be great or not. Secondly people see the results of their actions in very different degrees, no man being able to see all the results of any particular action, and all men being able to see some of them.

As a result it was found that owing to the inferiority of their powers of choice and foresight, the many came to be exploited by the few in the interests, not of the many or of the community at large, but of the few, and at this stage the State was compelled to step in and check by political legislation the blind results of economic action, e.g., the sweating of small children in factories. The necessity for the Factory Acts showed in short, that co-operation for economic purposes among members of a society, although not necessarily a co-operation of the whole society, has results which affect the whole society. These effects are only partially seen, and are never willed, and it is to minimise and check such effects on society as a whole that political action is necessary.

Political action, then, as opposed to economic action, is concerned with the good of society as a whole. It is not, therefore, concerned directly with economic action, which is the business of individuals as individuals, but with the effects of eco-

nomic action. It is obvious that the blindness of the effects of economic action must leave a good deal to be put right in society. For this purpose it is necessary (1) to control the economic actions of all the members of society by a will more enlightened than the will of individuals, and (2) to make men act in ways which are other than economic. The necessary action can only be performed by the State. It may be performed either by the appeal to the individual not to act in certain ways because the controlling will foresees that the effect will be bad for society as a whole, or by organising governmental action of the kind exemplified by the Factory Acts, compelling people thereby to act from the point of view of the good of society instead of pursuing the action which purely economic motives would dictate. The possibility of action under either (1) or (2) and the control or compulsion such action implies is only conditioned by the capacity of individuals for thinking politically, that is by recognising the interests of society at large.

Hence the necessity for the State which has more insight than any economic association and has also a common purpose arising from its concern with society as a whole. The State in fact is concerned, and is necessarily concerned with the results to the community as a whole of the economic action of certain members of it, and as the State is the only body interested in the good of society as a whole, the ultimate necessity for the con-

tinuance of the State is only reinforced by the prospect of the increasing importance of economic action.

The position of the State with regard to associations for ethical purposes is not dissimilar. In questions of ethics and conduct State action is important in two ways.

(1) We have indicated above the importance which has now come to be attributed to spontaneity and freedom of thought in ethical matters. This recognition of the importance of individual thinking is due very largely to the fact that all important advances in religion and morals have been made by individuals. But from the very circumstance that the individual minds which are concerned with the discovery and propagation of moral and religious truths, are not the minds which achieve greatness in economics and politics, and are frequently not the minds which accept the State sanctioned code of their particular period, there springs a latent opposition between ethical teachers and the State. New religions are often disruptive of existing codes. The religious teacher is concerned mainly with voicing the needs of his soul, and these are frequently not in harmony with what the prudences of society demand at the moment. Hence arises a tendency to opposition between the freedom of individual thought and the forces which hold society together. It is now agreed that it is not the business of the State to interfere with such freedom of thought. It is

sometimes concerned, as in economic action, with its effects.

The effects of the individual's teaching and example go out far beyond him, affect the conduct of men whom he may never know, and result perhaps in lines of conduct of which he would be the first to disapprove. The fact that he may be ignorant of the effects of his teaching on society does not however, mean that the State may remain indifferent to them. Once again the individual's will is more limited than his effective environment, and for this reason and in this sense the effects of ethical teaching may be blind, just as the effects of economic action may be blind. Ethical teaching may in fact be regarded from a double point of view, from the extent to which it satisfies the ideals of the individual, and from its effect upon the lives and conduct of others. The second is its social aspect, and because that effect may be unintended, subversive and anti-social, it is the business of the State to check possibly undesirable manifestations of it.

(2) Secondly it is a commonplace that the good and cultured life is only possible in certain environments. The presence of the burglar in quest of silver spoons constitutes a menace to fine thinking. Philosophy cannot flourish in an atmosphere of violence. The good life involves an assumption on the part of the liver of that life that others will behave with a minimum of decency towards him, it involves in fact a feeling of trustworthiness, since

the better people are the greater the opportunity they afford to others to profit by their goodness and at their expense. In this sense all evil is parasitic upon the good. To ensure that minimum of conduct on the part of all the members of society, which is the condition of the good life for those who wish to live it, is the business of the State.

In every community there exists a number of unrepresentative anti-social individuals whose depredations would, if unchecked, abolish the security necessary for soul development, mind culture, and money making on the part of the majority of the citizens. It is the State's business to prevent such persons becoming parasitic upon society. This it does by means of law. Law is concerned, not as the Greeks thought to promote the good life as envisaged by the law-giver for the individual, by obedience to the law, but to maintain that background of security, that minimum of decent behaviour on the part of all, which is the condition of the good life on the part of some.

Now the standard of behaviour so required by law is an empirical standard. It is continually changing, and on the whole its tendency is to improve, becoming higher as the general moral sense of the community progresses.

As conditions change more rapidly and the conceptions of the good life held by different individuals become more diverse and more elaborate the function of the State in making the laws neces-

sary to condition the pursuit of those conceptions becomes more important.

The modern theory that it is the business of the Government continually to make new laws is an entirely fresh conception in political philosophy. Each political party that is responsible for the formation of a new Government is elected on a definite programme of new laws which it proposes to make. The State is no longer a statically administrative body. As conditions change, and change mainly from economic causes, it must pass laws to check the blind effects of those changes on individuals. As the moral sense of the community progresses it must make laws to interpret the progress by imposing a higher standard of minimum conduct upon individuals. Thus in both the economic and the ethical sphere the State is concerned with the general background or conditions of the actions appropriate to those spheres. It is interested therefore in the effects of actions rather than in actions themselves.

In economics and in ethics individuals will choose for themselves the individuals with whom they desire to co-operate. The effects of their actions, however, pass beyond the horizon of their immediate vision, and affect others of whom they have no knowledge, and with whom they do not desire to co-operate. However embracing economic and ethical associations may become, however much they may occupy the forefront of the individual's mind, the function of the State in organising the

relations of people who do not stand in personal relations to one another must subsist.

Ethical and economic action is the concern of sections of the community who choose to act together for ethical or economic purposes. Political action is the concern of and concerned with every member of the community. For this reason the State or political form of association based on territorial divisions must always survive as a necessary form of organisation on whatever lines society may develop. Society cannot be resolved either into a number of economic associations bound together by considerations of what pays them, or into ethical groups who find a communion in the worship of God or the cultivation of their souls.

Having said so much with regard to the permanence of the function of the State in society, it is necessary to revert to the position from which this chapter started, and to urge that the practical danger is not that the State should be squeezed out, and its functions atrophy, but that it should usurp a power over the lives of individuals which has no part in its necessary function. The real danger is that the State, by a judicious practice of the German philosophy we have described, should so far aggrandise its power as to assume control of the forefront of the individual's life instead of guaranteeing its background. This would constitute a serious inversion of values. The State was made for man, and not man for the State. Individuals form a

State for their own purposes, and in this fundamental sense the State must always remain their servant. As Glaucon points out at the beginning of the "Republic," individuals came into the State for security, and the State is therefore in a sense based on force, just as in another sense it is based on consent. The danger is that it should so use this force as to destroy the security which the force has been given it to guarantee.

The element of force in the State, although necessary, is subsidiary. It is not true, as Glaucon urges, that every man is by nature anxious to do injustice to his fellows, and that therefore morality public and private is only maintained by force. Force is necessary, not as against our fellows as a whole, but against an unrepresentative few of them. Why, said Hobbes, who was anxious to prove the conventionality of all morality, and the consequent need of a strong Government to repress the natural predatory instinct of man, why do we all shut our doors and lock up our safes at night unless it is that we know that our neighbours would otherwise steal our belongings? The answer is that we shut our doors and lock up our safes, not against our neighbours as a whole, but against the anti-social few whose amorality is, as explained above, parasitic upon the good.

It is the existence of such persons in every State that necessitates the provision of force, and the law of the land will only be obeyed by them if there is force to back it. But this is an entirely

different thing from saying that force is what maintains morality in the community, or that the State may use the force which has been placed at its disposal to make the community obey laws against its will.

Yet this is the use to which force may legitimately be put on the Absolutist theory of the State. For this is the logical outcome of Mr. Bosanquet's proposition that in times of stress "the State. . . will suspend or subject to conditions any form of intercourse between its members and persons or associations within or without its territory, and will require any service that it thinks fit from any of its members." The use of force, if such services are withheld, is justified, apparently on the ground that the maintenance of the State is *the* thing of paramount importance. "What it permits," continues Mr. Bosanquet, "it permits by reason of its end, viz., the maintenance of individual rights." We might urge that the happiness of individuals transcends even the importance of the State which is, after all, only maintained for their welfare, and that this happiness is more directly secured by a refusal on the part of the State to coerce its members, than by the State's use of force against them on the ground that it is only performing its functions of maintaining their rights. But no State can, in the long run, coerce an unwilling society. There always comes a point when people are prepared to die rather than submit to coercion ; the right to revolt remains ; and one of the dangers

of the practice of Absolutism is the provocation it gives to violent and catastrophic revolutions, as the only means left to individuals to escape coercion.

In the long run the functions of the State can, only be limited by the moral sense of the community. The social sense of people produced the State ; their moral sense continues it, and it is to this moral sense that we are bound to turn for a judgment on the State's exercise of power. It is this fact which above all others is borne out by the lesson of the "Republic." Thrasymachus maintains that justice is the interest of the stronger, and asserts that provided that a ruler is clever and strong enough to commit successful injustice on an extensive scale he will obtain for himself all the material goods of life, and the reputation of being a just man into the bargain. Glaucon and Adeimantus elaborate the argument ; every man, were he guaranteed immunity from the consequences of injustice, as for instance by invisibility, would naturally pursue injustice. Even the gods can be squared, and the payment of conscience money in the shape of the endowment of churches and public libraries will guarantee him as much happiness in the world to come as his successful injustice has secured for him in this life. Socrates is then challenged to prove the essential superiority of justice to injustice, both being stripped of appearances and pursued for themselves alone.

His reply to the challenge is to construct the

ideal State, in which the workings of justice are seen pure and unalloyed, moulding the relationship between rulers and ruled, and reigning supreme in the soul of each of the citizens. In the last event, however, it is recognised and implicitly admitted by Socrates that the superiority of the just State over the unjust State cannot be demonstrated by reason alone. Having perfected his State he says in effect, "In answer to your challenge I have idealised justice, and constructed a State in which it attains perfect and complete manifestation. Do you not see this to be better than Thrasymachus' picture of rulers pursuing their own expediency and getting their course of action called justice? If you do not, I have no more to say except that your failure to recognise the superiority proves you to be devoid of the moral sense, and to that extent not wholly a man!"

It is to the moral sense, I am convinced, that we must look in the long run for condemnation of the traditional theory of the State. The reaction against this theory described above, intellectualist as it may be in method and appearance, is based upon a feeling of moral repugnance at the chaos to which the aggrandisement of the State has brought the world. This aggrandisement has resulted in the creation of a false scale of values, a scale of values deliberately cultivated and explicitly recognised by German philosophers, whereby the glory and power of the State is preferred to the happiness and safety of its component individuals.

"The law of Nature," said Locke, "willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind;" but the power which was given to the State to secure the peace of individuals has grown until it has become a menace instead of a safeguard.

If the principle which brought men into society for security be followed to its logical conclusion, we shall, while retaining the State as an indispensable factor in the organisation of society, pass beyond it to the wider conception of Internationalism, which by abolishing the disputes between States will afford that security to the State, which the State was created to afford to individuals.

If the hypothetical State of Nature in which no individual had security against his fellows was intolerable, equally intolerable is the State of society in which no State has security against its fellow State. Once the principle that individuals form a society for security, and in so doing acknowledge a good which is other than and transcends their own good, be admitted, there is no logical reason why that society should stop short of the whole human race.

And to that instinct which gave rise to society, which prompted the amalgamation of individual plus individual into family, of family plus family into tribe, and tribe plus tribe into State, we may look to place the coping stone on the edifice by amalgamating nation plus nation into League of Nations. And to that instinct we may look

finally for a condemnation of that theory of the State which, by divesting the State of morality in its relations both with citizens and other States, renders such a League of Nations **impracticable**.

Chapter VII.

THOUGHT AND TEMPERAMENT

SOCRATES, as is well known, emphasised the importance of definition before discussion. "What is the good of talking about something if you do not clearly know what it is," said he, "for all your observations may really have been concerned with something different; but you would be unable to know this, as a man who set out to look for something without knowing what it was, would never be able to tell when he had found it."

Mr. Chesterton has made the same point apparently independently. Speaking of the use of the word progress he affirms that "by its very name it indicates a direction." A direction implies a goal. Unless, therefore, we have made up our minds to begin with where we are going, we cannot talk about progress, and indeed, on these grounds we cannot, for as to the ultimate aim of human society, or the ideal life for the individual, opinions are so divergent as to be chaotic.

Arguments like these are unfortunate for philosophers who have spent nearly three thousand years talking, and subsequently writing, about the Good, the Just, Reality, Knowledge and so forth, without ever being able to define even to their own satisfaction what they meant by the terms they were using.

However, they constitute a precedent which it will be convenient to follow in a discussion on

thought and temperament, especially if it be granted that one of the objects of such a discussion may be an attempt to arrive at a definition of the terms discussed, and that the discussion may not be wholly fruitless, even if the attempt fails.

The practice of the poet too may be cited as a parallel, for the poet, who may be before composition entirely ignorant of the nature of the poem he intends to compose and so, in Mr. Chesterton's terminology, uncertain of his direction and his goal, may nevertheless legitimately apply the term progress to his efforts when the outline, or, it may be, the preliminary stanzas of his poem appear on paper.

The question of the influence of temperament on thought, which is what I propose to discuss, appears to have first assumed importance in modern philosophy owing to the writings of William James.

That such influence did exist, and that allowance must be made for it had always been recognised. There had always been a tendency, however, to rule it out of philosophical discussion, on the ground that pure thought as such was the only legitimate object of enquiry, and that in so far as thought was influenced by temperament it was to that extent not pure, and to that extent devoid of full significance. It is now, It hink, generally recognised that thought and temperament, instinctive attitude, inherited tendency, call it what you will, are so inseparably intermingled that there is no such thing as an act of pure intellectual appre-

hension, just as there is no such thing as a desire entirely devoid of any intellectual element.

That a distinction does exist between them, namely, the common distinction that thought is universally the same, and that temperaments are individual and different, is assumed equally to be valid, and is an assumption which will be taken for granted in this essay.

Of all the divisions that have been made of the human race into two classes William James' is perhaps the most successful. It is in the main a mental one. He distinguishes two philosophic types, the "tender-minded" and the "tough-minded."

The "tender-minded" are "rationalistic, intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic, and dogmatical."

The "tough-minded" are "empiricist, sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, sceptical." The gist of this distinction is, that the sort of creed you hold, the philosophic school you belong to, the view you take in purely intellectual matters, is to some extent conditioned by your character as a whole, and by your general outlook on life intellectual, emotional and instinctive. Certain types of view go with certain types of mind, and not only of mind but of character, and from your knowledge of the sort of man "A" is you can often predict fairly accurately the sort of opinions "A" will hold.

The fact that such a prediction can be made is of the greatest significance as regards the closeness of the relation between temperament and thought, and in particular, as indicating the influence of the first upon the second.

I hope to make the point clearer by some instances.

It is a well-known fact that nature exhibits both what is called design and lack of design. On the one hand we have multitudinous facts which lend support to the design theory. The maternal instinct is strongest when the offspring is weakest. Those flowers which can only be fertilised by the transference of the pollen from the male to the female flower are also most attractive to bees. Herodotus observed as a dual phenomenon that dangerous animals, such as the serpent, bring forth infrequently and with difficulty, but that the hare, which is preyed upon by all the other beasts, is defenceless, and provides adequate nourishment for the most varied tastes, has numerous offspring with the greatest facility. All these phenomena point to design in the plan of the Universe, and a Divine Intelligence planning and guiding the whole can be, and is, inferred from them.

A lack of design is, however, equally apparent if we look for it. A German writer, Lange, compared the workings of Nature to the actions of a man who, wishing to shoot a hare in a certain field, procured a thousand guns, surrounded the

field, and caused them all to be shot off, or, desiring a house to live in, built a whole town, and abandoned to decay all the houses except one. Rain spoils the farmer's crops, and the mutual relations of animals to one another produce an impression of the grossest cruelty and injustice. From such phenomena it is a possible inference either that the Universe is entirely mindless, as Mr. Hardy sometimes appears to think, or that God, if there is one, is a malignant practical joker who created its anomalies solely for the amusement of contemplating them.

The interesting point is that where the tough-minded and the tender-minded man are presented with precisely the same phenomena as in the present instance, they will base opposite conclusions upon them, these conclusions being apparently dictated entirely by differences in the nature of the men who form them.

This result appears to be due to the different aspects of the phenomena under observation, to which different men will direct their attention according to their temperaments. Thus, while a devout Wesleyan will deduce from a still summer's evening of surpassing beauty evidence pointing to the power and goodness of God who created it, Mr. Hardy is primarily attracted by the "cry of some small bird that was being killed by an owl in the adjoining wood," from which the undrawn inference of the cruelty of the spirit, if any, behind nature is equally apparent.

To many minds the appearance of flowers in early spring is an occasion for gladness, and a source of renewed hope in the signs of Nature's renewed life. Strindberg, however, finds his attention directed to other aspects of the same phenomenon. "Spring had come," he says, "the windows of the flower shops glowed with azaleas, and half-starved children were selling little bunches of liverwort in the street."

Thus the tender-minded man can find evidence for the beliefs to which his temperament predisposes him, just as the tough-minded man is furnished by the same material with matter for his contrary views. Temperament governs our attention. According to temperament we lay emphasis on different aspects of the same phenomena, and upon the aspects so selected our intellectual creed is founded. So that if temperament conditions selection, and selection intellectual conclusion, it may be asserted that in this respect at least thought is influenced by temperament.

Another striking instance of the way in which the formation of opposing intellectual creeds upon the same data has been largely influenced by what I have ventured to call the temperaments of the people concerned, is afforded by the circumstances involved in the rise of Theosophy.

Mrs. Besant draws a vivid picture of the thorough overhauling of religious beliefs occasioned by the discoveries of science in the eighteen-seventies.

Comparative mythology had revealed the fact that all the great religions which had existed embodied precisely the same truths with regard to their most salient features. Differences were confined to accidental and irrelevant divergencies of dogma. Science had recently discovered its "Open Sesame" of Evolution. Transfer its application from man's body to man's beliefs, and the phenomena revealed by comparative mythology are explained. Religion has evolved. As civilisation advanced religion became more elaborate. Its germ however remained the same. By the process of Evolution, "the medicine men of savages had been glorified into the founders of religions : the teachings of Saints and Prophets were the refining of the hysterical babblings of half epileptic visionaries ; the synthesis of natural forces—a synthesis wrought out by man's splendid intellect—had been emotionalised into God." Here was a situation, as a result of which, even if religion as such was not discredited, yet all religions were put on an equal basis, and the devotees of each must contemplate the overthrow of their special Deity from his pedestal, and be prepared to recognise the claims of rival creeds. Assuming these scientific and critical discoveries to be valid, two positions now became logically possible to those who tried to accommodate religion within their framework. Granted that there was no one true religion, one might hold that all religions were true, or one might hold that all religions were false.

And this development did in point of fact take place. From the eighteen-seventies we can trace the beginnings of Theosophy, and the growth of Agnosticism. The Agnostics asked what man could know beyond what his senses could discover, or his intellect grasp, and insisted that all religions must remain false unless they could be proved true. The Theosophist pointed to the demonstrable fact that intellect and the senses had reduced religion to chaos, affirmed the validity of the testimony of the spirit, and asserted that, in a spiritual sense, all religions were true in so far as each embodied a different stage in the revelation of the one truth or body of truths.

If we now put the question, what was it that, abstracting all other irrelevant considerations as one might do in a novel, determined in the face of precisely the same scientific and critical data, whether a man would cleave to Agnosticism or Theosophy, the answer is his temperament. If tender-minded, he sided with Theosophy and belief, if tough with Agnosticism and doubt.

From a consideration of these and numerous other instances the following truth appears to emerge. Two men are faced with the same phenomena upon which conclusions are to be formed. The conclusions arrived at are often divergent and may be contradictory. All sorts of causes, such as those of environment, circumstance and upbringing may operate to effect the divergence, but it is often

due largely, and sometimes wholly, to temperament alone.

If this conclusion be thought disturbing to our predilection that reason is, or should be free, the answer is that in most of its operations and over by far the largest fields of its activity, it is not free, and has not been considered so.

We are, for instance, confronted historically with two main positions as to the function of reason in moral philosophy. Aristotle, who was tough-minded, and not sentimental about reason, held it to be the slave of the desires ; Kant, who was presumably tender-minded, held that it dictated to them. For Aristotle desire both set the end of life and formulated the multitudinous individual ends which we pursue day by day. It was the business of reason acting subservient to this dictation to discover the steps by which these individual ends, and the end of life in general could be attained. For Kant, reason was free, and we only acted freely when obeying its dictates in opposition to those of the passions ; but Aristotle's has been perhaps the predominant tradition in moral philosophy, and with regard to most of the operations of reason there seems to be little doubt that Aristotle was right.

If reason acts mainly as the handmaid of desire we cannot say that we will think this or think that. What precisely we do think depends in a large degree upon our temperaments, the machinery of interaction being, as suggested above, the selec-

tion by reason according to our temperaments of different aspects of a given whole as the material upon which reason forms her conclusions.

The fact that our convictions, formed as many of them are in virtue of our temperaments, are not matters of free will, is the root justification of toleration, and freedom from persecution in religious matters. For our religious convictions are in a pre-eminent degree dependent upon temperament, belief being a highly composite affair, including many elements besides the purely rational, and as a rule requiring some quality of enthusiasm as an ingredient which is associated less frequently with scepticism. A fanatical or persecuting Agnostic, though a possible phenomenon, is a rare one.

The case of mysticism sets forth the matter in the plainest light. It is, I think, generally recognised that mysticism pre-supposes a peculiar kind of temperament rather than a peculiar set of intellectual convictions. The mystic, like the ascetic, is always thought of as being such and such a man, rather than as holding such and such beliefs. Mysticism involves a certain attitude towards things which are not capable of being either explained or understood. The matters with which mysticism is concerned cannot be either explained or understood simply because mysticism, if it could give an account of itself, would cease to be mysticism. But whereas the tender-minded will regard such matters as being above under-

standing, and therefore sacred, the tough-minded will regard them as being unfit for understanding, and therefore valueless. The tender-minded reveres what is beyond him, the tough denies it.

The tough-minded man calls everything to the bar of intelligence, and if it can give no account of itself, condemns it. He regards mysticism, Theosophy and all doctrines which make more demands upon a man's faith than upon his intelligence, as the resource of second-rate minds, which have been driven to shelter themselves behind bulwarks of dogma, as a protection from the assaults of their intellectual superiors in the open field. Finding that intellect is not their forte they cry "These grapes are sour," disclaim its sovereignty, and affirm that the most essential truths about life, God, immortality, and the nature of the Universe cannot be grasped by intellect at all. If this is the attitude of the tough-minded with regard to the Shibboleths of the tender-minded, the latter takes his revenge by pointing to the chaos of belief achieved by philosophy, and is almost inclined to say that the more you trust to intellect the further you drift from truth. For such a mind mysticism is the only salvation from the barren quibbles of logic, which by enabling you to prove everything, turns round in your hands, and ends in proving nothing; for the tough-minded it is God's last ditch, the barrier erected by the intellectually unfit to save their self-respect from the defeats administered to

orthodox religion by Evolution and the Higher Criticism.

The same divergence can be distinguished in the fundamental positions taken up by philosophers with regard to the ultimate constitution of the Universe and the significance of human consciousness upon it, positions which form the basis of clear cut intellectual creeds, such as those of Monism and Pluralism, but which are originally embraced from temperamental reasons.

William James speaks specifically of the clash between what he calls the cynical and the sympathetic temper, from which materialistic and spiritualistic philosophies are the rival types that result. The former defines the world, and feels no spiritual pang of loneliness at so defining it, as something in essence alien to human consciousness, which appears upon it purely as an incidental phenomenon, "a sort of outside passenger" without unique significance or participation in the real essence of the Universe. The world contains many different things, and human consciousness is just one of them, a mere eddy in the primæval slime, hence Pluralism. The latter "insists that the intimate and human must surround and underlie the brutal." The nature of reality must be something akin to human consciousness, from which it is but a step to say that all human consciousnesses are part of one another and of it, hence Monism.

It is in the light of these two attitudes, which

I claim are fundamentally matters of temperament, that we must interpret the different values commonly assigned to the religious experiences associated with what is called conversion. If we believe that our consciousness is continuous with a "more" of the same quality which is operative in the universe outside us, we shall insist on the real significance of these experiences as pointing to the directness of our connection, a significance which gives value and justification to religious conversions, and more especially of those religious conversions for which no rational ground can be given. *ἐνθουσίασμος* and *ἐκστασις* cease to be irrational babbling, and become the symbol and expression of the bond, to a knowledge of which we can never attain by reason alone, that links us to the guiding spirit of the Universe. It is in such experiences and in the parallel phenomena of artistic inspiration that, as James has pointed out, we can* find the most convincing evidence for the truth of Fechner's theories, and of Monism in general. "Why," he asks, "have philosophers always made the mistake of basing Monism on logical grounds only?" It may be remarked, however, as obvious, that if we do not happen to believe in the "more," *ἐνθουσίασμος* and *ἐκστασις*, religious and otherwise, remain just babblings, a mere material derangement of the nervous system of the nature of *πηρώσεις* and other Aristotelian phenomena.

These two fundamental attitudes are not so much a matter of intellectual conviction as of

general mental make-up, a make-up not devoid of emotional and temperamental elements. The spiritual attitude regards a Universe alien in structure, as intolerably lonely and hostile, and tends to endow it with something of its own nature for solace and, as it were, for spiritual company. The materialistic consciousness is not overwhelmed at the thought of its own insignificance in an alien world, stands bravely alone, makes much of its hardihood in facing unpalatable facts, and regards it as no intellectual gain to falsify them for the purpose of gaining emotional consolation. Thus William James regards the Absolute with its sense of all embracing intimacy, as a "large seaside boarding house with no private bedroom in which I might take refuge from the society of the place." It appears in fact that James did not logically convince himself on intellectual grounds that the doctrine of the Absolute was wrong, and then suddenly evolve these feelings of emotional antipathy to it. The antipathy was fundamental and original, and influenced his thought in the direction of finding intellectual reasons to justify it. It is not too much to say that the divergences of all our conclusions may be at bottom conditioned by the different selections of facts on which they are based, and though it may be arguable whether, were we all presented with the same factual data without power of selection from them, we should all hold the same views, there would be at least much more unanimity than there is under present conditions.

Our convictions, then, are formed by the intellect but they are formed upon emotional bases. It is matter for conjecture and ultimately for decision on temperamental grounds whether this enhances or invalidates their truth. M. Sabatier has written a book purporting to prove the existence of God. The religious sentiment is shown therein to be fundamental, and is traced through its evolutionary stages from witchcraft and devil worship to the refined and elaborate product of to-day. Most significant, he thinks, is the additional strength of the religious impulse, the craving for sympathy and the passionate desire to turn to an interested and personal God in times of trouble and distress. When our confidence in ourselves is least our confidence in God is greatest. Thus on purely emotional and sentimental phenomena is based an intellectual conviction that a personal God exists, the fact that our belief is grounded in emotion being held to add to its value and enhance its validity. God must be there, it is thought, or we should not all feel so strongly that He is there. The Agnostic will feel inclined to doubt this reasoning. Our emotional states may dictate our beliefs, he will say, but that does not prove them true. Belief in God is irrational, because it is founded on emotion. At most we can have a reasonable expectation that the assumption of a deity is the most probable explanation of certain material and psychological phenomena. The mere fact, he would say, that you are led to your

belief by the emotional comfort it affords should make you suspicious of its validity. Such a belief is open to the same kind of suspicion as that which attaches to the smoker's cherished conviction that tobacco ash is good for the carpet.

Once again the tough dissents from the tender-minded, in his interpretation of the same phenomena, the phenomena about which they differ being in this case concerned with the very matter of which we are treating, namely, the significance of thought which is influenced and dictated by emotion. Whereas the tender-minded man considers on the whole that the value of such thought is enhanced, the tough holds that it is diminished. Unpalatable truths, he would maintain, are valuable, not so much because they are true, but because they are unpalatable ; yet even so they are far more likely to be true than palatable ones, for we tend to believe unpalatable truths because they are true, and palatable ones because they are pleasant. This insistence on the part of the toughminded on the more unpalatable aspects of truth will appear doubly striking when we come to consider the different attitudes of these two classes of temperament, in the sphere of what we may, for convenience, call Politics.

For the present, however, it is sufficient to note that, while our selection of facts is sentimental, the convictions we base upon them are intellectual, and this point is admitted as much by the tender as the tough. A few exceptional cases of inversion

only serve to prove the rule. It may be but a superficial observation, but it has been noted as a peculiarity of a well-known political economist that he is rational about his facts and sentimental about his conclusions. The meaning intended would appear to be that, while his premises were chosen and his deductions from them made with a scientific impartiality and mathematical precision that entirely disclaimed the warping influence of temperament or convenience, once those deductions were made and conclusions formed he developed a passionate attachment to them which savoured rather of the enthusiasm of the religious devotee than of the cold rationality by means of which he had been led to them. Many of us indeed are fanatical about our convictions, but that is because we are fanatical people. But that a man should conduct his researches in an impartial scientific spirit, carefully weighing all the evidence, balancing one hypothesis against another, proceeding by qualified assertions, statements of aspects of truth and reservations, neither inclining to believe conclusions true simply because they were pleasant and he wished them to be true, nor as a satirist, because they were unpleasant, and mankind hoped they were not true, that such a man should then invest the results he has arrived at with a firm and burning faith, claiming dogmatically for them an absolute certainty, and rejecting with scorn the least divergences in the conclusions of

others, is a curious phenomenon indeed, rare but not impossible ; it is, in fact, a process analogous to Plato's account of the rational steps of mathematical and logical probation by which we slowly and laboriously advance to an apprehension of the $\epsilon\delta\eta$, an apprehension which once achieved passes beyond the realms of reason, and becomes a thing of intuition and of faith, a divine revelation. The $\epsilon\delta\eta$ once known, doubts are done with. So with our modern economist. If an inversion of the principle suggested above, he is an inversion that helps to prove the principle.

If we turn to what I have for convenience described as the sphere of politics, the same principle seems to hold. In his book "Compromise," Viscount Morley instances as the fundamental characteristic of political thinking the sequence of convenience first, and truth second, just as the characteristic of religious thought is emotional comfort first, truth second. It is easy to point to the most obvious examples. It is, for instance, so pleasant and easy for the upper classes to believe Socialism impracticable, because it would, if practicable, be so inconvenient to them personally. It is equally pleasant and easy for the out of work or the clerk earning two pounds a week to believe in the equal distribution of property and a rigorous application of the theories of Marx, because it would be so convenient to him personally. That is why Socialism is, in the main, the creed of the lower classes and the intellectuals of the middle

classes who do not feel that under the present circumstances they are receiving the recognition that their abilities deserve. Such observations are trite to the point of platitudinousness.

Equally obvious is the historical use made of religion on the part of the rich to keep the poor in order, from the days of the mediæval priests who had a monopoly of knowledge to the days of religious workers in the slums, who have a monopoly of beneficence. Most of the rationalists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were academic people whose books were too difficult or too dull to command a popular circulation. Excepting Woolston they escaped unpunished. But Peter Annett, a schoolmaster who tried to popularise free thought and held forth on the village green, was sentenced to the pillory and hard labour in 1763. "If we take the cases in which the civil authorities have intervened to repress the publication of orthodox opinions during the last two centuries," says Mr. Bury, "we find that the object has always been to prevent the spread of freethought among the masses." This amounts to a statement that the intellectual conviction that a personal and partially revealed deity is the most probable explanation of the phenomena of the Universe is, if true, not true for all minds and for all people. It is true for the minds of people with empty pockets, but open to doubt by the minds of people with full ones. A further point to be borne in mind is that the

temperament developed by an undue share of the seamy side of this life in the poor man makes him particularly inclined to that view of the universe which provides him with a divine consoler of his sorrows and a divine adjuster of his grievances in the next. Thus, if it is expediency on the part of the rich which makes them believe religion to be true for the poor, it is temperament on the part of the poor which makes them believe it to be true for rich and poor alike.

The prime instance of what we have in mind, the effect of emotion upon intelligence in wartime is too obvious to call for comment. Of all the parallel cases of its kind historically recorded, the intellectual volte face in the English estimate of German scholarship and culture will surely stand out as immeasurably the most startling. The German intellectual method in matters of learning and scholarship, the German patience in scientific and literary criticism, the profundity of German thought in matters of Philosophy, were before the war the theme of ungrudging admiration among English savants. Within the space of two years we have discoverd innumerable defects in the German method, and have stripped the gilt from numberless exploded reputations. We have found that Wagner is the musical embodiment of a ruthless and chaotic militarism, that Nietzsche's philosophy is the incoherent babbling of a dyspeptic megalomaniac, that Hegel is the apostle of a monstrous and repellent state,

which makes insatiable demands upon the lives of its individuals, sacrifices happiness to efficiency, and liberty to a false deification of discipline and order. Only those Germans who are sufficiently separated from the emotional condemnations of to-day by the lapse of over a century—Kant and Beethoven—escape the universal disparagement. These are intellectual judgments that we pass, and we are not concerned here to weigh them as right or wrong ; only be it noted they are the direct outcome of feeling engendered by the war, and immeasurably disparate from their predecessors of four years ago.

If we have been dealing in these instances with the effect rather of expediency and emotion than of what is thought of as distinctively temperament upon the intellect, there is no lack of evidence for the influence of the latter even in the forming of political judgments. Mr. W. S. Gilibert has crystallised a truth into his notorious remark as to the natal proclivities of infants to Liberalism or Conservatism, a remark which has become a proverb. The still more pointed contrast between the mental outlook of the ardent young socialist and the experienced upholder of the *status quo* recalls in many of its aspects the distinction between tough and tender minds. The socialist is always discovering unpalatable facts derogatory to the present system. The Conservative is always for belittling their importance and doubting their application. The

Socialist would say that he deliberately shuts his mind to them. There are instances of minds so tender that they simply refuse to credit social phenomena the evidence for which rests upon the unimpeachable authority of Government blue books. An elderly gentleman, when faced with statistics showing that the infant mortality rate in a Blackburn slum was proportionately more than twice as great as that in a fashionable London suburb, said simply, "I can't believe it," a disclaimer based not so much on real suspicion of the evidence as on the disabilities of his mind, under the warping influence of his temperament. It simply would not allow him to admit the existence of things so contrary to its tenderest beliefs.

It is conceivable that, reason as such being uniform, the deliverances of unbiased reason upon identical phenomena would also be uniform; this, of course, presuming we could confine reason in a watertight compartment and regard its action as isolated. The existence of controversy and differences of opinion would then be sufficiently accounted for merely by the influence of temperamental and emotional factors upon it. In the last satire of Gulliver, Swift gives us a picture of equine perfection and unanimity which is guided by reason alone, *i.e.*, reason unwarped by temperament.

"Neither is reason among them," he says, speaking of the *Houyhnhnms*, "a point problematical

as among us where men can argue with plausibility on both sides of a question, but strikes you with immediate conviction, as it must needs do where it is not mingled, obscured, or discovered by passion and interest. I remember that it was with extreme difficulty that I could bring my master to understand the meaning of the word 'opinion,' or how a point could be disputable, because reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain, and beyond our knowledge we cannot do either."

This leads us to a consideration of that branch of knowledge and that kind of reasoning which appears to be mainly, if not wholly, exempt from the influence of temperament.

It would appear that in the forefront of such knowledge we must place mathematical truths. The conviction that the proposition two plus two makes four is true is an intellectual conviction, and apparently unanimously subscribed to by people of every kind of temperament. All purely mathematical truths appear to be of this kind deriving the unanimity with which they are embraced from the fact that it is not possible for the human mind to conceive them to be otherwise. The apprehension of most scientific truths which are formed by generalisation upon a number of instances, such as the law of gravitation, also appears to come under this category. The same holds true of certain moral truths, i.e., those that are concerned with classes of actions.

Although there is the greatest divergence as to the rightness or wrongness of actions in particular instances, as for example whether one ought to tell this particular lie in these particular circumstances, a question which may very frequently be decided in accordance with temperamental considerations, the tough-minded man tending to decide by utilitarian criteria and the tender to insist on following what he calls his intuitions, and to ignore the consequences, we all agree to condemn lying generally as wrong.

It may well be that all the occupations which may or have been ascribed to an omnipotent mind are exempt from temperamental influences. Thus Aristotle regards mathematics as pre-eminently the object of contemplation of $\delta\theta\epsilon\varsigma$, who is, according to his view, non-temperamental, and mathematics does seem to be pre-eminently the study, excellence or stupidity in which can be ascribed exclusively to excellence or deficiency in the reasoning faculty, and not to the warping or stimulating influence of any form of temperament whatsoever, excepting always the existence of that curiosity which is fundamentally at the root of any intellectual pursuit, and which even a mathematician cannot afford to be without.

Much controversy exists, as we have seen, both as to the nature and number of the Platonic $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$. While, however, Plato's belief in the Forms of hair and mud is a matter of dispute, there are certain $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$ as to the existence

of which there can no doubt be maintained continuous and unswerving allegiance. On reduction and exclusion of all doubtful cases these appear to be the $\epsilon\delta\sigma$ of Truth, the $\epsilon\delta\sigma$ of Beauty, and the $\epsilon\delta\sigma$ of Goodness. There was always something peculiar about these $\epsilon\delta\eta$ such that the transcendentalising of them does not appear to be nonsense, but, granting their existence, a not improbable fact. It may of course be coincidence, but these $\epsilon\delta\eta$ appear to be set over against just those activities of the mind which have seemed to us to be exempt from temperamental influence. We may differ, as pointed out above, in the degree of our appreciation of sunsets, but there is no recorded instance of a civilised man who did not think sunsets beautiful.

This peculiarity of our mental attitudes towards the $\epsilon\delta\eta$ of truth, beauty and goodness is usually expressed by saying that these concepts are not purely subjective. Something objective exists in these cases, of which appreciation may be full or meagre, but in so far as we are human beings at all we cannot fail to appreciate it in some degree, however minute. And this appreciation though the precise form it takes may be conditioned by our temperament, is not dependent for its existence upon it. Our appreciation of sunsets may be ecstatic or it may be tranquil ; that depends upon whether we are excitable or placid people ; but the existence of the appreciation of obvious beauty, just like the existence of the appre-

hension of obvious mathematical truth, appears to be unconditioned by temperamental considerations.

Can the same be said of philosophical thought? It would seem not. Our philosophical views appear to be distinguished from our mathematical knowledge, in that the former are views and open to dispute, while the latter is knowledge and not controverted. This distinction is mainly due to the difference between the objects studied.

The objects studied by mathematicians are in a sense abstractions. The integer two is arrived at originally by an abstraction from instances, e.g., two men, two ponies, two pineapples. In mathematics, however, we are occupied with The Two. In Philosophy we are concerned with The Two, and with the two men, the two ponies and the two pineapples, and the relations between them. We are concerned, in fact with everything, we contemplate life itself.

Now our attitude to life in general is a different thing from our intellectual apprehension of the functions and powers of certain unchangeable realities. Our attitude to life in general embraces all our faculties, and includes among other things that intellectual contemplation of our attitude to life which is the main subject of this chapter. Unlimited possibilities of infinite regress here present themselves. Just as the most disturbing thing about being worried about yourself is the fact that you get worried about being worried about yourself, you

realise in fact that you have nerves, so the mere fact of recognising that you possess an attitude towards life leads to speculation about that recognition, a speculation which is bound to some extent to be modified in its conclusions according to the nature of the attitude it studies. The experiences of an ascetic hermit are plainly different from those of a prosperous merchant. Contemplation by each of his experiences must necessarily lead to different views as to the aims of life and the object and nature of the Universe. The ascetic, contemplating his experience, concludes that the appetites are unimportant but that the control of them is important. The business man, in so far as he contemplates himself at all, tends on the whole to arrive at the opposite conclusion. The Universe can, in fact, only be interpreted through the medium of our own experience of it; our experiences are largely conditioned by our temperaments, which have led us to choose them, and our intellectual creed, which is leavened by the material of experience upon which it is formed, indirectly reflects the temperament which is responsible for the material.

Hence the controversial nature of Philosophy and the uncertainty of its results. Kant remarks in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that Philosophy is distinct from the sciences, inasmuch as steady progress and definite incontrovertible results are attained in mathematics and physics,

while the history of Philosophy is the history of marches and counter-marches, of systems elaborately built up only to be knocked down by their authors' successors, and of controversy which rages around the validity of hypotheses, inferences and conclusions alike.

It has been pointed out that several causes contribute to this result. But while the fact that directly a speculation changes its character of speculation and becomes knowledge it ceases to be Philosophy, and the peculiar and all embracing nature of its subject matter have undoubtedly contributed largely to the uncertainty of philosophical thought, it is clear that the temperaments of the various thinkers have had an equally potent influence in bringing about the diversity of their conclusions.

If we consider the broad distinction noticed above between tough and tender types of thinking in its relation to specifically philosophical thought, it seems to express itself in the tendency to divide and draw distinctions between things on the one hand, and to lump them together and assimilate them on the other. To put the same proposition shortly, we may say that tender-minded people are chiefly concerned with the likenesses between things, and tough-minded people with their differences.

One of the best examples of this distinction is given by the different methods continuously employed by Plato and Aristotle.

Plato is always looking for the common elements in things, the qualities of likeness that connect them, and so we have the theory of the $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$. There is further a tendency to emphasise the common attributes of the $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$ of sensible things, hair, horses, mud, and so forth, and of the $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$ of so called abstract qualities, such as beauty and goodness.

Aristotle's criticism consists almost entirely of pointing out radical differences in the natures of the things Plato has lumped together, asserting that a conclusion which holds as regards some of them, e.g., goodness and beauty, does not apply equally to all, e.g., hair and mud. As an instance of this he notices, as we have seen, that the relation between certain of the $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$ and their particulars is that of participation, while in other cases it is much more properly one of $\mu\iota\mu\eta\pi\iota\sigma$.

Plato, however, has suggested that the relation is in all cases the same.

In the same strain is Aristotle's anxiety about definitions, and his unvarying habit of distinguishing different types and kinds of various phenomena before he proceeds to consider the phenomena themselves. Plato, by ignoring differences as irrelevant, endeavours to bring all the variety of the worlds of sense and thought under a few comprehensive formulæ. Aristotle by insisting on differences largely multiplies the number of formulæ and reduces their application.

That is why his Philosophy appears on the surface so much more variegated and elaborate, so much more a matter of rules and formulæ, with qualities, attributes and phenomena each ticketed and placed in its proper pigeon hole, than that of Plato.

Spinoza's insistence on the oneness of the source of diversity, stamps him as tender-minded. Berkeley's simplification of the Universe into notions and ideas in the mind of God, places him in the same category. Locke, on the other hand, with his complicated modes was tough-minded. Speaking generally, Monists exhibit to-day the tendency to ignore differences, to emphasise likenesses and so to infer a homogeneous source or indivisible constitution of the Universe ; while Pluralists, insisting that the diversity of things is of more significance than their unity, assert the individuality and distinctness of minds and objects as against the Universe which contains them ; just as in Political Philosophy they tend to uphold the rights and independence of the individual as against the State, tender-minded persons being inclined on the whole to the Hegelian view of the State and the machinery of State Socialism. For in the age-long quarrel between the State and the individual it is to be noted that the upholders of the former, emphasising the common or social qualities among persons, insist on the assimilability of all to one form of Government for all, while their opponents, being concerned more with

the idiosyncracies and differences of people, tend to demand a degree of freedom from State control, in which the individual may find room to develop as far as is compatible with the safety of society the peculiarities which distinguish his personality. The Philosophic Radicals were essentially tough-minded.

Mr. Russell may be taken as the type of the tough-minded school to-day. His philosophy is based on distinctions ; distinctions between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, vicious and harmless kinds of infinite regress, knowledge and probable belief, the nature of a thing and the truths about a thing, series finite and infinite, relations symmetrical and asymmetrical, data hard and soft, aggregates and wholes. Mr. Bradley on the other hand is essentially tender-minded.

If any degree of truth can be claimed for the foregoing arguments, if it is really true that what we think is largely conditioned by what we feel, if our views of truth, rightness and justice are frequently and largely dependent upon inborn peculiarities of temperament, the case for toleration, always strong, is tremendously strengthened. We can say we will do this or we will do that, remarks Mr. Shaw, but we cannot say that we will like doing this or like doing that, that in fact, we will feel like this or feel like that. If then our feelings are beyond our control, so to a large extent are our views. Consequently we should extend

the widest toleration to apparently wrong-headed people who disagree with us, on the ground that they are not responsible for their apparent wrong-headedness. They are not responsible, not on deterministic but on temperamental grounds. We shall not say, it was fated he should think so and so, but he is the sort of man who necessarily would think so and so.

It may be that every man's temperament naturally fits him for such and such a one particularly, of all the intellectual beliefs of his age (or at any rate of some age), so that if we could imagine all the various attitudes to every controversial question of the day, moral, political, religious and scientific, every question upon which, if a man thinks at all he must necessarily take up some attitude, exhibited for inspection as it were at a sale, practically every man would find one, at least, to fit his temperament like a glove. Those who do not are geniuses who think in advance of their time and consequently unpopular. They create opinions instead of adopting them.

Hence the enormous importance of allowing every child and man access to every kind of literature, that he may find at last that view of life to which his own temperament predisposes him, and may thereafter specialise in his special intellectual department. And finally that is why persecution and intolerance, unwise and unjust upon any view, take on a fresh aspect of evil on this and become irrational also.

All persecution, it is not too much to say all propaganda, arises from the curious inability of the human mind to think anything by itself. Directly we hold a belief to be true we desire to communicate it to others, directly we think such and such things desirable we endeavour to make others think them desirable also. The inventor who has discovered a new method of cookery immediately bruits abroad his opinion that to cook in his way and no other is rational, and does not rest until he has persuaded others to agree with his opinion. The fanatic who thinks that God should be worshipped in one particular way and one only, is ready to roast or excommunicate whoever does not think likewise. The State Socialist who believes that maternity should be endowed continually publishes tracts with the object of making others share his opinion. If men originally desire originality it is only in order that their own originality may become universalised into orthodoxy. No man wishes to be original all by himself. It may be that this tendency arises from a sort of spiritual loneliness of the kind attributed to tender-minded philosophers above, which leads them to endow the Universe with a something not alien to their own consciousness. Just as man appears to be social politically he appears to be social mentally. No philosopher is really content with the conviction that he has found truth. He is lonely with truth and is not content until others share it. Hence propaganda, and, in extreme cases,

persecution. But once grant that our selection of truth is not free, but that our choice is conditioned in part by temperament, and the irrationality of endeavouring to make others see truth as we see it becomes overwhelmingly clear.

